Pakistan’s Afghan Dilemma-Dr Hamid Hussain

 

I have summarized some recent conversations about Pakistan's Afghan policy and possible scenarios.  Our views are shaped by our own experiences and biases and mine are based on my own interaction with a number of people of different backgrounds.  It is more focused on Pakistan army; my own area of interest.  Two anecdotes may help to understand some background of shaping of my own views about the subject.  One was interaction with an Afghan woman who had married an American.  Our conversation was general but she specifically addressed the issue of why she married a non-Muslim.  She had lived the horrors of intense civil war in Kabul in mid 1990s.  She and her sisters along with many other Afghan women went through hell fearing everyday of being raped.  This is the most shameful episode of Afghan history which no Afghan wants to talk about.  Rape was used as a weapon by all factions.  She told me that 'I have married this man because he was the first male in my life who gave me respect'. 

 

Second encounter was with a Pushtun soldier who served with 3^rd Commando Battalion in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971.  He is from a small village with education not beyond eighth grade.  When he was waiting to be airlifted from Karachi to Dacca, he got the news of death of his father.  He first thought of asking for leave to attend his father's funeral but dropped the idea as his comrades may think that he was trying to runaway from the battle.  He told me that 'I have not cried on the death of my father but twice in East Pakistan I cried.  First time was when during a search operation, a young Bengali girl ran out of her hut stark naked in hysterical fear.  She was probably taking a bath and getting scared ran out.  Second time was when the jeep I was travelling in got stuck behind a convoy of Bengalis running away from their homes with their meager belongings.  We could not stand non-stop shrieks of a woman which was piercing our ears.  I went to the cart and asked an elderly man why this woman was crying.  I was told that she was giving birth and had some complication and nobody knew what to do and they could not stop.  I cried on these two occasions with the thought that today this is happening to them, can this happen to my own people tomorrow?  I never thought I'll live to see this day but now I see hundreds of thousands of Pushtuns uprooted from their homes in Swat and tribal areas.'  

 

Food for thought for all of us from such encounters. 

 

Warm Regards,

Hamid

 

Pakistan's Afghan Dilemma

Hamid Hussain

 

'The desire to gain an immediate selfish advantage always imperils their ultimate interests.  If they recognize this fact, they usually recognize it too late'.  Reinhold Niebuhr

 

Pakistan and Afghanistan relations over the last six decades have evolved through complex domestic and international events.  In 1950s and 60s relations between the two countries were marred with friction over Afghanistan's claim of interest in Pushtun areas of Pakistan.  There were incidents of diplomatic point scoring as well as minor border skirmishes; however Pakistan's main concern was threat from India on eastern border.  Despite problems with Afghanistan, Pakistan never viewed it as a serious threat to allocate more military resources towards western frontier.  Military deployment along western border essentially followed the pre-independence British posture.  In 1950s, when Pakistan signed up for western sponsored military alliances, there was gradual increased diplomatic, economic and military penetration of Afghanistan by Soviet Union.  In 1970s, a leftist coup in Afghanistan forced Pakistan to pay more attention to the country; however it was recovering from its own humiliating defeat and separation of eastern wing in 1971 and after 1973, increasing violent insurgency in Baluchistan.  In the aftermath of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistani military decision makers decided to thwart Soviet efforts by supporting Afghan guerrillas with active support from Western countries as well as newly rich Gulf sheikhdoms. 

 

In the early stages of the conflict, Pakistani military leadership's aim was simply tying Soviet forces in Afghanistan to diminish threat to Pakistan.  However, by mid 80s when it was clear that Soviets may leave Afghanistan, Pakistan's objective changed to establishment of an Afghan government that was friendly to Pakistan.  It was a fair objective; however the methodology adopted by Pakistan was counterproductive to this objective.  Pakistan's policy was formulated and run by a small group of Pakistani officers.  There was no serious discussion and debate about benefits and risks of various options.  Pakistan had presented its foreign and military policy in Afghanistan to domestic audience in religious symbols.  It was seriously deficient in diplomacy and military knowledge.  In view of active diplomatic and military assistance from external sources, Pakistan was able to offset the negative fallout of these policy deficiencies.  The killing fields were far away from Pakistani cities and towns therefore the brunt of Pakistan's failure was absorbed by Afghan state and society. 

 

After the departure of Soviet troops, one simple fact that Pakistani decision makers failed to comprehend was that now they were actively involved in the civil war of Afghanistan.  They were directly supporting one faction against the other to secure Pakistan's interests.  In time, this earned Pakistan lasting hostility from many Afghan factions.  Even today, a large number of Afghans blame Pakistan for the destruction of their homeland.  Surely, it was Afghans who perpetrated horrible atrocities against their own kin but in view of direct Pakistani support many Afghans blamed Pakistan for all their suffering.  This author remembers the painful agony and whispered curses of several Afghans who lost everything especially in the brutal civil war of early 1990s.  Pakistan supplied hundreds of trucks full of rockets to its Afghan proxies that rained on Kabul city destroying everything.  In 1980s, Afghan guerrillas killed female and male school teachers blaming them for teaching Communism and their Pakistani handlers may have not specifically told them to do so, there is also no evidence that they tried to stop such inhumane acts.  Pakistani handlers justified bombing of Kabul University cafeteria a 'fair game' as Communism was taught at the university.  Some of the Afghan laments directed towards Pakistan included 'May the flames engulfing my people envelop your body' and 'May your children carry the gun around their neck for their whole life as you have not allowed the pen in the hands of my children'.  Some Afghans painfully pointed to the fact two decades ago, Pakistan's favorites Afghan proxies after overrunning a town looted the local school and distributed school supplies and furniture as war booty among themselves.  The ironic circle was completed in 2008 when Pakistani extremists blew up one of the best school in Swat named Sangota Public School.  After bombing, computers and all other equipment were looted by locals.  

 

Now that Pakistan's Afghan chickens have come home to roost, many Pakistani Pushtuns are blaming Pakistani security establishment for their miseries lamenting that 'you fanned the flames of Kabul and in the process have burned my Waziristan'.  Even military operations planned and executed by Pakistani officers had serious drawbacks.  Knowledge of many Pakistani officers working in Afghanistan was limited to vague generalization and very few officers had studied Afghan state and society as well as its complex inner dynamics.  Jalalabad fiasco in February 1989 was a classic example of poorly planned and executed military operation.  This was despite the fact that junior intelligence field officers had provided details of strong defense of the city when they scouted the area accompanying the funeral procession of veteran Pushtun leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan to Jalalabad.  They had recommended against any conventional assault on the town.  Pakistan's failure was summed up in one sentence by then Afghan President Najibullah.  When asked what happened in Jalalabad, the wily Afghan leader with a smile replied that 'Pakistani generals had a great plan but they only forgot one small detail.  They never figured in their planning what we will do?'

 

In 1990s, Pakistan decided to support the new faction of Taliban against their foes in the ongoing civil war.  Taliban was an exclusively Pushtun phenomenon and its leadership was mainly from southern Afghanistan.  When they started to win on the field, many coat hangers joined the winning team but core leadership remained from southern Afghan Pushtun areas.  Pakistan's support of Taliban came with the cost of complete alienation of all non-Pushtun groups (Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, Turkmen etc.) as well as those Pushtun groups not aligned with Taliban i.e. royalists, secular and nationalist.  During this time period, major powers followed the hands off policy as far as Afghanistan was concerned therefore Pakistan naturally felt that it was on top of its game.  One fact which they conveniently forgot was that while they surely had influence on Afghan field due to their decade long involvement, however they didn't have the economic muscle to keep their proxies on their side forever.  When United States disengaged from Afghanistan in early 1990s, Saudi Arabia picked up the tab of providing funds for Pakistan's Afghan operations.  Now Pakistan had to accommodate Saudi Arabia's interests as they were the paymasters.  This invariably got Pakistan involved in the sectarian warfare.  Saudi Arabia and Iran were already engaged in a sectarian fratricidal war in Lebanon and Gulf sheikhdoms and the battlefield now expanded to Afghanistan and eventually Pakistan.  Rival Shia and Sunni militant organizations inside Pakistan were funded by Saudi Arabia and Iran and Pakistani society saw a rapid escalation of sectarian war.  Some extremist outfits had their members rotating through sectarian and Jihadi organizations operating from Pakistan and Afghanistan.  When Pakistani leaders approached Taliban regarding this issue they were rebuffed.  In one case, Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (DGISI) Lieutenant General Khawaja Ziauddin during his visit to Kandahar was given cold shoulder by Taliban leadership and in another case Pakistan's interior minister retired Lieutenant General Moinuddin Haider was ridiculed by his Afghan hosts.  Both these officers are non-Pushtuns and Taliban leaders gave their accompanying Pushtun interpreter officers what they really thought about them. 

 

In the aftermath of September 11, 20001 and arrival of U.S. forces in Afghanistan suddenly changed the Afghan scene as far Pakistan was concerned.  Events moved much faster and Pakistan took sometime to re-establish or strengthen its ties with some Afghan factions.  In the meantime, the real blowback of Afghanistan stunned and confused Pakistani decision makers and public alike.  The much vaunted idea of 'strategic depth' was turned over its head in front of shocked Pakistanis.  Instead of Pakistan having 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan, it was now Taliban who had the 'strategic depth' all over Pakistan.  Extremist Pakistani groups declared open war against Pakistani state and society and embarked on brutal tactics of bombing everything in their sight including military targets, shops, bazaars, schools, hospitals and places of worship.  For the first time in Pakistan's history, militants targeted armed forces directly by launching daredevil attacks on high profile military targets including attacks on army chief, chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff committee, Corps commander, army headquarters, Special Forces training facility and target killing of army officers.  Now Pakistan army is frontally engaged with a variety of militant groups in Pakistan's tribal areas as well as settled areas of Malakand division. 

 

United States policy towards Afghanistan will see some shifts in the next twelve months and it is not yet clear which way the wind will blow.  In addition, we will see intense competition among Afghan players.  In view of recent developments of engagement of Taliban, all non-Pushtun groups have been startled and they are going to realign themselves for coming changes.  No one can predict about the coming events in Afghanistan but there are several possible scenarios from extremely unpalatable to very desirable.  The most desirable outcome is that Afghans agree among themselves about a viable set up with gradual withdrawal of foreign forces.  If all interested parties keep in check their desires and delusions and not cross a certain threshold then it may happen.  This is indeed a tall order and lessons of history are not very encouraging.  Even if Afghans decide to continue the fratricidal war, the fallout can be manageable if all interested parties can control their hand.  Second outcome is that there is continued low level violence in southern and eastern Pushtun parts of the country.  This will invariably be linked with violence in Pakistan's border areas therefore possible solutions offered will cover both areas.  If this scenario unfolds then it is very likely that there will be a de facto partition of Afghanistan along Hindu Kush line.  The rationale will be to maintain stability of non-Pushtun areas of Afghanistan and at the same time quarantine violent Pushtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Interests of all major players including United States, Russia, Central Asian Republics, Iran, China and India are served with this option.  The solution of keeping violence in Pushtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan below a certain threshold will likely include providing assistance to Pakistani army to maintain its presence in troubled part of Pakistan and strengthening Pushtun groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan who are opposed to militancy and extremism.  Some may want to include more extreme measures in this solution by advocating creating pressure groups along the flanks of Taliban.  This may include efforts to empower nationalist Pushtun parties such as Awami National party in Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa and Pukhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party in Pushtun areas of Baluchistan, directly arming and subsidizing tribal militias along Durand Line and providing direct assistance to Baluch nationalists.  These measures will be aimed at protecting the flanks of widening areas of destabilization but the very nature of this approach means prolongation of the conflict. 

 

The least desirable outcome is decision by all major players to pick their own Afghan proxies and support them with economic resources and arms to fulfill their own objectives.  This will depend on the crucial factor if United Sates decides to markedly reduce its footprint in Afghanistan.  If this scenario unfolds, then we may see cooperation and competition among interested parties.  Russia, Central Asian Republics bordering Afghanistan, Iran, China and India will cooperate to strengthen non-Pushtun groups.  Northern Afghanistan will be viewed as a buffer that will at least slow down the winds of chaos emanating from troubled south and east of Afghanistan.  Old hands like Ismail Khan in Herat and Abdul Rashid Dostum in Mazar Sharif as well as new groups such as Hazara will be strengthened. 

 

In view of concerns regarding reestablishment of extremists with international agenda in Afghanistan will require presence of some U.S. assets on ground.  This will likely include intelligence apparatus, drones and small Special Forces teams.  If United States integrates its efforts with parties working with non-Pushtun groups then it can still maintain presence in Afghanistan although Washington will not be the decider on all issues.  Pushtun insurgent groups if able to cooperate may hold on to some large cities and towns on their own.  The decision of Pakistan will be crucial whether it decides to keep its hands off or decide to support Pushtun insurgent groups inside Afghanistan.  If it goes for siding with the insurgent groups to maintain some influence on Afghan scene then it will need financial resources and the only country that can provide it is Saudi Arabia.  Once the lines are demarcated clearly about who is on which side then actions and reactions will be quite unpredictable.  Now some foreigners along with their Afghan allies are in 'construction business' while some other foreigners and their Afghan allies are in 'destruction business'.  Once the equation is changed and those who are in 'construction business' pull most of the boots out of the theatre then they will not be restrained by issues like force protection and winning hearts and minds.  Rules of engagement will change and infiltration, covert operations, bombs and drones will be liberally used to keep extremists off balance. 

All these possible outcomes in Afghanistan have the necessary ingredients of major fallout for Pakistan.  Pakistan needs to keep channels open with all interested parties.  There will be some give and take with each party to safeguard Pakistan's security first.  The military aspect of the puzzle from Pakistan's perspective indicates that they have a window of about twelve to eighteen months to clear the last frontier of North Waziristan to tackle Pakistani Taliban.  If a vacuum occurs in Afghanistan before Pakistan clears North Waziristan then it is likely that major portion of Pakistani Taliban will cross over the border making the problem a chronic one.  The dilemma of Pakistan is that Pakistan army is already stretched and several divisions are operating in tribal areas and Malakand division.  There is a genuine concern among senior brass about overstretching as well as realization that they can not go after everyone everywhere.  There are limitations to military operations and the real task is to find the balance.  Another concern is that if domestic pressures force United States to pull out major portion of the troops and dramatically reduce economic assistance then Pakistan will be forced to tackle the problem with limited resources. 

 

Major problem of Pakistan is finding some middle ground with India.  India's increased presence in Afghanistan is solely to prevent Afghanistan being used again as a base against India.  A lot of confidence building measures will be needed where Pakistan gives guarantees that it has given up the idea of using non-state actors to fulfill its national security agenda and in return India concentrates only on reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.  This is a win-win solution for both countries.  One the other hand, if both countries decide to fight a proxy war on Afghan soil then it is likely that Pakistan will use its Afghan proxies to hit Indian targets in Afghanistan while India will increase its support of Baluch nationalists.  Both countries will likely burn their fingers in this business.  If leaders pause for a moment and civil societies of both countries maintain minimum pressure on their own leaders forcing them to engage constructively and avoid a costly proxy war then one hopes that saner elements will prevail.  Pakistan's long standing security problem with India is partly solved by acquisition of nuclear deterrent and incorporation of this into wider national security debate should help to allay some of Pakistan's security concerns (Many mid ranking Pakistani officers have worked on nuclear doctrine as well as internal threats from extremists long before these topics were fashionable and bringing them in the room may be a good idea).  As far Pakistan is concerned, in this serious business there is no room for rhetoric, wishful thinking, hyperbole and utopian dreams.  Acknowledging ground realities, weighing Pakistan's strengths as well as vulnerabilities as well as a rational debate among Pakistanis will be needed to proceed forward on the road of stability. 

 

One sincerely hopes that Pakistan is not going to make the same mistake in case of Afghanistan as it did in Kashmir.  In its quest for settling the Kashmir issue with India on its own terms without addressing core political and social issues at home resulted in separation of eastern wing as independent country.  In 1990s, Pakistan decided to use non-state actors to fulfill its foreign and military policy in Kashmir.  This proved to be devastating to Pakistani state and society.  If any one has doubts then he should look at few simple facts.  In fifteen years, non-state actors operating in Kashmir were never able to hold any sizeable territory and the highest ranking Indian officer killed was a Colonel rank.  When these demons decided to devour its creator then it five short years, they were not only able to get control of large swaths of tribal territory but also able to wrest control of a whole division (Malakand) of settled areas booting a century old administration firmly put in place by colonial masters in a short span of months.  The retreat of the state was shocking to say the least.  When the guns were turned on Pakistan army, extremists were able to attack the most secure centers of the army and able to kill three, two and one star general rank officers (the long list includes Lieutenant General Mushtaq Beg, Major General Bilal Omar, Major General Amir Faisal Alvi, Brigadier Anwar, Brigadier Hussain Abbas and many others); the likes of which has never been seen before even in the days of British Raj. 

 

Pushtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan blame outsiders for their woes thus hindering some soul searching.  The plain fact is that Pushtun societies in both countries are in a state of civil war and the outcome of this war will determine the future of their generations.  If the vision of militancy and extremism gets the upper hand then the conflict will continue for at least a decade if one keeps in mind the recent history of Afghanistan.  If the vision of moderation and peace gets the upper hand then there is hope that violence will be kept at the fringes of Pushtun society while majority of Pushtuns of both countries are able to work with non-Pushtun groups of their respective societies.  Both countries can then find the balance of peaceful coexistence and work for peace and stability. 

 

Serious challenges to Pakistan are now internal and unresolved political, economic and social issues as well as dramatic changes in regional and international arenas contributed to widening of all fault lines including social, class, ethnic and sectarian.  In its quest for finding security solutions in neighboring countries may result in serious harm to Pakistan.  If Pakistan decides to put all the chips on Afghanistan table in view of exaggerated fears and compulsions then there is a clear and present danger to the very existence of Pakistan in its current geographical shape.  One former Pakistani diplomat called Afghanistan a 'snake pit' and if Pakistan gets itself sucked again into the power struggle inside Afghanistan; it will have some serious repercussions.  Pakistanis have already paid the heavy price for some of the decisions of the security establishment and it is time now for reflection and introspection. 

 

Pakistani senior brass need to seriously incorporate elements of social, political, economic, national integration and diplomacy in national security paradigm.  Military operations are only a small part of the puzzle and if military leadership comprehends the limitations of military power in this equation, it is more likely that they will work together with civilians to address core issues.  Pakistan's interests will be best served if civilian and military leadership works together rather than undermining each other.  Everyone understands Pakistan's genuine interests in Afghanistan and many are willing to accommodate them to some extent.  However, the wish of Pakistan that it should have a monopoly over decisions about Afghanistan or that interests of all other parties should be subservient to Pakistani interests is an unrealistic expectation. 

 

'The keenest sorrow is to recognize ourselves as the sole cause of our adversities.'    Sophocles

 

Acknowledgement

 

Author thanks numerous Pakistanis and Afghans of different backgrounds for educating and enlightening me about some of the most painful episodes of their collective history.  One Pushtu couplet encompasses their collective anguish;

 

The Pukhtano da menay dak mazigar ma wranawae

Pa Kabul der ujaredam; Pekhawar ma wranawae

 

Don't destroy the love filled evening of Pushtuns

I have already cried a lot over Kabul; now don't destroy Peshawar.

 

Hamid Hussain

June 30, 2010