DR HAMID HUSSAIN ON PAKISTAN ARMY PROMOTIONS IN 2010

Dear All;

There is lot of speculation inside and outside Pakistan about coming retirement of COAS General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani.  In case of Pakistan, COAS is an all rounder and plays on both domestic and international grounds.  Many a times present looks like a replica of the past.  C-in-C designate Lt. General Muhammad Ayub Khan uttered following words in late 1950; few months before he actually occupied the chair of C-in-C;

'The C-in-C, in fact is a more important man than the P.M. (Prime Minister) in our country as the situation stands today'.  Same can be said in 2010. In December 1963, on a personal trip to India retired Major General Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan Pataudi met Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and asked him to talk to Pakistan about Kashmir issue.  Nehru replied 'But whom do I talk to.  You have military men dictating'.  In 2010, with a civilian government in place in Pakistan, Indian government has repeatedly conveyed the message in many ways that no matter what kind of arrangement they reach with their civilian counterparts in Pakistan, military men if not in agreement will sabotage it a la Kargil affair.  In 1950s, army chief negotiated independently with United States on a parallel track and 2010 seems like a de ja vu of 1950s. Sometimes perceptions can be more powerful than reality. 

 I have written in the past about the senior brass.  I know many of you have family members, friends, course mates, juniors and seniors among the officers discussed in the piece and may have different opinion which I respect.  I have reviewed the subject as an outsider.  In writing this I have kept history in mind.  Every comment made in the piece has historical context but I could not give all examples to keep the draft at a readable length.  In addition, some things are better left unsaid but I'm sure those of you familiar with the subject will be able to read between the lines.  My main focus is on institutional interests and not individuals.  I think time has come to move beyond the individuals. 

As always any correction of factual error is greatly appreciated.

'For whoever habitually suppresses the truth in the interests of tact will produce a deformity from the womb of his thought.'  Liddelhart

 

Warm Regards,

Hamid

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Change of Guard

Hamid Hussain

'The general is the supporting pillar of the state.  If his talents are all encompassing, the state will invariably be strong.  If the supporting pillar is marked by fissures, the state will invariably grow weaker'.  Sun Tzu 

Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of Pakistan army General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani (Balochi of 45^th PMA Long Course) is due to retire in November 2010.  There is lot of speculation that he may get one year extension or appointed as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) with enhanced powers.  Those advocating that he should get an extension point to the fact that he has been in charge of ongoing military operations and it is better to leave the commander in place for another year.  This is a valid point, however the fact remains that even if all goes well it is unlikely that military operations will be completed in a year.  It is likely that current forward deployment of army will be in place for a while and even if Kayani gets one year extension, new COAS will take over next year therefore no useful purpose will be served with one year extension to Kayani.  Some even suggest that Kayani should get two year extension.  Second school of thought is of the view that powers of CJCSC should be enhanced including presence at promotion board of senior officers.  This group advocates that after enhancing the powers of this position, Kayani should be appointed CJCSC when current incumbent General Tariq Majid (Balochi of 6^th Graduate Course) retires in October 2010; few weeks prior to General Kayani's own retirement.  They are of the view that in this way Kayani who has been in the forefront of both domestic and international negotiations will continue to guide the events from his new position.  This point of view also has some merits and best suited for countries where civilians are in firm control of state's affairs. 

In case of Pakistan, army is the dominant institution of the state and civilian leadership's role is severely restricted in some areas of foreign policy and defense matters. Secondly, the culture of Pakistan army like other institutions of the state is highly personal rather than institutional.  In the current set up, only the man at the top makes most of the decisions and by creating additional centers of power, there is a risk of division of senior brass.  If powers of CJCSC are enhanced, the clash between COAS and CJCSC is inevitable in case of Pakistan.  Some officers will align with COAS while others with CJCSC thus creating friction at the top.  In an ideal situation where civilian leaders with adequate legitimacy are in full control of state's affairs; then a careful balance between powers of COAS, CJCSC, Army Commanders and Corps commanders will pay the dividends in the long run. However, Pakistan is far from this ideal outcome.  A responsible polity that is able to secure minimum legitimacy is an essential element of balanced civil-military relations and political forces of the country have to improve their performance if they wish to rule.  Two conditions are essential if civilians want to be equal partners in civil-military relations.  First they institute democratic reforms in their own political parties and second they fight their political battles at the polling booths and assemblies and not by backroom deals with military brass.

A review of the last three years performance of General Kayani will help to understand the ongoing changes in the army.  Kayani had his hands full from day one.  He had to handle several tasks simultaneously including getting full control of his own organization, create a healthy distance between the army and former COAS and then incumbent President General Pervez Musharraf, reorient and expand military operations and negotiations with domestic and international power brokers.  The first good act of Kayani was to clearly communicate to all officers to stay away from politics and he kept army away from fine tuning 2008 elections.  General Pervez Musharraf prior to handing charge to Kayani had placed his confidants at key positions including Director General Military Intelligence (DGMI), Director General Inter Service Intelligence (DGISI), subordinate officers at ISI and key Corps Commanders.  (For details of this aspect see author's previous report, Hamid Hussain.  Shuffling The Deck – Senior officer promotions in Pakistan Army, September 2007) Many feared that these officers will be used to influence the electoral process. 

Kayani had been in the office for barely two months and retired General Pervez Musharraf was still the president of the country with significant powers; however Kayani was able to keep his uniformed flock away from elections.  This helped to rehabilitate army's image to some extent that had taken severe beating during General Musharraf's previous eight year rule.  In view of a complicated arrangement where his previous boss after hanging his boots was occupying the President House with significant powers, Kayani brought his own team at senior command and staff positions gradually over a year.  This was a good move on part of Kayani and he avoided direct conflict with President Pervez Musharraf as well as kept friction with senior generals appointed by Musharraf to minimal.  (For details of these changes see author's three previous reports, Hamid Hussain.  Kiani Factor, June 2008, Hamid Hussain.  Careful Choreography - Next Round of Senior Officer Promotions & Postings in Pakistan Army, September 2008 and Hamid Hussain.  Chief's Call - Next Round of Promotions in Pakistan Army, July 2009)

Kayani continued the tradition of first building consensus among his own senior brass at Corps Commanders conference before presenting army's views to domestic and international players.  (For details of relationship between army chief and his senior commanders see author's report Hamid Hussain.  Handle With Care - Managing Senior Brass of Pakistan Army, April 2009) He was successful on international front where major powers accepted army's central role in Pakistan, however by undermining the civilian set up in higher decision making and at times openly criticizing civilian leaders, he exposed Pakistan's vulnerability.   Deep mistrust prevented a coherent civil-military approach to complex and grave problems and set the stage for further intrigues which is not a good omen for the country.  This mistrust between civilian and military leaders is Pakistan's Achilles' heel. 

Third task of Kayani was conduct of military operations in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Malakand Division that includes Swat valley.  Military leadership headed by Kayani followed a double standard in this regard.  In case of Malakand Division, where public opinion had turned in favor of military operation, General Head Quarters (GHQ) worked closely with civilian leadership both at center and provincial level.  Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) as well as main opposition party Muslim League (Nawaz Group) and Pushtun Awami National Party (ANP) governing Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa was taken into confidence.  ANP was very helpful to the military for grass root level support and GHQ worked closely with them.  Relative peace achieved so far is the result of this close cooperation and not only soldiers but political leaders and workers also gave the supreme sacrifice when they were targeted by extremists.  This should be a model for securing tribal areas also. 

In contrast, GHQ kept civilian leaders at arms length as far as operations in FATA are concerned.  Federal government in close cooperation with its Pushtun allies of ANP worked on a new social and political contract for FATA and this policy was announced by President Asif Ali Zardari.  The objective is to integrate FATA politically and economically with rest of the Pushtun areas.  GHQ communicated its displeasure to the President House and resisted any changes.  The result is deep mistrust between civilian and military leadership which will hamper post-conflict stabilization efforts in FATA.  Military may have decided on this approach to keep full control of events in FATA and avoid usual nuisances which come with more access to the area as well as political activities.  In my view, military authorities are short sighted in this regard and by obstructing these efforts they are setting themselves up for long entanglement in FATA.  FATA is far from secure and everyone understands that military presence is essential; however gradual integration of civilian administrative structure and political elements will ease the transition. 

The most damaging effect of mistrust between civilian and military leaders is reinforcement of the view of many civilians that army wants full control and no transparency in FATA as it is still clinging to the idea of keeping some 'good militants' for future use.  This perception has the unintended consequence of deep suspicion on part of the administrative set up of FATA headed by the office of political agent as well as tribesmen.  Political agent already sidelined by the military is always looking over his shoulder.  On the other hand most tribesmen are now like orphans suspended in the confusion where several competing power centers i.e. militants, military, political agent, political parties and clerics have emerged on the scene.   An average tribesman now needs to know the local Talib commander, Captain of the battalion deployed in his area, Major rank officer of local MI or ISI detachment, cleric, political tehsildar of his agency and political party leader to survive in an extremely difficult and dangerous situation.  Tribal elders, army officers, spooks, swindlers, middlemen, brokers and con artists are all operating in the tribal frontier.  This confusion was highlighted when Mahsud tribesmen refused to go back to their lands in South Waziristan despite repeated efforts by military authorities.  There needs to be close cooperation between military authorities, federal and provincial government representatives and tribal leaders.  There should be clear understanding that as long as military is present in full force it is responsible for the security.  It is naïve to expect that when confronted with trouble, military authorities ask tribal elders to expel hard core militants.  If military with its enormous firepower can not tackle them quickly, it is unrealistic to expect that poorly armed tribesman can expel them.  Faced with this dilemma, majority of tribesmen decided to leave their land, villages and hamlets to let army and militants slug it out among themselves.  Exodus of Mahsuds from South Waziristan was almost complete and this is an example of how dramatic changes have swept through tribal areas in the last few years. 

Tactically, Kayani went with the option of first letting the civilian populations leave their homes before embarking on military operations.  It gave army more room in terms of using artillery and air assets with less risk of collateral damage; however it resulted in major problem of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).  Army tried to decrease the suffering of IDPs by running camps and providing food, shelter and health facilities.  This helped in softening some of the resentment.   Departure of majority of civilian population gave military a free hand resulting in liberal use of artillery and air power.  Mountain hideouts of militants are away from populated areas therefore there is no negative impact; however use of this 'heavy punch' in towns resulted in almost complete destruction of infrastructure.  Large scale reconstruction of main towns will be needed after these areas are cleared of militants.  

Army divisions operating in Swat and tribal areas are reinforced with additional brigades.  Divisional and Brigade commanders are doing some heavy lifting in operational areas and battalion commanders are quick in comprehending new challenges.  After initial set backs, army went back to the old days of frontier warfare practiced by the frontier scouts.   Learning curve was sharp and many tactical maneuvers particular to frontier warfare such as relying more on foot movements, picketing, Chagha Groups, (quick reaction back up platoons) and use of speculative fire kept casualties at low level. Rather than moving astride roads that were vulnerable to ambushes, the fighting units tediously moved along ridge lines, hence dominating the valleys and ravines below by fire. Artillery fire was invariably on call, while infantry heavy weapons were dismantled, carried and ready to use in few minutes. Use of helicopters covering large movements was mandatory.  All these maneuvers require discipline and hard work on part of soldiers and junior officers and so far Pakistan army has adapted to new situations reasonably well.

A very positive decision by high command is the fact that officers involved in these operations are now being rotated through instructional and staff appointments so that 'lessons learned' are transferred to the new generation of officers.  Major General Azhar Ali Shah after commanding Peshawar based 7^th Division was appointed Director General of Institute of Strategic Studies of National Defense University (NDU), Major General Sajjad Ghani (Engineers) after commanding 19^th Division in Swat is now appointed Deputy Chief of General Staff (DCGS) and Major General Khalid Rabbani after commanding Kohat based 9^th Division in tribal areas is appointed Commandant of Command and Staff College at Quetta.  In addition, newly promoted officers are being given command of the formations actively involved in operations.  Commanders of all divisions currently operating in tribal areas as well as Special Services Group (SSG) are newly promoted young officers and this is a healthy sign.  The next step should be appointment of officers of all ranks who have done tour of duty to positions such as Commandant of School of Infantry, instructors at National Defence University (NDU), Staff College at Quetta and Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) at Kakul.  The most important aspect which needs urgent attention at all military institutions is critically evaluating 'what went wrong' during military operations.  This is the only way to learn from mistakes and improve efficiency.  A culture of critical analysis and serious and meaningful review needs to be nurtured in military institutions. 

Promotions and transfers in the last one year has completed the normal cycle and prior to his retirement General Kayani will make four additional promotions and appointments to three star rank.  (For details of these changes see author's previous reports, Hamid Hussain.  Wheel of Fortune – Coming Senior Officer Promotions in Pakistan Army, September 2008 and Hamid Hussain.  Chief's Call - Next Round of Promotions in Pakistan Army, July 2009) In the fall of 2010, the competition will be intense and four officers will be chosen from a large group of good officers consisting of Major Generals Shakil Hussain (Balochi commanded 37^th Division, served as Vice Military Secretary and currently Director General of Anti-Narcotics Force), Muhammad Yaqub Khan (Azad Kashmir Regiment commanded 14^th Division and currently Director General Rangers Punjab), Raheel Sharif (PIFFER commanded 11^th Division and currently Commandant of PMA), Athar Abbas (Armored Corps officer commanded 6^th Armored Division and currently Director General Inter Services Public Relations), Azhar Ali Shah (Punjab Regiment officer commanded 7^th Division and currently Director General Institute of Strategic Studies), Tariq Khan (Armored Corps officer commanded Ist Armored and 14^th Infantry Division and currently Inspector General Frontier Corps Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa), Agha Omar Farooq (Balochi commanded 40^th Division and currently Commandant of School of Infantry) and Zaheer ul Islam (Punjab Regiment officer commanded 12^th Division and currently at ISI).  Some promotions to three star rank are due in September-October 2010.  If a decision is made about a new COAS, then the best thing for Kayani is to leave this decision to incoming COAS to pick his own team.  This will avoid complications that Kayani had to face and ease friction at the top. 

The most controversial decision of Kayani was granting service extensions to several senior officers.  In my view, this was not in the best interest of the institution.  In the past, 'extension business' caused a lot of resentment and friction among senior officers.  Those who got extensions were labeled as 'favorites' of the COAS or a reward for 'loyalty'.  Majority of officers don't regard extension as a reward for exceptional service or a sign of professionalism.  To the credit of General Pervez Musharraf, he didn't give extension to his confidants and accommodated some of them after retirement in different civilian areas.  He kept the promotion ladder clear and avoided clogging of the system.  (For detailed list of these officers see author's report, Hamid Hussain.  Kiani Factor, June 2008)

Kayani promoted four officers to Lieutenant General rank in the fall of 2008, fully aware that they will reach the retirement age before completing their tenure.  This is unprecedented in the sixty year history of Pakistan army.  These officers included Lt. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha (PIFFER of 49^th PMA Long Course), Muhammad Mustafa Khan (Armored Corps officer of 11^th Graduate Course), Shahid Iqbal (Balochi of 3^rd Special Short Course) and Zahid Hussain (Gunner officer of 49^th PMA Long Course).  After promotion, these officers were posted to important positions.  There is no problem with this approach of promoting an officer who is qualified but will not be able to complete his tenure due to age if the officer serves a year or two and retires on reaching the age of retirement.  Out of these four, Pasha and Mustafa were given one year extension.  In addition, Lieutenant General Sikandar Afzal (Armored Corps officer of Ist Special Short Course) was given one year extension and sent as Force Commander of United Nations Mission in Liberia.  Peshawar Corps Commander Lieutenant General Masood Aslam (Punjab Regiment officer of 47^th PMA Long Course) was retained for few extra months to allow the time of promotion of Major General Asif Yasin Malik.  Malik was given third star and brought as Peshawar Corps commander replacing Aslam. 

In my view, all these officers should have been allowed to retire at their normal time.  In an unusual move, Kayani gave Mustafa one year extension and then transferred him to important post of Corps Commander of Mangla Corps.  This means that he served little over a year at important position of Chief of General Staff (CGS) and will be only serving for a year as Mangla Corps commander.  Similar moves by Musharraf in the past where senior officers at key positions were rotated every year or so earned the ridicule of 'musical chairs of senior officers'.  (For detailed discussion of this aspect see a previous report of the author, Hamid Hussain.  Balancing Act, January 2008).  Command and Staff positions of three star rank are concerned with serious business of war and peace and an officer needs at least six months to settle down in his new position.  Another factor which is frequently overlooked is that it is not only the top man who moves.  Normally, a senior officer brings in his own team of junior officers who enjoy his confidence.  Quick moves at top result in shuffle way down the ladder which invariably affects the performance of the organization.  In my view, a minimum of two years at such positions will help smooth transition and functioning at these important posts.  In the last twenty years, extensions to three star rank were very few and far between.  Previous attempts to 'tinker' with the system to advance the career of favorite officers caused resentment among officer corps.  Some allege that by giving several extensions in a very short period of time which is unprecedented in Pakistan army, Kayani wanted to pave the way for his own extension by giving an impression that extension was a norm rather than exception in Pakistan army. 

There are three possible outcomes in November 2010 as far General Kayani is concerned.  He will retire on time, given one year extension or appointed CJCSC.  In my view, the best option is that he should retire on time.  The lesser evil can be an extension of one year but creating two powerful centers of COAS and CJCSC has the potential of serious friction among senior officers in the long run.  It looks that all chips are being placed on right positions both on domestic and international fronts to favor an extension of General Kayani.   No matter which route is chosen, the best thing will be to announce the decision at least four to six weeks before Kayani's retirement date.  This will avoid many complications. 

If General Kayani retires on time then next army chief will be selected from the senior four Lieutenant Generals who meet the normal criteria for the selection of the position.  All of these officers are good and qualified and anyone chosen will do fine.  (For a detailed review of the careers of these officers see Hamid Hussain.  Lucky Draw – Selection of Next Pakistan Army Chief, July 2009).  There may be some tussle between civilian leaders and outgoing COAS about the final choice and if a consensus candidate emerges that will be good for the country.  Recent shuffle of senior officers by General Kayani gives an insight into his thinking in this regard.  Kayani brought Lieutenant General Khalid Shamim Wayen (Punjab Regiment officer of Ist Special Short Course) from Quetta based XII Corps to CGS position, moved Lieutenant General Javed Zia (Punjab Regiment officer of Ist Special Short Course) from Adjutant General (AG) position to command XII Corps, moved Lieutenant General Muhammad Yusuf (Gunner officer of Ist Special Short Course) from Bahawalpur based XXXI Corps to National Defence University and moved Lieutenant General Nadeem Taj from Gujranwala based XXX Corps to AG post.  This suggests that if Kayani is thinking about hanging his boots on time, his first preference may be Wayen with Javed as a back up candidate.  Bringing Wayen as CGS just four months before the selection of COAS looks like when Lieutenant General Asif Nawaz Janjua was brought from the command of Karachi based V Corps to CGS position in April 1991and four months later he replaced General Mirza Aslam Beg as COAS.  However, if Kayani is positioning himself for an extension then bringing Wayen as CGS can be considered a 'consolation prize' and even after retirement Wayen will likely be accommodated at a suitable position. 

Current Military Secretary Lieutenant General Mohsin Kamal (Punjab Regiment officer of 2^nd Special Short Course) was moved from Rawalpindi based X Corps due to health reasons at his own request about year and a half ago.  Now that he has fully recovered, he also emerges as a strong contender for the COAS slot.  Mohsin is a well respected thoroughly professional officer with no baggage, however my own feeling is that health factor has precluded him for consideration of COAS position.  Recent shuffle shows that Lieutenant General Nadeem Taj (Punjab Regiment officer of 2^nd Special Short Course) is not Kayani's preference.  If the gulf between President Asif Ali Zardari and Kayani is wide enough by the fall of 2010 and Zardari decides on Nadeem as COAS, he will need the cooperation of Prime Minister to get his wish fulfilled. 

One simple fact which is usually not taken into consideration is that regardless of the system of the government in place, appointment of army chief is essentially a political appointment.  In every army, there are five or six competent senior generals and appointing authority whether King, President, Prime Minister or an outgoing general picks the officer he is comfortable with.  All things being equal, the appointing authority chooses the officer who enjoys its confidence. Any officer among the top four or five senior Lieutenant Generals can be chosen as COAS of Pakistan army and he will be as good or bad as the other.  Personal ambition is natural to humans and every candidate will consider himself as fully qualified.  Important thing is to make sure that transition is smooth with least amount of friction. 

If a decision is made about giving extension to Kayani then it should be announced at least six to eight weeks prior to his retirement to put a stop to rumor mill.  If Kayani is to retire on time, then it will be better if there is consensus between General Kayani and civilian leadership about the selection of next COAS.  If this agreement is reached then it should be announced at least four to six weeks before General Kayani's retirement.  This will allow transparency and avoid intrigues.  If Wayen is the selected as COAS then there is no problem as he is already serving as CGS; the second most important post after COAS.  Kayani can brief him on all important matters in the next few months before handing him the charge.  This will also allow sometime for Wayen to gain confidence of his commanders and develop relationship that will help him to run the organization efficiently.  If another officer is selected then the new COAS will need some time to settle down.  If Kayani has decided to retire on time then he should learn some lessons from his own elevation and some awkward moments.   (For details of General Musharraf's appointments see author's previous report, Hamid Hussain.  Shuffling The Deck – Senior officer promotions in Pakistan Army, September 2007) He should not shuffle senior positions any more and let the new COAS choose his team after taking over.  This will help in smooth transition at the top.  As things stand now, if a new COAS is selected in November 2010, he will need some limited reshuffle of several senior command and staff positions to bring his own team.  All senior officers should remember one simple fact that this change of guard is not occurring in a peacetime army.  Several divisions of Pakistan army are frontally deployed and involved in some very difficult operations.  Large numbers of troops have been rotated through these formations over the last few years.  This causes enormous strain on junior and mid level officers.  Any sign of friction or intrigues at highest level can have not only very demoralizing effect on the organization but there is a risk of more serious repercussions. 

Personal ambition is natural and it can be a healthy stimulant towards achievement.  However, when personal ambition clashes with institutional interest then later always takes precedence.  If every senior officer keeps in mind the simple fact that at every step of his own promotion, someone more qualified than him was passed over, then there will be less disappointment and heartburn.  Every senior officer should perform his task as if this was his last assignment.   Pakistani senior brass must remember the words of General Dwight Eisenhower that 'humility must always be the portion of any man who receives acclaim earned in the blood of his followers and the sacrifices of his friends.'    Pakistan army's image has been rehabilitated solely due to the blood of soldiers, Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and officers who gave supreme sacrifice and many others who lay wounded in military hospitals all over the country.  The only way senior brass can reciprocate this sacrifice is by adopting a highly professional and morally upright conduct in war and peace.  The most dangerous person is usually the one 'who whispers in king's ears'.  If civilian and military leaders are careful regarding this one factor, then despite genuine differences they can avoid many complications. 

 

'Soldiers ought more to fear their general than their enemy.'       Michel De Montaigne

 

Acknowledgements:

 

Author thanks many for their valuable input and corrections; however author is solely responsible for conclusions as well as errors and omissions. 

 

Dr. Hamid Hussain is an independent analyst based in New York.

 

Hamid Hussain

July 10, 2010