Dr Hamid Hussains Comments on General Pervez Musharaf Article

Dear Dr.Hamid,
                    Forwarding this article for your kind perusal.
                               Warm regards,
                                 


My recent trip to the United States has been an enriching experience, during which I had a very healthy discourse with the American public and an opportunity to understand their concerns about the war in Afghanistan. One question I was asked almost everywhere I went was, "How can we stop losing?"

The answer is a political surge, in conjunction with the additional troops requested by Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Quitting is not an option.

A military solution alone cannot guarantee success. Armies can only win sometimes, and at best, create an environment for the political process to work. At the end of the day, it is civilians, not soldiers, who have to take charge of their country.

U.S. Army and National Guard troops on patrol in Logar Province, Afghanistan

After decades of civil war and anarchy, the Taliban established control over 95% of Afghanistan in 1996. Unfortunately, the Taliban imposed their strict interpretation of Islam on the country. Nevertheless, I proposed to recognize the Taliban regime, in the hope of transforming them from within. Had my strategy been enacted,we might have persuaded the Taliban to deny a safe haven to al Qaeda and avoided the tragic 9/11 attacks. (Taliban were recognized by Pakistan government prior to elevation of General Mussharraf as Chief of Army Staff (COAS).  In fact, Taliban used fissures at the Pakistani high command at that particular time to their advantage.  A brief review will explain this complex scenario.  Nawaz Sharif had appointed Lt. General Khawaja Ziauddin as DGISI without consulting General Mussharraf at about the same time that Mussharraf was appointed COAS.  Mussharraf appointed Lt. General Aziz Khan as CGS and transferred many Afghan parleys under Military Intelligence (MI) then headed by Major General Ehsan ul Haq.  In addition, some of Ziauddin's subordinates bypassed their boss and passed on Afghan information to GHQ via MI & CGS.  This was de ja vu of 1989, when Benazir had appointed retired Lt. General Shams ur Rahman Kallu as DGISI.  The fountain of power is COAS therefore everyone changes the direction towards this ultimate power center. Army high command was fractured as far as dealing with Taliban was concerned.  One group headed by DGISI & other by COAS.  Taliban quickly recognized the fissures at high command as they were receiving two separate delegations; one headed by Ziauddin and his subordinates and other by Mussharraf's representatives.  Some subordinate officers at ISI bypassed their own boss and passed information to COAS.  Mussharraf's emissaries told Taliban not to listen to DG ISI people.  No wonder that Taliban cold shouldered Ziauddin at one point by serving him okra dish on his visit.  What influence Pakistan had on its proxies can be judged from the fact that when Pakistani delegation asked Taliban to hand over some sectarian killers, they were told to go away and look for them in Pakistan.  From time immemorial everyone who worked with Afghans has learned that even those Afghan proxies who will eat form your hands for decades will not let you dictate everything.  Two examples will suffice.  In 1960s, during one of his visits Prime Minister Dawood stormed out of a meeting red in face with highest Russian officials when he was asked to cut down contacts with some countries.  Gulbadin and Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf got the lion's share of Saudi largesse but during Gulf war rooted for Saddam Hussain.  The furious chief of staff (Ahmad Badeeb) of Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki publicly abused Sayyaf reminding him that even his name was proper Muslim and it was Saudis who have given him a proper Muslim name. Later, on one occasion Mullah Omar and Prince Turki had also a stormy meeting.)

Another golden opportunity to rescue the Afghan people emerged after the United Nations sanctioned international military operation launched after 9/11. Having liberated Afghanistan from the tyranny of al Qaeda and Taliban, the U.S. had the unequivocal support of the majority of Afghans. The establishment of a truly representative national government which gave proportional representation to all ethnic groups—including the majority Pashtuns—would have brought peace to Afghanistan and ousted al Qaeda once and for all. Unfortunately this did not happen. (This is an interesting observation and one is compelled to compare with two other modern historical events of such conflicts.  First, a monumental decision of defeated Japanese leaders after utter devastation of their country in the aftermath of Second World War when they decided to use the conqueror's resources to rebuild their country.  Second example is that of Vietnamese.  They fought and won against a superpower giving enormous sacrifices with over one million dead.  They emerged from this utter devastation and now a reasonably decent, stable and peaceful society.  They did it on their own.  Unfortunately, Afghans chose their own way.  G. W. Hegel gave the true definition of courage stating that 'Courage is of different kinds.  The ferocity of animal, the bravado of the robber, the bravery due to a sense of honor or chivalry is not courage in the true sense…. Only the aim and the content of action give meaning to the feeling of 'fearlessness'.' )

 

The political instability and ethnic imbalance in Afghanistan after 9/11 marginalized the majority Pashtuns and pushed them into the Taliban fold, even though they were not ideological supporters of the Taliban. The blunder of inducting 80,000 troops of Tajiks into the Afghan national army further alienated the Pashtuns.

Meanwhile, Pakistan forcefully tackled the influx of al Qaeda into our tribal areas, capturing over 600 al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders, some of them of very high value. (This needs to be put in perspective.  It must be remembered that when Kabul fell, there were less than 2000 U.S. boots on the ground predominantly Special Forces and CIA paramilitary.  Then defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld's famous quote was 'we don't do nation building'.  Pakistani high command looking at the ground realities concluded that U.S. was not in for a long haul.  Their assessment which was correct based on the available information that U.S. will put the head of Osama Bin Ladin on the spike and go back home to victory parades and Pakistan will be left with Afghan baggage again.  All non-Pushtuns had allied with U.S. against Taliban right from the start while many Pushtuns waited till the last minute to see who will be the winner as vast areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan were still not yet secured.  In this calculation, Pakistan thought that in the post-American Afghanistan they will need their some of the old Taliban allies to keep the influence therefore they made the decision to hand over only non-Afghans (Arabs, Chechen etc.) to U.S. but not Taliban leaders.  It was quite late in the game when Pakistan handed few like Taliban ambassador Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef to Americans.  In fact, during Bonn process Pakistan actively lobbied to include 'moderate Taliban' in the process which in the hindsight seem to be a good idea.  However, U.S. flushed with its easy initial sweep refused to listen. In addition, other players such as royalist Pushtuns, Iran etc. strongly opposed any idea of bringing Taliban in the tent.)  We established 1,000 border check posts and even offered to mine or fence off the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, but this never came to pass. The Afghan government, led by President Hamid Karzai, had no writ outside of Kabul, and the insufficient ground troops of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) allowed the Taliban to regroup. The 2004 invasion of Iraq shifted the focus and also contributed to the Taliban gaining ground in Afghanistan. (This is correct analysis of the events.)

Al Qaeda terrorists who fled from Afghanistan came to Pakistan and settled initially in South Waziristan. Through successful intelligence and law-enforcement operations, we eliminated al Qaeda from our cities and destroyed their command, communication and propaganda centers. They fled to the adjoining North Waziristan, Bajur and Swat regions. (Even some Pakistani military officers consider handling of foreigners in FATA as a disaster in 2003-04 period.  Pakistani intelligence provided detailed information about this influx, however some commanders were in total denial.  Then Peshawar Corps Commander Lt. General Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai and IGFC Major General Taj ul Haq did an excellent job as far as deployment of regular troops & FC on the border was concerned.  Both being Pushtun used their negotiating skills and took local tribal leadership in confidence and deployment was peaceful.  However, where they failed was denial that any foreigners were present.  My own view is that it was for two reasons; lack of their own intelligence and deep suspicion of ISI.  Corps commanders have their own Corps intelligence outfit headed by a Colonel rank officer but its capabilities are limited to discipline among troops and other minor tasks.  FC then had no dedicated intelligence section.  When ISI briefed them about influx and entrenchment of foreigners in tribal territories, they refused to believe it and the result was that no timely action was taken.  This combined with complete sidelining of the office of the political agent meant that local tribal leadership sat on the sideline rather than partnering with Pakistani government's decisions. The results that were not very encouraging were soon apparent. The house keeping job for Pakistani troops in tribal areas is now a daunting challenge.)

From 2004 onwards, we witnessed a gradual shift in the terrorist center of gravity. The Taliban started to re-emerge in Afghanistan and gradually gained a dominant role. They developed ties with the Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas, especially in North and South Waziristan. With a grand strategy to destabilize the whole region, the Taliban and al Qaeda established links with extremists in Pakistani society on the one hand and with Muslim fundamentalists in India on the other. They pose a grave threat to South Asia and peace in the world. (This may be true but the solution will also be local.  Domino theory has been advocated in previous conflicts such as Vietnam but it proved to be wrong.)

We now have to deal with a complex situation. Casualties suffered by our soldiers in the line of duty will not go wasted only if we are able to fully secure our next generations from the menace of terrorism. The exit strategy from Afghanistan must not and cannot be time related. It has to ask, "What effect do we want to create on the ground?" We must eliminate al Qaeda, dominate the Taliban militarily, and establish a representative, legitimate government in Afghanistan.

The military must ensure that we deal with insurgents from a position of strength. The dwindling number of al Qaeda elements must be totally eliminated and the Taliban have to be dominated militarily. We must strengthen border-control measures with all possible means to isolate the militants on the Afghanistan and Pakistan sides.

The Pakistan military must continue to act strongly. Operationally, we must raise substantially more forces from within the tribal groups and equip them with more tanks and guns. On the Afghan side, the U.S. and ISAF troops must be reinforced. All of this must be done in combination with raising additional Afghan National Army troops, with significant Pashtun representation. Exploiting tribal divisions, we should also raise local militias. (I'm not sure whether General Mussharraf is suggesting this option only for Afghanistan or for Pakistan also.  In short term, it may be useful but in the long run it may have negative consequences.  This aspect needs careful analysis of risk and benefits and even in extreme situations even when this option is used, the collective tribal leadership rather than creating local warlords should always be kept in mind.  Second, rather than simply handing money, the theme presented to these tribal communities should be only on safeguarding their own communities.  On my recent visit to the area, I had a conversation with a local Malik of Mohmand Agency.  He told me that Pakistani officers came to us telling us to raise militias and confront militants.  He said that 'I told the officer that you have the guns, tanks and helicopters, you go and kill them'.  He then went on about deep suspicion about Pakistan's own intelligence.  One reason of reluctance of many tribal leaders to come forward is this suspicion.  Which militant group is 'friend' and which one is 'foe' of Pakistani establishment is the cause of confusion and many think that if one makes a mistake in this regard one may loose his head literally. It will take a while and lot of genuine efforts to rebuild the trust.  One needs to be realistic when offering solutions.  One example will suffice.  The main Tal-Parachinar road has been blocked and made unsafe by militants for over two years and Pakistan government has not been able to open it.  The result is that Upper Kurram agency has been practically integrated with Afghanistan.  Kurram residents travel through Afghanistan and then come through Torkham border to re-enter Pakistan.  One can easily figure out what these tribesmen think about Pakistan and its power.)

On the political front, we need an invigorated dialogue with all groups in Afghanistan, including the Taliban. Afghanistan for centuries has been governed loosely through a social covenant between all the ethnic groups, under a sovereign king. This structure is needed again to bring peace and harmony. We have to reach out to Pashtun tribes and others who do not ideologically align themselves with the Taliban or al Qaeda. I have always said that "all Talibans are Pashtun, but all Pashtuns are not Taliban." Pakistan and Saudi Arabia can play pivotal roles in facilitating this outreach. (This advice is probably right but not too many people trust it when Pakistan is advocating it.  After all they never went for this option when they were calling the shots.  They fully supported Pushtun factions to complete military victory and telling all non-Pushtuns to accept this fait accompli.)  

Pakistan and Afghanistan were shortsightedly abandoned to their fate by the West in 1989, in spite of the fact that they were the ones who won a victory for the Free World against the Soviet Union. This abandonment lead to a sense of betrayal amongst the people of the region. For the sake of regional and world peace, let us not repeat the same mistake. (This is the most amazing statement and General Mussharraf is not alone. I have heard it from a number of Pakistanis both civilians and military.  When U.S. lands at a place obviously for its own interests, every one climbs on the rooftop accusing them as hegemons, imperialists, greedy for native natural resources etc. Right and left are unanimous in this condemnation.  Once U.S. decides to disengage for its own reasons (it feels that it has no vital interest at stake or has burned its fingers), then everybody climbs on the roof top again accusing them of 'abandonment' and 'great betrayal'.  Problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan will be solved by Afghans and Pakistanis.  It is better that they solve their problems even if the solution is imperfect or not to U.S. or anybody's else likings.  Outsiders can help to some extent or can create more troubles but ultimately it is the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who will decide about their future.  Both countries should try to work with their own people and try to bring everyone inside the tent.  It is better to have everybody inside the tent pissing outside rather than having some outside the tent pissing inside.  Those who are 'irreconcilable' should also be handled by their own people.  Stranger will neither have the patience nor wisdom and more importantly unlimited resources to be spent on far off areas. Pretty soon residents of Louisiana and Alabama will be asking for the reconstruction money and it is very likely that American president's priority will be Louisiana rather than Logar.  My own view which may be wrong is that Washington has become a highly 'radioactive commodity'.  There is so much mistrust that even genuine efforts are not likely to pay the dividends.  I feel it is in U.S. as well as local interests that a little pull back may help more to resolve issues than more intervention. 

Dispassionate analysis and not finger pointing and realization that no decision is risk free should be the foundation stone of way forward.  Once these two conditions are met where basic facts are acknowledged and then benefits and side effects of all possible options are reviewed and then they can go ahead and live with the decision.  If it is good, you reap the rewards and if it is bad you live with the consequences.  This is the law of nature. There is a limit to human calculations and no human being no matter how intelligent or sincere can calculate third and fourth order consequences of his or her decision.

Jheel ankhon ko na hoonton ko kanwal kehtey hein

Hum to zakhmon ki namaish ko ghazal kehtey hein

Warm Regards,

Hamid)

By Pervez Musharraf. Mr. Musharraf is a former president (2001-2008) and chief of army staff (1998-2007) of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Maj Kamil Hameed

Community Relations / Security Officer

(Mubarak Block)

Petronas Carigali (Pakistan) Ltd.

House No.32, Hill Side Road, Sector E-7

Islamabad,Pakistan.