The Punjabi-UP joint operation to sideline Bengalis in Pakistani politics

The Pakistani politics of 1947-58 revolve largely round the destruction of democracy by the civil-military elite, partly in collaboration with some politicians. In one respect, the Pakistani politics of this period represent a transformation from emphasis on ideological themes to class and ethnic themes. During this period nominated and unelected men succeeded in sidelining elected men from the political scene. We have already discussed in an earlier chapter that till 1937 regional issues dominated the politics of the Indian Muslims. The Indian Muslims till 1937 were broadly divided into two groups i.e. the Muslims from Muslim minority provinces who were grouped as the All India (a misleading title) Muslim League and the Muslims from Muslim majority provinces who were grouped into various provincial parties with emphasis on provincial issues .The overwhelming success of the Hindu dominated All India Congress in the 1937 elections in the Hindu majority provinces and even in non-Muslim constituencies in Muslim majority provinces had a tremendous impact on the politics of the Indian Muslims. Fear of Hindu rule in case British left India united various Muslim parties under the overall leadership of Mr. Jinnah as a result of which the Muslim League emerged as the largest Muslim party in the 1946 elections.

Till 1937 the All India Muslim League was largely a Hindustani or UP Muslim dominated party. After 1937 when Mr. Jinnah realized that without bringing in the Muslim majority provinces the Muslim League could not become an All India Muslim Party, the importance of Punjab and Bengal became relatively greater. The Muslim League, however, continued to be dominated by the Muslims from Muslim minority provinces and particularly the UP Muslims, major qualitative change took place in 1947. Suddenly Punjab and Bengal became the two most important provinces of Pakistan. Mr Jinnah had nominated Mr. Liaquat (1895-1951) a Hindustani Muslim as Prime Minister, but politically the Hindustani Muslims were no longer as dominating as before 1947 or before 1937. The Muslim League before 1937 had no following in the provinces of Punjab or Sindh and a limited following in Bengal. When the Pakistan idea had gained popularity in the period 1940-47 the feudal and the commercial interests in Punjab, Sindh and  Bengal had joined the Muslim League. This enabled the Muslim League to win the 1946 elections, but did not organizationally make the Muslim League a very strong party. After 1947 the Bengali Muslims were the largest group in terms of voting strength. However, in real terms the Hindustani Muslims and the Punjabi Muslims by virtue of domination of Muslim League and representation in the civil service, armed forces were the strongest group. Mr Jinnah had nominated Liaquat as his Prime Minister because Liaquat had stood by Jinnah while Jinnah was not firmly in saddle as India's sole Muslim leader during the period 1934-40. Liaquat was not a very heroic figure, just like any other Punjabi Sindhi, Bengali or Pathan Muslim League leader of that time, having never taken any part in any anti-British agitation, having never spent one day in jail, never having made one anti British speech in any legislative forum. But Mr. Jinnah had limited choices and relatively it appears that Liaquat was, as far as Mr Jinnah's judgement was concerned, was his  best choice. Liaquat was not brilliant but dependable, and although never very popular was accepted as Jinnah's political heir at least till 1948. From 1948, onwards, however, once Mr. Jinnah died and all real political power passed into Liaquat's hand, the fact that Liaquat was not unconditionally accepted as a natural leader emerged. We will examine this important aspect in a little more detail.

It became fashionable from 1951 onwards, after Liaquat was assassinated, for a Punjabi Muslim to repeat in almost every second book written in Pakistan Liaquat was not a fair man. That he was biased in favour of the Hindustani Muslims etc etc. That since Liaquat was a refugee from India he hesitated from holding elections1. I have quoted this book since it was published in 1996 and may be called a Punjabi Muslim version of Pakistani politics. The irony is that this particular author cites an Indian Venktaramani an Indian who has written an authoritative book on Pakistan's foreign policy but possesses extremely limited knowledge of Pakistani local politics to support this statement about Liaquat's hesitation in holding elections. Things were not as naïve and simplistic as this. Many refugees who came from India were elected repeatedly like Chaudhry Ali Akbar from East Punjab and many others. Had Liaquat contested elections from an area with Muslim Ranghars (these are not Punjabi but are mostly settled in Punjab) or from Karachi it would have been no problem for him to win a seat. The fact that the Hindustani Muslims concentrated at Karachi is pinching the Punjabi, Sindhi and Pathan politicians to this day! A Police Officer who also later served as Director Intelligence Bureau N.A Razvi (a Punjabi from Lahore) was one of those who went on record in asserting that settlement of refugees in Karachi was a conspiracy by Liaquat2! As a matter of fact these refugees simply went to Karachi because they were from the urban areas of UP and were not agriculturists. It may be noted that the greater part of Hindustani Muslims in UP in India were from cities whereas the greater part of Ranghars were from rural areas. In contrast with these the Ranghars who were again not at all Punjabis but from south eastern districts of Punjab near Delhi settled in rural areas of  Punjab and Sindh. It is simply ridiculous to assert that there was any conspiracy on part of Liaquat who could not have possibly ensured that all Hindustanis should go to Karachi.  These people came to Karachi simply because they wanted to go to a city and Karachi was a city where they could get jobs by virtue of being the country's capital. It is important to note that even today i.e. 1999 Ranghars who are in majority in Multan city and in many sub-districts between Lahore and Multan do not vote for any Punjabi Muslim candidate and elect only Ranghar candidates. The Ranghars have always identified Liaquat as one of them being from a Ranghar district of East Punjab i.e. Karnal. It is also instructive to note that the Punjabi Muslim landlords were deeply perturbed by the Ranghar presence in Punjab and made many efforts to disperse them. Daultana and Mamdot were allegedly involved in certain firing incidents on many Ranghar refugee camps in Punjab. The Ranghars being mostly soldiers or ex-soldiers survived these attempts to disperse them all over Punjab and even today are concentrated in Kasur, Okara, Vihari, Khanewal, Multan and Lodhran districts and vote only for Ranghar candidates regardless of party affiliation. The reason for Liaquat not holding elections were explained clearly in a book written by a thorough bred Punjabi Choudhry Mohammad Ali 3. It was not holding elections in which Liaquat failed but in constitution making. As a matter of fact Liaquat was as obsessed by elections and winning them as Z.A Bhutto another future Prime Minister of Pakistan. Liaquat also laid the foundation of  manipulation of election results by using the state machinery in Pakistan. Thus in May 1949 he had the results of the Mymensingh election set aside, just because a spineless Muslim League candidate was defeated by an independent candidate! Liaquat was more interested in elections and as a matter of fact took more interest in holding provincial elections in steps in all provinces than in constitution making.

Governor General Jinnah (1947-48), Governor General NAZIMUDDIN (1948-1951), First Constituent Assembly and  Prime Minister Liaquat (1947-1951)

The most important constitutional question of the newly created state of Pakistan was that of representation in the parliament. Initially  the First Constituent Assembly consisted of  69 members elected indirectly by the respective provincial legislatures of the areas which were to constitute Pakistan. These provincial legislatures were elected as a result of the 1946 general elections before independence. Later, once the various states joined Pakistan the First Constituent Assembly was enlarged to 79 members. These included four seats assigned to states like Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Balochistan  States Union and the Frontier States and six additional seats added as a result of the refugee influx, out of which five were allotted to Punjab and one to Sindh. The provincewise share in by 1948 was as following 4:--

49 out of the original 69 members of the First Constituent Assembly belonged to the Muslim League out of which 24 were from East Bengal and 14 were from West Punjab 5. The irony of this situation was the fact that non Bengali Muslims held 11 out of 31  Muslim seats while 13 seats were reserved for the Bengali Hindus. This meant that there were just 20 Bengali Muslims instead of at least 33 which was their due6! Many of the 11 like I.H Qureshi, Ghulam Mohammad etc were quite dispensable and their services could have been utilised without allowing them to sit in the central cabinet! The Bengalis and above all Nazimuddin was the main culprit in allowing this to happen by not taking a stand about the gross injustice with the Muslim League Central Command. The Bengalis missed the train in 1947 because of their misplaced largeheartedness! They indeed did pay a heavy price for this blunder in 1971! There is no consolation in offering the standard Pakistani excuse  that "had Jinnah lived, this would not have happened"! To say that absence or presence of one individual led to gross constitutional injustice to the whole Bengali Muslim nation is a hollow argument! The reader who will later read about Bengali Muslim excesses against West Pakistanis in 1971 is adviced to note that the events of 1971 had a deep connection with many injustices perpetrated on the Bengalis during the period 1947-69 just because they were large hearted and just because their ancestors unlike the ancestors of many West Pakistani Muslims were not good British lackeys! The above figures have been given just to show the foreigners, why all major West Pakistani politicians whether Hindustani Muslim or Punjabi were in no  hurry to do constitution making and took pride in passing resolutions that "Sovereignty belonged to God"; something which is an irrevocable fact and even known to a child! This is with reference to Liaquat's much trumpeted "Objectives Resolution" which stated that Sovereignty rested with God! This resolution is regarded a magnum bonum achievement of Liaquat! Yes sovereignty indeed did belong to Allah and he had definitely ordained that the Bengali Muslims should be made fools by the joint  Hindustani-Punjabi-Pathans who ruled Pakistan from 1948 to 1971 in the name of Allah! Allah be praised! Much later it was only in Paltan Maidan that the West Pakistanis realise that Allah was not on their side and was not the Allah of Liaquat, Ghulam Muhammad, Ayub, Yahya, etc! It is an irony of the so-called Islamic Republic of Pakistan's history that the Bengali  Muslims were finally saved from genocide, rape and total humiliation by the non-Muslim army of a non-Muslim country! But more of this later.

Most Pakistani historians are not intellectually honest while dealing with this issue. On the surface it was a simple issue, ie how were the different provinces to be represented in the parliament. The Bengalis who were about 54% of the total population (with at least theoretically 44 seats in the First Constituent Assembly out of a total of 79 seats)7 but had been sidelined from leading the Muslims by the Hindustani Muslims because of backwardness in education now rightfully demanded that representation in parliament should be according to population. The simple reason for delay in constitution making and one which is evaded by most non- Bengali historians was the fact that all non-Bengali leaders including Liaquat and almost all leaders from Punjab were not willing to grant the Bengalis their natural right ie representation in the parliament as per population! The Punjabis who were just 20% of the population (22 out of 79 seats) were the second most dominant group in the period 1947-51 following the Hindustani Muslims who dominated political power because of Liaquat's Prime Ministership and by virtue of representation in the civil service. Both these groups ie the Hindustani Muslims and  Punjabi  Muslims were not in favour of giving Bengalis their representation as per population. They despised the Bengalis and looked upon them as inferior species. The reason for this attitude was the fact that there were very few Bengalis in the civil service and the army and the Hindustani and Punjabi Muslims were convinced that they by virtue of more education, greater representation in civil service and the army and in the Muslim League were the natural leaders of Pakistan. A new and most unfortunate exercise was started to exclude the Bengali Muslims from the higher corridors of power. The West Pakistani politicians led by Punjabi politicians now started demanding weightage for the west wing and refused to accept the just Bengali demand for representation in parliament as per population. Liaquat was also a party to this since he made no resolute effort to arive at a constitutional formula settling the issue of representation. Instead the West Wing politicians created a smoke screen around the core issue of representation by talking about the Islamic character of the new state! Thus religion was again brought in as a cheap slogan in order to evade basic issues. The failure for constitution making can be squarely placed on the shoulders of Liaquat who did nothing to prod all West Pakistani members into arriving at a formula deciding the issue of representation during the period 1947-51. There is no doubt that the Punjabi Muslim leaders were most keen to sideline Liaquat, and Ghulam Mohammad their principle spokesman in Liaquat's cabinet played as keen a role in sabotaging the constituent assembly's efforts to arrive at constitution  formula of provincial representation as Liaquat. But it was Liaquat's failure in not being able to be ruthless in dealing with all the members of the Constitutuent Assembly who were taking an unjust stand over allowing the Bengalis their simple constitutional right of having representation as per population. This attitude was an unfortunate continuation of the pre-1947 rhetoric about fear of Hindu domination and proves that the bourgeois class and the  feudals who were the mainstay of Muslim League were fighting a battle for the preservation of their class interests rather than that of the Indian Muslims. The same people now wanted safeguards against Bengali Muslim domination in the constititution of Pakistan. SO WHERE WAS ISLAM NOW AND WHAT WAS THE AIM OF PAKISTAN? The Hindustani-Punjabi Muslim rivalry and the west Wing East Wing rivalry clearly proves that the Muslim League struggle for Pakistan although a most necessary struggle, as far as the larger interest of all Indian Muslims living in Muslim majority provinces were concerned, was a reaction  against fear of Hindu domination which was replaced by fear of Bengali Muslim domination immediately after partition and later by fear of Punjabi Muslim domination after 1977. Islam was used as a political slogan by various politicians basically for regional interests and was used as a mask which was discarded immediately after 1947 in favour of class and regional interests!

We will briefly discuss the constitution making done during the Prime Ministership of Liaquat. The First much trumpeted effort was the "Objective Resolution" which in reality was an extremely vague piece of legislation, having nothing to do with any of Pakistan's major constitutional issues. The  "Objectives Resolution" carried through the assembly in March 1949, and regarded by many as  Liaquat's masterpiece  was an abstract piece of writing dealing with intangible issues and  merely stated the self-evident fact that sovereignty belonged to Allah (God) and that the Muslims could fashiom their lives in accordance with the teachings of  Islam (which as a matter of fact they were doing even before independence)! The second important piece of  constitution making was the "Interim Report" submitted by the Liaquat Government before the Constituent Assembly in September 1950. The report was essentially nothing more than the  Government of  India Act of 1935 (passed by the British parliament) with some superficial amendments. The report, however, was vague and also had traces of an ulterior attempt to reduce the relative importance of the East Wing. It visualised two legislative houses, a  House of  People elected by direct vote of the people,and a House of Units,elected by the provincial legislatures.The catch was that the provinces of East Bengal, West Punjab (as Punjab was known), NWFP, Balochistan (not yet a province) and  Sindh were to be equally represented in the House of Units. The report was vague in the sense that the most crucial issue of whether representation from both wings would be on the basis of  population or on a parity of 50% basis (as was frequently demanded/suggested  in the assembly debates) was not specified. The plea taken for this lapse was the fact that the franchise sub-committee had not yet finalised its recommendations. It may be noted that the "Franchise Sub-Committee endorsed a 50% East-West Wing Parity in the lower House six weeks after Liaquat's assassination 8. The report did not satisfy the Bengalis since Bengali was not accorded the status of one of the national languages. The most unreasonable and outrageous part of the report was the provision that in case of any conflict of opinion between the two houses the matter would be decided by a joint session of the two houses. This provision ensured that since the west wing had four provinces in the upper house as against East Pakistan as the fifth province, with all five provinces having equal votes, any joint sitting of the two houses  would be  a totally west wing provinces dominated  affair, even if the East Pakistanis were given their 54% actual vote in terms of population which they were demanding! The Bengalis were simply shocked once the newspapers carried the "Interim Committee  Report"!9 To add fuel to fire the Interim Report visualised a very strong centre, with little hope of any provincial autonomy, ensuring that the East  Pakistanis remained the virtual colony of a Federal Government dominated by the Hindustani Muslims or the Punjabi Muslims who were swiftly racing towards supremacy in the politics of Pakistan by virtue of their relative strength in terms of population in the west wing provinces and their fast growing numbers in the civil service (which they were able to dominate by 1952, thanks to massive recruitment) and in the army which they were dominating right from 1947. The foreign reader may feel that all this was untrue and closer to fiction, but we must remind him,that this was what the West Pakistani Muslims did to their so called East Pakistani Muslim brothers! Needless to add the "Interim Report" was a total failure and after presenting it Liaquat downgraded constitution making to the lowest rung of the ladder and concentrated on strengthening his personal political power and on holding elections in Punjab which were won by the  Muslim  League with 141 seats (which were increased to 153 the next day and to 166 within four months, truly reflecting the prevalent opportunism) in a legislature of 19710. This was the constitution making done by the Prime Minister eulogised as Quaid-e-Millat (Leader of the Nation) by many in today's  Pakistan!

Liaquat was regarded by Muslims of Punjab11 and Sindh as an outsider and ethnically biased in favour of Hindustanis. The spearhead of this part genuine and part  exaggerated (since the Punjabis were far more better represented than the Bengalis) campaign was the  Nawa-e-Waqt  newspaper of Lahore. The major Punjabi grievance was that its representation was less than its population warranted (keeping in view the massive influx of refugees), no attempts made to hold by election to the vacant Punjabi assembly seats and discrimination against the Punjabis, the civil services because of domination of Hindustani Muslim civil servants. The reader may note that these grievances were soon settled once five more seats were added to the Punjabi quota and once Messrs Mohammad Ali and Ghulam  Mohammad ensured that the Punjabi recruitment exceeded all others, including the real majority ie the Bengalis! The reader may note that the Bengalis were fighting for their due rights while both the Punjabi and Hindustani Muslims were fighting to further improve (Punjabis) or at least preserve (the Hindustanis) an unfair advantage over and above their population warranted in both the army (in case of Punjabis) and the civil service in case of the Hindustanis. Liaquat could have bypassed the Punjabi leaders who were mostly feudal and established a direct rapport with the Punjabi peasants by land reforms but this was never a part of the All India Muslim League which was essentially a Feudal-Bourgeois dominated party! The examination of these attitudes or their objective analysis is beyond the scope of this book. In brief, Liaquat inherited a weak Muslim League divided by ethnical dissensions. He was not perceived as a fairman by the Punjabis, Sindhis and Bengalis and did not prove by his actions anything otherwise. On Jinnah's death in September 1948 real political power came into the hands of Liaquat. Jinnah as Governor General by virtue of being the Founder of Pakistan had wielded greater authority than Prime Minister. In India it was the other way round because Gandhi had not accepted any office and the Governor General was more of a ceremonial post. On Jinnah's death Liaquat nominated Nazimuddin (1894-1964) a Bengali Muslim with a weak and indecisive personality as the Governor General. In principle Liaquat was now the strongest man in Pakistan's political set up. However, he failed to solve any of Pakistan's major problems in his three-year tenure as Pakistan's strongest Prime Minister at least till 1972. Thus while Nehru had given India a constitution by 1949, we find Liaquat having done little till he was finally assassinated in mysterious circumstances in Rawalpindi on 16 October 1951 12.

Liaquat remains a controversial Prime Minister, eulogised by Hindustani Muslims mostly living in Karachi and despised and assailed by Punjabi and Sindhi Muslims as biased till today. As a war leader we have seen he did little in terms of energetic conduct of war in Kashmir or even in terms of visiting the troops/militia/tribals fighting in Kashmir; and thus paved the way for the military's disgust with politicians, fact which as we shall later  discussed played a major part in the destruction of democracy in Pakistan. As a pure politician he failed to solve any of Pakistan's basic problems i.e. constitution making, evacuee property etc.Keith Callard and L.Binder two foreign political analysts and historians squarely blamed Liaquat for not being able to solve any of Pakistan's specific and immediate political problems 13. It is a favourite Hindustani Muslim conversation theme that Liaquat was planning to carry out land reforms before he was assassinated! Nothing is farther from truth than this assertion! Soon after partition the only progressive and comparatively intellectually endowed Muslim League Mian Iftikhar ud Din (Punjab) resigned from ministerial office because the Muslim League showed no interest in distributing land in landless peasants. The sincerity of the Muslim League government regarding land reforms can be gauged from the fact that Daultana one of the country's largest landlords was appointed by Liaquat to study land reforms!14 Iftikhar as the Minister for Refugees and Rehabilitation in the first Punjab provincial cabinet had called for distribution of large estates left by non- Muslims among refugees from East Punjab etc. resigned from his ministerial appointment when he realized that Muslim League in Punjab had absolutely no interest in land reforms or in redistribution of land. The Muslim League as a party never stood for any such thing like Land Reform. It was largely a combination of Muslim middle classes and landlords with a sprinkling of Muslim commercial interests who felt threatened by the Hindu middle classes and business interests. The only redeeming factor in Liaquat's tenure was the fact that he tried to follow an independent foreign policy, independent of USA and Britain, but here too by vacillation and indecision and finally the imperial blunder of deciding to go to visit USA before USSR whereas the  USSR was the first to invite Liaquat, Liaquat layed the foundation of the ridiculous Pakistan US alliance, which was less of an alliance and more of Pakistan being reduced to a low paid mistress of USA. Later events proved that while USSR was a dependable ally USA as an ally was as unreliable and erratic as the average American lass! It has been asserted that USA and Britain may have had a hand in Liaquat's assassination. Here again it was Liaquat's indecision and extremely slow pace of decision making that enabled the foreign powers to have him assassinated. Had he simply followed a more radical and revolutionary line of condemning the west openly and allying with USSR by maximum 1949 or early 1950,no power inside or outside Pakistan  could have challenged Liaquat! But we must remember that Liaquat was the product of Muslim loyalism and could not boldly do what his grandfather or father could not have even thought of doing! The Muslim League leaders that surrounded Jinnah were mild yes men without an independent judgement and pursuing an independent foreign policy was beyond their capability both in terms of quantity of relative intellect and resolution! Liaquat played the feudal game of bargaining with the western powers for too long and in the process enabled his internal opponents like Mirza Ghulam Muhammad and possibly Ayub to perfect plans for his assassiantion. Liaquat's tragedy was that he got the chance of being a hero but missed it despite three long years to seize it! He is mourned as well as remembered only  by the Hindustani Muslims,whereas one resolute anti west speech in Lahore or Peshawar could have made him a national hero, just like Bhutto became in Punjab, much later! Liaquats ultimate failure stemmed not because he was a Hindustani but because in terms of resolution and independent judgement he proved as hopeless as all members of his feudal class ie the Punjabi, Sindhi and Pathan feudals. Much later Bhutto transcended provincial boundaries and became an all West Pakistan leader by virtue of his resolute anti-India and anti-west stand! Liaquat's dismal performance as a prime minister and failure to actively assume the role of a popular leader who was perceived as one above the narrow definition of ethnicity, paved the way for destruction of democracy in Pakistan! History was kind to him in allowing him three long years as an all powerful prime minister at  a time when the Pakistani nation was relatively highly motivated and could have been integrated provided led by a man who was willing to be courageous in terms of foreign as well as internal policy. Liaquat failed in both and layed the foundation of destruction of democracy. Instead of strengthening his party on a national basis, he tried to play one province against another, at the same time pitching bureaucrats against his political opponents and bringing in non-Muslim League into his cabinet. He failed as a war prime minister, taking no interest in prodding the British

C in C into introducing the Pakistan Army in Kashmir, or simply by just visiting Kashmir during the whole war, something which he did not do even once! He missed the chance of being a popular leader by instituting land reforms which could have enabled him to bypass both the Punjabi or the Sindhi landlords. He failed to win over the Bengali masses (apart from the pliable and hopelss Nazimuddin) by solving the language question or by introducing legislation which paved the way for giving the East Pakistanis their due representation at the central legislature. His interest in democracy can be gauged from the fact that he declared that he would not tolerate any opposition and in branding all who opposed him as dogs of India15. He increased the powers of the police to search and harass the common man, destroyed the basic constitutional rights of the army officer by denying him a right (which he had enjoyed even during the British times) to represent against summary dismissal without  any reason, introduced the practice of dubbing political opponents as traitors and further carried forward the practice of reducing provincial autonomy, which was used by Jinnah only as a last resort and because of substantial reasons in the case of Sindh government in 1948. His widow with the benefit of hindsight claimed later that Liaquat was about to make a historical announcement on the day of his assassination! History cannot excuse Liaquat for failing to give  Pakistan a constitution in three years, something that was achieved in neighbouring India within just one year and four months of independence by January 1950. Four years in Prime Minister's seat with three years absolute in  power (following Jinnah's death)  is not a short time.

Governor General Ghulam Mohammad (1951-55), First  Constituent Assembly and Prime Minister Nazimuddin  (1951-1953)

No exact account is available about what transpired at the meeting between Ghulam Muhammad and other members of the cabinet after Liaquat's assassination. At that time Sardar Nishtar a Pathan was thought to be the most deserving candidate to succeed Liaquat. It appears that Ghulam Muhammad combined with Bengali and Punjabi members and Iskandar Mirza to sideline Nishtar. As a result of the meeting held in Rawalpindi immediately after Liaquat's assassination Ghulam Muhammad promoted himself to the rank of Governor General while Nazimuddin was made the Prime Minister. From now on Ghulam Muhammad dominated the government by sheer strength of personality. The centre of gravity of political power shifted from the Prime Minister to the Governor General. It appears that Nazimuddin mistakenly thought that as Prime Minister he would be as powerful as Liaquat without realising the profound truth behind the age old saying that it is not the office but the man who holds it that matters! The fact that Pakistan was without a constitution, thanks to Liaquat's inefficiency and that entrusting Governor Generalship to an ex-bureaucrat who had little connection with the Muslim League or the Pakistan Movement was not registered by Nazimuddin who was more famous for religious piety than for political acumen or strength of personality. The important qualitative change from the date of Ghulam's assumption of Governor General lay in the fact that real political power had passed into the hands of the Punjabi burueucrat group, whereas it had been held by the Hindustani Muslim Prime Minister. The Hindustani Muslim had appointed Nazimuddin the Bengali as Governor General because he regarded Nazimuddin to be a spineless person who could be manipulated. Now the reverse had happened. A crafty and assertive man was Governor General while the spineless and indecisive man was a Prime Minister.

Since Nazimuddin was despised and viewed as a weak man, the prestige of  the prime minister appointment was devalued, major change was introduced in Pakistan's foreign policy from 1951 onwards. Till Liaquat's death, Pakistan was not aligned with either the communist world or the west. Liaquat had been invited to USSR on 2nd June 194915 and had accepted the invitation.According to Pakistan's ambassador to USA at that time this acceptance of the Russian invitation by Liaquat changed the US Government's attitude towards Pakistan. In the Ambassador's words "Until a few months ago, we were unable to obtain anything except a few sweet words from middling state department officials. We were taken for granted as good boys; boys who would not play ball with communism or flirt with the left…we were treated as a country that did not seriously matter...with your acceptance of the invitation from Moscow overnight Pakistan began to receive the serious notice and consideration of the US government...efforts are now being made to rid us of our suspicion that we shall be accorded just treatment and the attention we deserve 16. Ghulam Muhammad on the other hand even as Finance Minister was in favour of a closer relationship with USA in order to beef up Pakistan's Defence and in order to get financial aid to improve the Pakistani economy. Ghulam Muhammad's perception about closer relations with USA was shared by Iskandar Mirza, Ayub, Zafrullah (Foreign Minister) and Ikramullah (Foreign Secretary). The USSR option was enthusiastically advocated by Raja Ghazanfar Ali the Pakistani Ambassador in Iran through whom the USSR  invitation had been routed (at that time there was no Pakistani embassy in USSR). The US embassy in Karachi had already reported to Washington that Ghulam Muhammad was accused by people in Pakistan of harbouring  political ambitions of some day replacing Liaquat as Pakistan's Prime Minister17. Initially the US government had regarded India as the best potential anti-communist ally in Asia and had invited Nehru to USA. Nehru visited USA in October 1949 but exhibited an upright and independent approach by flatly refusing to toe the US  line in Asia! US Secretary of State Dean Acheson found Nehru to be "One of the most difficult men I have ever had to deal with".18 Compare Nehru with Ghulam Muhammad (the literal meaning of Ghulam Muhammad is slave, and this fits on Ghulam Muhammad as far as sycophancy was concerned, which won him Knighthood before partition and later acted as the principal catalyst in making Pakistan a cheap US ally in Asia) who according to the US Embassy in Karachi was panting since 1947 to visit USA to present the Pakistani case before the US leaders 19. True to the Indian Muslim  traditions of  "Loyalism"  President Truman found Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zafrullah more reasonable (in other words obsequious and fully ready to do anything as ordered)20. After being snubbed by Nehru, the US  government realized that India was unwilling to assume the cheap role of a second rate (first rate being European countries) US ally in Asia. Thus, after Nehru's departure in November, President Truman on 23 November 1949 wrote a letter to Liaquat inviting him to visit USA21. In principle Liaquat should have visited USSR first since the USSR invitation was forwarded earlier than Truman's invitation i.e. June 1949 as compared to November 1949. According to G.W Choudhry an authority on Pakistan's foreign policy there was a powerful clique in Pakistan consisting of men with a known "Loyalist" pre-1947 like Ghulam Muhammad, Zafrullah and Ikramullah who were against Liaquat visiting Moscow, and these men were able to convince Liaquat to visit the USA first22 Liaquat decided to visit USA first and visited USA in May 1950. Resultantly USSR was naturally annoyed and Pakistan has not recovered till today from this faux pas of 1950! While the US abandoned Pakistan after temporarily retaining Pakistan as a cheap ally during the period 1954-65 the Russians continued to openly assist India as a result of which Pakistan went through the humiliation of 1971, the scars of which still haunt the Pakistani psyche. Meanwhile, in May 1950 a top secret formal agreement had been reached between UK and USA to pursue a joint policy in the sub continent23. After coming back from USA Liaquat annoyed the USA and UK by proposing a Prime Ministerial meeting between the Prime Ministers of Iran (Mossadegh who was deeply anti US/UK), Egypt and Pakistan to discuss Iranian Oil, Suez Canal, Palestine and Kashmir 24. Raja Ghazanfar Ali the Pakistani ambassador in Iran was called by Liaquat to finalize the details of the proposed conference in early October 195125. The fact that there were strongly pro-US elements in Pakistani leaderships higher echelons points towards the chances of a US-UK hand in Liaquat's assassination. After Liaquat's assassination the US- Pakistan relations became much closer. Ayub visited USA and met Dulles on 30th September 1953. On this visit Ayub told a US official "For Christ's sake, I didn't come to the US to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you want us. But lets make a decision"26. Psychologically Ayub was reflecting the pre-1947 Indian loyalist mercenary tradition that made the Indians fight for Britain. It was logical  for the son of a VCO to think like that! The lure of all those Jangi Inams and Jagirs that the British gave for military services. Perhaps Ayub carried a subconscious desire for a Jangi Inam and this the Pakistani elite was destined to get in form of economic aid, as we shall discuss later! In other words Ayub was saying that Pakistan's Army was ready to soldier for USA in any US war in Asia. This was followed by Ghulam Muhammad's meeting with  Eisenhower on 12th November 1953. The Americans knew that the post Liaquat Pakistani leadership was desperate and nothing immediate was achieved by Ghulam-Ayub duo. Ayub described the talks as "highly complicated, occasionally extremely slow, but eventually successful"27. The various negotiations that followed Ghulam Muhammad's visit are beyond the scope of this book. Finally on 25 February 1954 Eisenhower announced that USA intended to favourably respond to Pakistan's request for military aid under the mutual defence assistance programme.28 A US military mission finally arrived in Pakistan in March 1954 in order to study Pakistan's military requirements in detail. In May 1954 Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with USA. Later in a book published with Ayub's blessings in 1960 it was claimed that Ayub was the architect of the military aid programme29. The same book claimed that the US did not have a very high opinion about Pakistan's political leadership and was "happy that the Pakistan Army was on their side"30. It was an irony that Pakistan was having an army leadership that was dying to do anything for US interests at a time when Asia had leaders like Nasser and Mosaddegh! Pakistan proved its unconditional loyalty by signing the SEATO agreement in September 1954 and the CENTO agreement in February 1955. It was as a result of these agreements that Pakistan received approximately 1.2 to 1.5 billion US Dollar in military aid during the period 1954-6531. It must be understood that Pakistan was always a second rate ally of USA and received much less military aid than Turkey   South Korea etc32. Even Yugoslavia despite being a non aligned country got more aid than Pakistan. The US aid was designed to keep Pakistan away from Communist Russia and not to win a war with India. It was peanuts compared with USSR aid to India and Egypt, but enough to keep Pakistan's ruling elite happy. In 1956 when Israel, France and UK attacked Egypt, Pakistan which was mistakenly called the bastion of Islam did not even verbally utter one word of sympathy for Egypt! The most important component of this aid was the economic aid which was largely siphoned by the civil-military-business elite of West Pakistan and resulted in the creation of 21 Families (including Ayub's family) which controlled Pakistan's economy. This aid  during the period 1947-65 amounted to approximately

3 billion USD33. The US military aid created an impression in the Pakistani public that Pakistan's defence had become impregnable and that Pakistan could overrun India in case of a war in no time gave misconception which ultimately proved to be counterproductive for Ayub in the aftermath of the 1965 war. It appears that the ruling elite of Pakistan also believed in this delusion. We will discuss this aspect in greater detail subsequently.

While Liaquat despite not being a great statesman and a national leader was at least assertive and possessed an independent will and was a strong Prime Minister at least as far as his personal interests were concerned, Nazimuddin was neither a strong man, nor a great statesman, nor a national leader. Thus Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor General became a more important pillar of state, than was the case during Liaquat's Prime Ministership after Mr Jinnah's death. Nazimuddin's constitution making record, however, was better than Liaquat's record. The most significant of  Nazimuddin government's effort in this regard was the "Basic Principles Committee of December 1952". This sub-committee was constituted during Liaquat's tenure in January 1951 following the negative reaction in the East wing over the "Interim Committee Report". The committee made no progress during Liaquat's tenure but finalised its recommendations in December 1952, and these were presented by Nazimuddin in the Constituent Assembly on 22 December 1952. The report did not contain anything dynamic except removing the most unreasonable suggestion of  allowing all five provinces equal number of votes in the upper house. The report recognised the principle of parity (knowing fully well that real power was not held by the Bengalis but by the two larger ethnic groups of the West Wing ie the Hindustani Muslims and the Punjabi Muslims) but made little allowance for provincial autonomy. It visualised a two house federal legislature with the upper house having sixty members from each wing and a lower house with 200 members from each wing, divided as following 34:-

The report allowed the federal legislature to reallocate seats in both the houses,provided the principle of parity and weightage to smaller units were observed and the proposed reallocation refelected the then existing ratio of population. The lower house was to deal with all major issues like "Budget making", "Money Bills" and "Motions of Confidence". The upper house only had "recommendatory powers".The report despite the fact that the government led by a Bengali Prime Minister  had renounced the East Wing's majority and had accepted parity was not acceptable to the Punjabi politicians. Their principle objection being that East Pakistan could easily outmanoeuvre a fragmented West Pakistan divided into various provinces!35 Tempers in the Punjab were  so high that three days before the Basic Principles Committee Report was formally presented,the newspaper Nawa-i-Waqt supported the idea that both East and West Pakistan should be "absolutely free and independent states in keeping with the spirit of Lahore Resolution and should link themselves in a confedration dealing with only three subjects: defence, external affairs and currency" 36. The report was rejected by all major Punjabi politicians including Choudhry Mohammad Ali who had been elevated to the post of the Central Finance Minister in October 1951, once Nazimuddin had succeeded Liaquat as the Prime Minister37. The fierce Punjabi opposition to the report ensured that constitution making was yet again delayed by two years. As a result the cause of democracy suffered and the civil-military clique became far more stronger than it was in 1951. No further progress was made in constitution making following this deadlock. Before any other major move could be made to overcome this constitutional deadlock the west wing and Punjab in particular was rocked by the anti-Ahmaddiya riots. The Ahmadis are an Islamic sect  who somewhat deny one of the basic tenets of Islam, that Mohammad (P.B.U.H) is the last  of the prophets. The Ahmadis were a small (about 200,000 in 1953) but well organised, highly motivated whatever their belief and an extremely close knit community. The fact that one of their members Choudhry Zafrullah was included as Pakistan's first Foreign Minister in the cabinet signified that Mr Jinnah regarded them as good as any other Muslim from any other sect of Pakistan. Orthodox religious feeling against this community was very strong in Punjab and a party had been formed long before independence with the very aim of persecuting this small and peaceful community. On 21 January 1953 a delegation of the obscurantist Mullahs delivered an ultimatum to Nazimuddin that they would resort to direct action (violent protests/agitation) unless the government declared the Ahmadis  a non-Muslim minority and dismissed all Ahmadis including Zafrullah from government posts! The situation was further aggravated because of the extremely, dubious and negative role of Liaquat's handpicked Chief Minister of Punjab Daultana, who issued a public statement exhorting the central government to agree to all the demands of the Mullahs38! Daultana's prime motivation in issuing this statement seems to have been to destabilise the government of the Bengali Prime Minister Nazimuddin. Serious disturbances broke out in Punjab from early March 1953 and the civil administration proved incapable of dealing with the situation. Nazimuddin being an essentially indecisive man, as most mild men are instead of energetically tackling the rioters,was paralysed by total inertia. The rioters damaged public property and killed a significant number of people including some policemen. Daultana the Chief Minister who somehow thought that he could capitalise by the unrest did not show firmness in dealing with the mullahs. The situation was only controlled once the army took over and imposed martial law.It is not clear whether General Azam the military commander in Lahore took over on his own and imposed martial law  or did so as specifically ordered by Iskandar Mirza39. However, the impotance of the civilian government  further reduced the credibility of democratic institutions in Pakistan. Nazimuddin's situation was made yet more worse by grave food shortage as a result of bad harvest. Taking advantage of Nazimuddin's vulnerable situation Ghulam Muhammad asked Nazimuddin to sack two cabinet ministers ie Sattar Pirzada the Food Minister  from Sindh and Fazlur Rahman the Commerce Minister from Bengal. Nazimuddin resisted the suggestion and was dismissed by  Ghulam Muhammad in accordance with the constitutional powers of the Governor General (as stipulated in the 1935 India Act) to do so40. Ghulam Muhammad in doing so as  a matter of fact took advantage of a constitutional loophole left by Liaquat who viewed the state as essentially an interplay between men who were pliable and not as what an office holder could or could not do constitutionally. Nazimuddin in line with his weak personality did not challenge his dismissal and the primacy of the office of the Prime Minister as the leader of the Parliament was seriously undermined. It may be noted that the Defence Secretary Iskandar Mirza and the army c in c Ayub were in league with Ghulam Muhammad41. A clear cut precedent that the army and the civilian bureaucrats could dismiss governments at will  was established. The failure of Liaquat to frame a constitution, just because he wanted to avoid Bengali or Punjabi domination, paved the way for the destruction of democracy in Pakistan. The expedient of having a pliable and docile man as Governor General instead of institutionally ensuring through acts of parliament that the governor general was a mere figure head enabled a non-elected man, who had nothing to do with the Muslim League, enabled Ghulam Muhammad to resort to an act which ensured that democracy as a political system had no chance of success in Pakistan. The worst part of the whole affair was the fact that the action of Ghulam Muhammad was welcomed by the public and was even hailed by so-called eminent periodicals like the Economist of London and  the Times newspaper of London! The US Ambassador  to Pakistan described Ghulam Muhammad's action as  "one of the most popular coups in history"42

According to Firoz Khan Noon who later served as Prime Minister of Pakistan, the government after Liaquat's assassination was dominated by Ghulam Muhammad, Mohammad Ali and Iskandar Mirza43. The Army was politicized once Ayub was given the first extension by Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar in 1953. In April 1953 Ghulam Muhammad dismissed the Prime Minister Nazimuddin and his cabinet citing inefficiency as the cause for doing so. Theoretically, the Prime Minister was the most powerful man in Pakistan while the Governor General was only a figurehead. In reality Ghulam Muhammad by strength of personality was running the whole show while Nazimuddin because of lack of moral courage and decisiveness was playing second fiddle to Ghulam Muhammad! This enabled Ghulam to dismiss Nazimuddin and his cabinet. Inefficiency of Pakistani Prime Minister, inability to formulate a constitution in six years greatly assisted Ghulam Mohammad in resorting to this arbitrary action. Ghulam Muhammad now nominated Mohammad Ali Bogra a Bengali who was quite similar in being like a rubber stamp to Nazimuddin. He also removed two ministers who had a will of their own and had consistently refused to get dictation from Ghulam Muhammad i.e. Nishtar and Fazl ur Rahman (Bengali).

Recent research by a brilliant Pakistani scholar  suggests some very cogent reasons why Nazimuddin was dismissed. Despite the anti-Ahmadi agitation, Nazimuddin enjoyed the confidence of the legislature and this is proved by the fact that he was able to get the annual budget passed44. Nazimuddin's budget had reduced the defence allocation by 30 percent 45 and this action was naturally viewed with great apprehension by the military establishment, who despised, both the Bengalis as a race and Nazimuddin!

The First Constituent Assembly, Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra (1953-1954)

Ghulam Muhammad recalled Mohammad Ali Bogra another Bengali who was also pliable like Nazimuddin but also slippery, then serving as Pakistan's ambassador to US.Mohammad Ali Bogra was a strange character; one with no conviction but one who could be manipulated in any direction, by anyone who was assertive! Mohammad Ali had no ego or pride and ideally fitted in Dalhousie's definition of the Indian princely state rulers ie "one who could stand any amount of kicking". We will prove this assertion in a subsequent paragraph 46.

Bogra did not have spine or  political conviction  but  proved more talented than all his predecessors, as far as constitution making was concerned! He was able to overcome the deadlock over representation between the East and West wings by presenting a constitutional formula which was acceptable to both the wings 47. Bogra presented a new constitutional formula; which had the distinction of being one; which was acceptable to both the wings of the country while ensuring that both wings could not dominate each other and the smaller provinces also had a say in legislation and in running of the country. The "Mohammad Ali Formula" presented as a part of the "Basic Principles Committee Report"  which consisted of approximately 250 clauses48, on 7th October 1953 envisaged a bicameral legislature; with a lower house of 300 members, elected on the basis of population, and a upper house of fifty members in which all five provinces had equal representation 49:-