A Pakistani General gives a lesson on Pakistans History

Amin Globe Journal May 2001 The Political Life of Gen Babar


End Notes by Dr Andre

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The Political Life of Gen Babar[1]

Conducted by A.H Amin

Agha.H.Amin

Published in Globe Journal May 2001

April 2001

Personal Life

1. Please tell us something about your early life before you joined the Army?

I was born in Peshawar in 1928. Our ancestors originated from Kandahar and had settled in the Peshawar Valley, particularly at Pirpai (my ancestral village) near Nowshera. There is a Babar Settlement at Zhob and there are small communities of Babar, at Quetta, Multan and D I Khan (Chaudwan). Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan also hails from the same tribe (Muzaffargarh). In the First World War 78 people went to the war as Indian Army men and four laid down their life. Pirpai is one of the very few villages which has an official plaque commemorating its First World War contribution. My father was basically a Recruiting Officer of the Indian Army but had been attached for sometime to the 6 Rajputana Rifles.

After initial study of two years at a Private Public School (Miss Birch), I joined the Presentation Convent School Peshawar from 1935 to 1939. From 1939 to 1941 I attended the Burn Hall School, then located at Baramula and Srinagar. (Please note that they shifted from Baramula to Abbottabad in 1947 since they did not desire to continue in India). From 1941 to 1946 I studied at the Prince of Wales' Royal Indian Military College Dehra Dun from where I did my Senior Cambridge and also received one year's pure Military Training. It was here in Dehra Dun that I was lucky to be the student of the well-known Mr Catchpole. Catchpole was a man of great devotion, conviction and dedication. He played a very formative role in our education at Dehra Dun. After Senior Cambridge from the RIMC Dehra Dun I appeared before the Services Selection Board at Meerut and was selected for the Indian Army in November 1947. We were airlifted to Lahore along with Muslim GCs (Gentleman Cadets) from the IMA as the First PMA and were privileged to be received by Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. I joined the PMA in January 1948.

2. Please describe your parents and their influence on your perception/personality?

My father and grandfather were the two most honest and upright people that I saw in life. I was greatly inspired by both of these individuals and inherited their basic traits. In character building the role of mother was more significant.

3. Please tell us about any incident in your early years that left a lasting impression on your personality ?

Two events left a particularly strong impression. One was the abject poverty and submissiveness of the Kashmiri Muslims, particularly the males owing to severe oppression by the Dogra rulers. However, the females were fairly aggressive in protecting their rights. The second significant incident was while proceeding to Meerut I saw a Muslim refugee train which had been attacked near Jagadhri in 1947. All my life thence I have not been able to reconcile with the feigned Indian democracy and been involved in four wars against India, viz; 1948 (Kashmir); 1965 Rann of Kutch, 1965 (Indo-Pak War), 1971 (Indo-Pak War). In three of these I found myself in Kashmir!

4. How was your student life?

It was memorable. The missionaries at the convent in Peshawar and at Burn Hall Baramula/Srinagar were a dedicated lot. Education in those days was a very healthy combination of intellectual and physical activity. I got an early exposure to military training at RIMC where one year was completely dedicated to military training.

5. Any teacher who played a decisive role in formation of your perceptions/convictions?

There were many teachers who I can mention. There was Father Shanks, Father Moran, Father Louis a Dutchman who later died at Malakwal, Father Mallet, at Burns Haiz, Mr Catchpole and Mr E I Connolly, a Battle of Britain fighter pilot, who had already received a DSO and DFC (Bar) at the RIMC.

6. What was your opinion about Mr Bhutto[2] as you saw him as a Minister the period 1958-66?

I had seen Mr Bhutto as a Minister in 1958-66 as an Army Major and felt that he had great talents. From 1972 onwards I saw him far more closely as IG FC.

7. What do you have to say about the Balochistan problem of 1974-76?

This problem was created through the intrigues of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan[3], the then Interior Minister. Qayyum was an arch intriguer and wanted to strengthen his party in Balochistan. Thus the problem in Lasbela was started due to his machinations. Mengal[4] was a patriot who was manoeuvred into a controversial role through Qayyum's intrigues. I may add that the motivation of taking the army to Balochistan was positive. Given the task even the FC could have done the job as we earlier did in Kakar Khurasan. Mr Bhutto was a bit impatient since all members of his family had not crossed the 50 year age mark. He wanted to do away with the Sardari System[5] and bring development in Balochistan. Regrettably, the Chief Secretary and the Corps Commander were brothers and this led to a much quicker employment of the Army.

8. What about the Hyderabad tribunal[6] and disengagement of the army from Balochistan?

It is on record that Mr Bhutto wanted to withdraw the Army from Balochistan in 1976. The then Army Chief Zia[7] opposed this idea. In addition around the same time Mr Bhutto wanted to wind up the Hyderabad Tribunal. This was again opposed by Zia as Army Chief. Ironically Zia did exactly what Mr Bhutto wanted in 1977 rather than 1976. The two subjects were discussed in my presence in November 1976 at Dir. Zia had wanted to use these as excuses/pretexts for military take over. He was already in collusion with the opposition.

9. You were selected as Governor NWFP in 1974-75. How did this occur ?

Mr Bhutto had already seen me as IG FC (Inspector General Frontier Corps) and was keen to have me in the province as a Governor since the province was a political trouble spot and he wanted to integrate the tribal areas and organise the nascent Afghan resistance, a task, commenced by me in October '73 as IG FC.

10. So how was this stint?

We did well. During this period there were a large number of bomb blasts in the NWFP with Ajmal Khattak[8] and Azam Hoti[9] sitting in Kabul indulging in anti-Pakistan speeches and activity. In order to convey a message to Sardar Daud[10] that we could play the same game and to assess the training level of the resistance an operation was initiated in Panjsher Valley in August 1975. The operation was a total success. The Afghans suffered heavily in men and equipment and Daud sought peace and accepted the Durand Line. He initiated an agreement in mid-1976. However, the formal agreement was not signed in view of Zia's take over.

11. When did Pakistan enter the Afghan scenario as a party, which was assisting the anti-Daud insurgents in Afghanistan?

In October 1973 while I was serving as IG FC an Afghan named Habibur Rahman (Shaheed) came and contacted me about setting up a resistance movement in Afghanistan with active military assistance of Pakistan. I conveyed the same to Mr Bhutto, who accepted my proposal in view of the changed situation in Afghanistan and asked me to organise training of Afghans.

12. What was the political and military aim of the Pakistani government of that time?

From 1947 till that date all Afghan governments had generally not been friendly towards Pakistan. They raised the bogey of Pakhtunistan but refrained from acting against us in 1965 and 1971 when at war with India because of the political environment after the Liaquat Bagh meeting. There were a large number of bomb blasts. Mr Z.A Bhutto was very clear even in 1973 after Daud's coup. An analysis of the regional environment was undertaken, highlighting the break in the Afghan system of continuity; the impending generational change in the leadership in the USSR and China (Chou had died). The inability of continuity/stability in Iran with removal of Shah of Iran from the scene. Being the last of the party ideologues it looked likely that the USSR leadership may take the opportunity to move once more and invade Afghanistan, a step towards the fulfilment of Peter the Great's will (1777). Thus we established the base of Afghan Mujahideen resistance in 1973.

13. What type of assistance was provided to the Afghan resistance and which Pakistani agencies were involved?

We gave them basic infantry weapons, some specialised training in how to conduct guerrilla warfare under an SSG team[11] until it was discontinued on 05 July 1977 by Gen Zia, who lacked the strategic vision.

14. At what stage did the SSG enter the scene as the principal agency that trained the Afghan resistance?

They (a team) imparted training in the belief that they were training Frontier Corps personnel (all trainees were enlisted in the Frontier Corps before training)

15. What was the ISI[12] role in Afghanistan in the period 1974-77?

It was a top secret affair and the ISI had no role. The secret was shared between Mr Bhutto, myself, Aziz Ahmad[13] and the then Army Chief Tikka Khan[14]. This was for obvious reasons. The Foreign Office could with, nonchalance deny if the issue was raised at UN or any other forum.

16. Who were the pioneers of the anti-Daud Afghan resistance?

These were Ustad Rabbani[15], Hikmatyar[16], Ahmad Shah Masood[17] and a host of others who came to Pakistan after October 1973.

17. You have been a committed member of the PPP? At what stage did you decide that you must join Mr Bhutto's party?

I was impressed by Mr Bhutto's progressive policies since 1972. On 27 July 1977 after Martial Law Mr Bhutto personally requested me to join the PPP. I did so out of conviction once Mr Bhutto was out of power.

18. Why did Mr Bhutto select Zia as a COAS (Chief of Army Staff)?

There were a number of reasons and these were discussed with me personally by Mr Bhutto, while in detention at Murree. One was the pretended humility of Zia, and this disarmed Mr Bhutto into the belief that he would pose no threat to the nascent democracy. Secondly, his performance when he invited Mr Bhutto to the centenary celebrations of 11 Cavalry at Kharian. He took pains to ascertain Mr Bhutto's tailor in Karachi (Hamid Khan) and had a Blue Patrols as Colonel-in-Chief of Armoured Corps stitched. On entering the room, Mr Bhutto found a suitcase on his bed and on inquiry was told that it contained the Blue Patrol. The next day, Mr Bhutto was requested to climb a tank and engage a target. Quite obviously the target was hit. Then was his performance while on deputation in Jordan, where he killed a large number of Palestinians (Black September), Mr Bhutto was led to the belief that if he was so loyal to Jordan, he would be even more loyal to Pakistan. His prime performance came at Multan, where he invited Mr Bhutto as Colonel-in-Chief. After the function, when Mr Bhutto had barely returned to Mr Sadiq Qureshi's house, when he was informed that General Zia requested to meet him. Mr Bhutto was surprised, having met him in the mess a little earlier. However, he called him into Mr Sadiq Qureshi's study/library. Gen Zia on entrance went round the Almirah, looking for something and on inquiry he revealed that he was looking for a copy of the Holy Quran. On finding a copy he placed his hand on and addressing Mr Bhutto he said, "You are the saviour of Pakistan and we owe it to you to be totally loyal to you". Then was the fact that there was little to pick and choose amongst the other aspirants. The only other suitable candidate was General Majeed Malik who was Mr Bhutto's favourite as a sound professional. Unfortunately was involved in the International Hotel Scandal where he was caught with Mustafa Khar. He was sent as Ambassador to Libya. Finally, of course was the American angle. Zia's obsequeous behaviour made Mr Bhutto think that he was a non-political man. Pakistani democracy was at an infant stage and could not afford an Army Chief with political ambitions. Then there was not much choice. Gen Sharif was considered politically unreliable since he had been very close to Ayub Khan[18]. Jillani had no command experience and was the head of ISI. Akbar Khan had not performed well as a GOC 12 Division in Kashmir in 1971 war. Gen Aftab and AB Awan had no command potential and were not suitable.

19. It has been said that a large number of PPP[19] tickets for 1977 elections were awarded to opportunists who were not sincere workers of PPP. Why did this happen?

It is good to be idealistic! However, in politics as in other fields of endeavour, the ground realities cannot be ignored. It is typical of us to select one aspect of an event and pass judgements rather than rationally analyse the problem in its entirety. Firstly, political parties, unlike dictatorship, perform under a manifesto or a programme rather than on whims as dictators generally do. Individuals, in consequence, are not of prime import as long as they subscribe to the basics/underlying philosophy of the manifesto. Judgement should only have been passed if the individuals had performed for a reasonable period and not abided by the party's basic philosophy/manifesto.

20. It has been asserted that Mr Bhutto was punished by some foreign powers/power for initiating Pakistan's nuclear programme. Is this correct?

Within hours of the declaration of an election programme/date the PNA[20] came into being and thus, through all means fair or foul thwarted the political process. As, in the ultimate, they were working at someone else's behest and according to someone else's agenda. It would be pertinent to recall Kissinger's remarks at Lahore and the letters written to army officers by a senior leader of the PNA (who even today masquerades as a democrat). The entire movement was in keeping with a programme and, in consequence, a large amount of dollars changed hands at Jan's, Peshawar Cantonment between a foreign representative and a senior leader of the PNA. 

ZA Bhutto meets Intellgence Boss Rao Rasheed .To the left another illustrious IG Police Fazl e Haq.I met Mr Fazl e Haq the first time in 1971 when he was serving as IG Balochistan.He was good friend of my father.I remember meeting his son Faizi in Quetta in 1971.He later served as IG in Sindh and Punjab too and also later wrote columns in newspapers.

Further more, in keeping with this/their programme some key leaders, of the PNA (detained at Sihala) thwarted efforts of reaching an agreement between the government and the PNA despite the fact that initial agreement to hold elections afresh was taken on May 12 1977 between the late Mufti Mahmood[21] and Mr. Z.A Bhutto in a meeting at the PM's house. Today, even Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, owing to belated pangs of conscience admits that the army moved in, despite an agreement having been clinched.

The bane of this country has been the repeated intervention of the army and thus frustrating political maturity and strengthening of political institutions. The four post-1988 interventions amply confirm this attitude/malaise of the Armed Forces.

It cannot be gainsaid that the military junta has failed in entirety in all interventions, and departed ignominously. The fate of the present element is yet to be seen but could be no different.

21. It has been said that Zia coup (he overthrew ruling Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in a bloodless coup d'état on 5. July 1977 and became the state's third ruler to impose martial law. He initially ruled as Chief Martial Law Administrator, but later installed himself as the President of Pakistan in September 1978.) was foreign inspired.

Yes, undoubtedly, the factors cited contributed to his selection as COAS. There was off course the American angle. They had picked Zia as suitable material at Fort Leavenworth, followed his career progress and possibly lobbied in his favour. They made it known to friends months in advance that he would be appointed COAS.

22. How would Mr ZA Bhutto have behaved had he been in power when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan?

Mr Bhutto laid the foundation of the Afghan resistance in 1973. He had the foresight and vision to do it. As a matter of fact we created the organisational network which was used by Zia and the USA to oppose the Soviets. Zia had a short term vision and ignored the political angle of organising an Afghan government in exile with ulterior aims of gobbling US aid. Had Mr Bhutto been in chair he would not have deliberately neglected the political angle like Zia. Even Daud was convinced by Mr Bhutto in 1976 and said "Pakistan and Afghanistan are in the same boat. If it is the threat from the North (USSR) it is Afghanistan today and Pakistan tomorrow. 

If it is the threat from the South (India) it is Pakistan today and Afghanistan tomorrow". You see after 1971 Indian strategists had placed Pakistan and Afghanistan in the same category as the next target. Mr Bhutto laid the foundation of the Afghan resistance for reasons discussed earlier. However, being a political animal, he also continued with a political alternative/solution. In November 1976, in consultation with the resistance leadership, two individuals, namely Wakil Azam Shinwari and Yunus Khugiani were selected to proceed to Rome and request King Zahir Shah[22] to return as his father had done earlier, to lead a movement into Afghanistan. 

The caveat was that Zahir Shah could return as a constitutional monarch under the Constitution drafted by Mr Musa Shafiq, a former Prime Minister and the mentor/founder of the Hizb in Afghanistan. However, Zahir Shah indicated that he was willing to play his role but he would first visit Saadat (Egypt), then visit the Shah of Iran and finally arrive in Pakistan. Mr Bhutto was confident that King Zahir Shah could act as a rallying point and play his historical role. Events, however, took a different turn and martial law was imposed in Pakistan. The other aspect was the negotiations with Sardar Daud. Even Daud as earlier discussed had accepted the Durand Line in 1976 and wanted peace with Pakistan. Also the successful negotiations with Sardar Daud, to safeguard Pakistan's, rightful interests are cases in point.

23. Why was the PPP unable to mobilise the masses around the time Mr. Bhutto was sentenced to death till his execution?

It would be recalled that the PPP workers made great sacrifices and the resistance put up by Mr. Bhutto himself during his incarceration proved a beacon light. He endured all the excesses with great courage and dignity. The workers on their part went to jail in the thousands! Every element of society (pressmen, lawyers) were brutalised and lashed. A large number of workers resorted to self-immolation. However, it was the leadership that eventually deserted them. Jatoi and Khar colluded with the army, proceeded abroad and despite being mixed up with the Indian intelligence agency RAW[23], later Mr Khar was never tried by the military! Hafeez Pirzada also married afresh and abandoned his leader! The worst instance was of the talented cousin Mr Mumtaz Bhutto[24], who not only abandoned Mr. Bhutto but also colluded with Zia. Maulana Niazi[25], Mir Afzal Khan[26] and a host of others initially endeavoured to take over the party. In February 1978, when the endeavour failed or was foiled and Begum Bhutto[27] was designated co-chairperson, they disappeared from the scene. Their political nemesis is abundant proof of their disloyalty and the party (workers) never accepted them in their fold. The most poignant scene was at Garhi Khuda Bux, when on one of the anniversaries, they were beaten up by the workers and had to flee barefooted in the scorching heat! It is to the credit of the workers, that, despite 11 years of repression and intrigue (formation of IJI by the ISI), they yet succeeded in bringing the party into government in 1988. Contrast this with the events of October 1999 and subsequently, when the main leadership (Nawaz Sharif[28] and family) of the so-called PML[29] (Nawaz) absconded to Saudi Arabia and the workers left in the lurch.

The biased trial of ZA Bhutto manipulated by zia and the sold characterless judges

24. It is being said in Sindh and Balochistan that had Mr. Bhutto not been from Sindh he would not have been executed but exiled like Mr. Nawaz Sharif. What is your opinion?

There is no doubt in this assertion. Initially the attitude of the Lahore High Court and its Chief Justice (Maulvi Mushtaq) is no secret. Even at the Supreme Court, it was a divided verdict and the judges hailing from Punjab on the one side and those hailing from the smaller provinces (all dissenting) on the other.

 It was a replay of the Lahore High Court scenario. Moreover, no divided judgement has ever been affected but in this case Mr. Bhutto, hailing from a smaller province, was executed. The merit of the judgement is evident from the fact that it cannot be cited as a legal precedent. Foreign judicial/legal experts have termed it as judicial murder.

Forced funeral of ZA Bhutto under military intelligence supervision of the usurper zia

25. How would you assess Zia's Afghan policy?

It was based on sheer opportunism and personal interest. Initially, he lacked the vision and, therefore, suspended financing the movement. This resulted in break-up of movement from one to seven groups, each leader fending for himself. Secondly, when the Soviet invasion took place he did not form a government in exile, which could gain experience during the Jehad and be available when the Geneva talks took place. Also all the US/Saudi and other assistance would have been routed through institutional organisations (Ministries) rather than individuals and would have prevented heart burning and divisive tendencies. Finally, he opposed the Geneva talks and visualised