Myths ,Distortions and Misconceptions of Indo Pak History-Part One
Myths ,Distortions and Misconceptions of Indo Pak History-Part One
A Chapter of the book
The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59
by
Agha.H.Amin
17 August 1998
The Martial Races Theory and its Consequences
The sepoy war of 1857 gave birth to a new theory in India. A theory was floated in the late nineteenth century that the races living in the north west part of India i.e. present northern regions of Pakistan and parts of Indian Punjab were the “Martial Races of Indiaâ€.!
The theory was based on “Punjab and Frontier†loyalty factor of 1857. Its most serious proponent was Lord Roberts563 the British
C-in-C in India. When I joined the army in 1981 I observed that many of the officers and soldiers serving in Pakistan Army were convinced that the races or castes living in the area between Chenab and IndusRivers were martial. Some Pathans originating from the NWFP were also regarded as junior partners of these martial races!
A cursory glance at the history of Indo-Pak subcontinent is enough for even a layman to understand that most of the invasions of India took place originating from areas north of Khyber Pass or west of Quetta i.e. Persia etc. The Mughals after 1526 recruited from Hindu Rajputs, Muslim Pathans, Muslim Rajputs, some Muslim Punjabis and Muslim Baloch, but the preference was given to trans-Indus races, mostly Pathans or Persian speaking, or to Hindu Rajputs.
The EEIC since it made its entry from the east had no choice but to recruit from Oudh parts of Bihar North West Provinces Madras Bombay Central India etc. In the earlier part of this work we have seen that using a predominantly Hindu army recruited from the Gangetic plain and led by British officers the pre-1857 Bengal Army defeated all races of India, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan etc. The Bombay Army of Hindu Mahrattas quickly made Persia behave! A couple of Bengal Army Regiments reinforced by an odd European regiment successfully defended Kandahar and Jallalabad against vastly superior forces.
The rebellion of 1857 changed British perceptions and keeping in view the political reliability as well as the administrative convenience factor the British decided to recruit mostly from the north west i.e. Punjab and Frontier provinces of India and the Gurkhas from Nepal. This change started from 1857 but became significant only around 1895.
Even reliability was not the only factor. Because the Madras and Bombay Armies had also stayed loyal. Still based on personal bias felt by Lord Roberts and under his influence by some other British senior officers the recruitment policy was changed. In general following 1857 the British adopted the policy of non-reliance on any particular race and even the Punjabi Muslims and the Pathans who had remained stand were mixed with other castes and religious communities only the Gurkhas were grouped together or certain Muzhbi Sikh Regiments. An experiment of having pure Muslim or pure Hindu Rajput regiments from 1893 but abandoned by 1919, keeping in view the mutinies of 5th Light Infantry and 15 Lancers at Singapore /Mesopotamia.
The Ranghar Muslims of 125th Light Infantry were superior in stature to any  Indian soldiers who were
mercenaries of British.In Pashtuns their greatness was matched by Wazirs,Mehsuds,Afridis and Alizais who rebelled against British in First World War
In the 1880 and 1890s it was widely believed that the Indian army was supposed to face the Russian threat originating from Central Asia. It was thus said that the Bombay or Madras soldiers who were shorter in height and smaller in physique were not fit for mountain warfare in India’s north west564. Charles Chenevix Trench an Indian Army British Officer and a respectable military historian has given a reason for the British bias against east of Jumna and South Indian races. He says in his book on the Indian Army that “Reasons for preferring northerners were largely racial. To Kipling’s contemporaries, the taller and fairer a native, the better man he was likely to be. He looked more impressive on parade, he might be physically stronger, he would surely be braver and more loyal than the down country men. There was a general preference for the wild over the half educated native as being less addicted to unwholesome political thinking565â€.
Charles Chenevix Trench went further in explaining this British bias, he said “Brahmins had been prominent in the Mutiny, and their diet and prejudices though somewhat illogical by stating as following: “The Madrasi soldier was smallish, blackish and rather low caste. The Mahratta was also in origin of no very high caste, and smallish to hoot. The fact that his grandfather had held India to ransom did not make him more acceptable to the Indian Army 567â€.
It must be noted that the first Afghan was fought by a largely Hindu based army. Whatever the initial British failures, the British won the First Afghan war giving Afghanistan such a mauling that the Afghans dared not attack India in 1857 when the British were really highly vulnerable.
It would be false and erroneous, however, to assume that the British immediately changed the class composition of the Indian Army (Bengal Army in particular) in the years following 1857. In this regard the British quality of patience and subtlety in terms of long-term thinking is admirable. They still continued recruitment from the areas around Delhi and east of Jumna; which had played a major role in the rebellion. The real shift and bias in British policy was a slower process; and had little connection with any war fought by a still largely Hindu majority and Hindustani heavy Bengal Army as evident in terms of 1885 statistics; in the period between 1880 and 1914.
The major factor in the anti-Hindustani/anti-Maratha/anti-Madrasi bias was the influence of Lord Roberts who remained the C-in-C of Madras Army and more importantly that of Bengal Army from 28 Nov 1885 to 7th April 1893568.
Robert played on the fears of Russian threat to India and succeeded in convincing the Viceroy and India Office to significantly change the class composition of the Bengal Army from a mixed affair to a largely Punjabised army dominated by Punjabi Muslims followed by Sikh Pathans and Gurkhas. Thus the “Martial Races Theory†had its origin in the mind of Lord Roberts and was not based on any significant and convincing conclusions deducted from war performance; and I mean comparative war performance of Hindu versus Muslim or Hindustani/Madrasi versus Punjabi/Pathan. Political reliability, however, became more serious as a factor as education increased in areas east of Jumna following 1857; by virtue of a deliberate British policy to educate Indians starting from 1857 when the three universities of Calcutta Bombay and Madras were established.
Thus statistics show a major change in British recruitment policy in the period from 1885 to 1914569:-
Companies Total Companies of each within the religious groups
total are underlined with percentage below
Religion/Group
Total
Brahman Hindu
Rajput Hindu
Other Hindu Hindu
Dogars Punjabi
Gurkhas Muslims
Punjabi Muslims
Hindustani Muslims
Pathans Muslims
Hindu
199
25
47
56
18
53
56.3%
12.56%
23.61%
26.63
9.04
26.63
Muslims
76
25
36
15
21.59%
32.89%
47.36%
19.73%
Sikhs       Â
77
                 Â
21.87%
Total
%age
352
25
47
56
18
53
25
36
15
7.10%
13.35%
15.90%
5.11%
15.05%
7.10%
10.22%
4.26%
Ethnically this came to the following Regional strength in terms of numbers of “Infantry Companies:--
PUNJABI
HINDUSTANI
GURKHA/HILL MEN
PATHANS
Punjabi Muslims- 25
Muslims-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 36
  Gurkha-               53
Settled Area-Â Â Â 10
Dogra-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 18
Hindu Brahmans -Â Â 25
  Nefa Hill Men -      9
Tribal Area-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 5
Sikhs-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 77
Hindu Rajput -Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 47
  Assamese -            3
Other Hindu  -       44
Total-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 120
Total-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 152
  Total-                   65
Total-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â 15
                  34.09%
                      43.18%
                      18.46%
                 4.26%
Further another major change took place in 1895. The three armies i.e. in Bengal Madras and Bombay armies were amalgamated. The percentage of ethnic Madrases and Mahrattas from Bombay was systematically reduced as a strict matter of policy570.
Henry Lawrence one of the eminent Lawrence Brothers made a very subtle remark in late 1840s. He said “Courage goes much by opinion; and many a man behaves as a hero or a coward, according as he considers he is expected to behave. Once two Roman Legions held Britain, now as many Britons might hold Italyâ€571.
Even many Britishers knew that there were no martial races. But Robert remains the culprit for having introduced a bias in recruitment. A bias which became a policy and has had a negative fact at least in the political situation in Pakistan in the post-1947 scenario.
The theory of martial races was tested and convincingly disproved in the First World War. The Mahrattas who had been dismissed as non-martial before First World War performed well during the First World War. In this regard particularly prominent was the battle performance as a unit of the 103, 110 and 117 Mahrattas at Kutal Amara against the Turks. At Sharqat the 114 Mahrattas with just three British officers played a decisive role in the defeat of the Turks 572.
In any case a major change took place in the class composition of the Indian Army which is evident from the class composition of Indian Army in 1914 573:-
Despite this preponderance the non-Punjabi Hindu Gurkhas and Hindu Garhwalis did well in the Indian Army in WW One. Above all theoretically at least the Punjabi Muslims who were the largest community in the fighting arms should have won the maximum number of VCs, but this did not happen. The intention behind the whole argument is to prove that bravery has little connection with race or religion.
The theory of “Martial Races†influenced the post-1947 Pakistani Politics in a negative way. The new state was a federation composed of five nationalities. The army due to pre-1947 British policy was largely Punjabi. It was perceived by Sind Baluchistan and East Pakistan largely as a Punjabi show in which the Pathans were junior partners. The army officers of that period were convinced that they were a martial race and the Hindus of Indian Army were cowards.
This myth was largely disproved in 1965 when despite having more sophisticated equipment, numerical preponderance in tanks and the element of surprise the Pakistan Armoured Division miserably failed at Khem Karn merely due to poor and irresolute leadership at the brigade and divisional level to a complete extent and even regimental level to a partial extent. Meanwhile the army employment in Baluchistan in 1950s made the Baluch think that little if any had changed si