Myths and Misconceptions of Indo Pak Military History-Part Three

Excerpts from Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted by Agha.H.Amin ,17 August 1998





Sepoy Perceptions about EEIC Military Effectiveness

The Bengal Army was the brain child of Lord Clive's military genius. The Bengal sepoys related to each other by blood relationship and caste bonds had served the EEIC for some 100 years when they rebelled in 1857. These men had a very close contact with the British and had observed them from very close quarters. Any neutral and unbiased account of the events of 1857 clearly proves that the Britisher as an officer was never disliked by the sepoys. As an officer who served in Pakistan Army I can state with conviction that the British provided excellent leadership to the Indians. They definitely knew how to lead and inspire the Indian, leading them from the forefront which I am afraid few of at least our native post 1947. Generals did either in Burma or in 1965 or in 1971. The sepoy admired and revered the British officer. In 1857 he was rebelling against the system instituted by the EEIC. Against policies formulated by men constituting a board of directors in far off England. The greasing of cartridges with pig or cow fat similarly was also an administrative decision. The sepoy perceived the British officer as a fair and brave leader and many British officers reciprocated these feelings. One of the British commanding officer committed suicide when his native infantry regiment was disbanded. Many others resisted disbandment of their units. One troop of 3rd Light Cavalry the most crucial unit of Bengal Army Sepoys as a matter of fact loyally fought for the British in 1857.

It appears, however, that sepoy perceptions about EEIC military effectiveness changed from absolute faith in the invincibility of the EEIC as a military machine to skepticism from 1804 to 1857.

Before we proceed further we must state that the first major reverse or defeat which the EEIC suffered in India was in 1780 at the hands of Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan who were heading forces whose fighting Hector Munro and Baillie in 1780 were defeated in a manner which was described by Fortes Cue the official historian of the British army in the following words, “The blunders had been flagrant and from a military point of view, Munro must be held solely responsible for one of the greatest calamities that has ever befallen the British arms”469. But this happened with the Madras Army. The Bengal Army sepoy realized for the first time in 1804 that the that EEIC was not invincible.


This happened while dealing with the Mahrattas and not the Afghans who came much later. In 1804 five battalions of sepoys and about 3000 irregular horse left by the C in C Bengal Army Lord Lake to keep the Mahratta Holkar in check under the command of Colonel Monsoon were forced to make a disastrous retreat from Central India to Agra470.

 The results of this reverse were short term since Lord Lake immediately assumed personal command and defeated the Mahrattas. However, the harm had been done and the myth of invincibility of the EEIC as far as the Bengal Army was concerned was challenged for the first time. Monsoon's retreat was followed by a much more serious reverse which for many years shattered the EEIC myth of invincibility. This happened at Bhurtpore, the Hindu Jat fortress which is the only fort in British Indian history which a British army in India failed in a siege to capture. Leading the EEIC army in this case was a man of no less a stature than Lord Lake who had previously captured Delhi and destroyed Mahratta power in North India in battle of Laswari. (It must be remembered that  Panipat - 1761 checked the Mahrattas, but this was temporary since within few years they recaptured Delhi.

 It was at Laswari on 01 Nov. 1803 that one European infantry regiment and a couple of Bengal Army Regiments composed of roughly 3/4 Hindu soldiers and 1/4 Hindustani Muslims destroyed the Mahratta Army) 471.




In 1805 Lake failed to capture Bhurtpore. He made a first assault in January 1805 but failed to capture the fort. The British troops became so demoralised that the three European regiments i.e. HM 75 Foot, HM 76 Foot and the 1st Bengal Europeans refused orders to attack and withdrew 472! Almost a thousand casualties were suffered but repeated British assaults were repulsed. At last on 24 February Lord Lake withdrew his army from Bhurtpore. Subsequently, the Hindu Jat Raja sued for peace in 1805 due to reasons of political expediency; but the fact remained that militarily this Hindu Jat Raja had not been defeated! The EEIC never forgot this defeat and later on they did capture Bhurtpore but this was much later i.e. on 18 January 1826.

Siege of Bhurtpore

 The force used at Bhurtpore this time was larger than the one the EEIC used to recapture Kabul in September 1842473 in the first Afghan War. Another reverse which the EEIC suffered was in the Nepal war of 1814-16.

General Bal Bhadra,the indomitable Gurkha commander in Anglo Nepal War of 1814-16

Here their initial advance into Nepal was repulsed. Nepal was subsequently defeated using the Bengal Sepoys but again the harm had been done.

General Ochterlony the conqueror of Nepal

 The sepoy's confidence in the British officer was a little shaken. The EEIC retreat from Kabul to Jalalabad in the first Afghan war was not a big disaster keeping in view the numbers involved.




There were only 700 Europeans in some 5000 troops in the weak and starved  brigade which withdrew from Kabul in January 1842 and which was destroyed by an overwhelming force of some 30,000 Afghans taking advantage of harsh weather and shortage of food in this EEIC force. The EEIC troops largely composed of Bengal sepoys did subsequently recapture Kabul in September 1842. But the human mind is not a computer and the net significant impression produced on the sepoy was that the EEIC had been forced to retreat. The extremely tough resistance of the valiant Sikhs in the First and Second Sikh wars again produced a strong impression on the mind of the Bengal Army Sepoy.


At Mudki the main British army survived just because the Sikh general Taj Singh did not attack them,474a otherwise their destruction was certain.

Battle of Mudki

This was a battle fought on absolutely plain land, unlike Afghanistan where the Afghans bravery had a deep connection with adverse mountainous terrain. The impressions of the Sikh wars were the deepest in convincing the sepoys that the British were not invincible.


 In Afghanistan the mountains, the adverse weather and the small numbers were an excuse; but at Chillianwala everything favoured the British and yet they failed!

Tejh Singh the Hindustani Hindu imported by Ranjit Singh from Meerut,UP in hope that a non Punjabi general wouldbereliable just as Nawaz thought in case of  Musharraf.Tejh Singh turned out to be the traitor who betrayed Sikhs at Moodki

All these disasters from 1804 till 1849 certainly had an influence on the mind of the Bengal sepoy and reinforced his decision to rebel in 1857. The sepoys felt in 1857 that they could meet the Europeans on the battlefield as an equal.

Their perceptions were however erroneous in one area. This was about realising that the principals force multiplier of sepoy efficiency was superior leadership of the British officer. Without British leadership the military effectiveness of the sepoy reduced by some 75%. Since the British suppressed the initial rebellions in Punjab they were able to use Punjab and Frontier's manpower to create new regiments or in using comparatively new regiments raised in 1846-49 which were used with as much effect at Delhi as the Bengal sepoy units at Kabul or Ghazni or at Gujrat.


The British officer of 1857 was the greatest force multiplier of military effectiveness by virtue of leadership which was far superior to be “Rebel” leadership in terms of “Resolution” “Tactical Efficiency” reinforced by an iron frame administrative organisation created by the EEIC during its 100 year rule in India and its eight year old rule in the Punjab.

Lack of Foreign Intervention

It has been said that “French” intervention in support of the American rebels during the American war of Independence played an important role in the success of the Americans against the British. The French navy played a decisive role in blocking British reinforcements and in movement of British ships from one part of America to the other.

Similarly, in 1971 the Indian intervention played an important role in the otherwise just and righteous struggle of the Bengalis against West Pakistan oppression.




The Vietnamese may not have succeeded the way they did against USA, had the Chinese and USSR not helped them the way they did. Similarly the Afghans against USSR may not have been so successful had the USA not aided them. The foreign intervention factor plays an important role in the success of a rebellion. In 1857 no such thing happened. Afghanistan was the only country which could have made the rebellion a success by invading India.

But we must remember that contrary to the prevalent myth about Afghan invincibility, these gentlemen had been so severely mauled by the EEIC in September 1842 that they did not dare to attack the EEIC in 1857, which as a matter of fact was a golden opportunity for them to attack India. The EEIC was at its lowest ebb and the Governor General of India and the Chief Commissioner of Punjab were seriously contemplating about surrendering all area upto river Indus to Afghanistan.

 In June - July 1857 John Lawrence the EEIC Chief Commissioner of Punjab (including present N.W.F.P.) had become so demoralised due to the siege of Delhi that he had informed Edward's the Commissioner of Peshawar that due to fear about security and survival of the British army at Delhi he was thinking about sending all British troops in Peshawar valley to Delhi and to invite the ruler of Afghanistan Dost Muhammad Khan to occupy the Peshawar valley upto the Indus on the understanding that if he proved faithful (which he certainly was!), the Peshawar valley would be ceded to him in perpetuity474. But Dost Muhammad was happier with the money EEIC was giving him every year.


Secondly, Edward's the EEIC man at Peshawar was a man of immense resolution. Edwardes declared that rather than obeying such a defeatist order to abandon Peshawar “he would feel bound by conscience to resign and explain his reason to the government”475. Lord Canning the Governor General to whom Lawrence had requested for clearance regarding the proposal to cede Peshawar also realised that psychologically and politically such an action would be fatal since it would be perceived in NWFP and in Afghanistan as a withdrawal and defeat on the EEIC part.





Canning therefore, decided in favour of Edwardes. Edwardes was right in understanding the true worth of Dost Muhammad Khan the so called “Amir of Afghanistan”! Dost Muhammad Khan's price was an annual subsidy of 12 lakh or 1.2 million Indian rupees per year 476! Just look at the difference in perceptions. The thoroughbred Britisher, the man who saved the Punjab in 1857 is thinking big. He thinks that “Dost Muhammad” the King of Afghanistan, the ruler of a proud race which became independent only in 1722 will accept nothing less than Peshawar valley from Khyber till Indus!




Edward is a better judge, he beautifully appreciates that 12 lakh an year will do. Was there any difference between Bahadur Shah Zafar who was drawing a similar allowance as Dost Muhammad of Afghanistan? It was Afghan loyalty which saved India for the British more than Punjab or NWFP loyalty! I give full marks to he EEIC General Pollock who in 1842 on his own initiative decided to capture and burn Kabul, despite contrary orders from Ellenborough the Viceroy of India477. Thus on his orders Kabul was captured and burnt on September 1842.



This was a good job since it was this severe mauling received in 1842 which most probably restrained Dost Muhammad from attacking India. Afghanistan thus lost probably the last chance to regain Peshawar!




Thus we find our brave Muslim Afghan neighbours concluding an offensive defensive treaty with the EEIC while the Hindu Raja of Ballabghar and the Mahratta Tantia Topi were fighting alongside their Muslim Bengal Army Sepoys! Just Rs. 12 lakh per year, cheap isn’t it! Thus Canning telegraphed Lawrence478:-

“Hold on to Peshawar. give upon nothing”

Money makes the mare go! The Khilafat Leaders of 1918-23 had not read the history of Afghans and thus naively hoped that the Afghans would invade India! The Afghans lost a golden opportunity of attacking British India during the First World War once the pure white troops holding India were as following479:

a.         Eight Infantry Battalions

b.         Thirteen Batteries of Artillery

c.         Two Cavalry Regiments

A total of some just 15,000 troops! Foolishly the Afghans did attack India in 1919 when a new king came into power and were quickly pushed back by the British Indian forces who were back to the pre war strength.

Logistic Factors

The sepoys were handicapped by logistic factors like shortage of gunpowder rifles and artillery ammunition i.e. grapeshot canister etc. These played a significant part in reducing their military effectiveness whereas the EEIC forces had no such shortage at any stage in 1857 or 1858.

Lack of Aggressive Leadership

This appears to have been a principal cause of sepoy failure. The Indian as a general rule have throughout history been handicapped in this aspect. It appears that outmoded concepts of “fatalism” “destiny” etc. have had a negative effect on the quality of leadership in all spheres of India. The general approach of wait for the events and to be moved by events rather than to move events has been and still is the hallmark of Indo Pak leadership. Thus we find the Muslim League without any clear programme right till 1940, a mere seven years before India got independence.

Lack of aggressive leadership was evident in most of the battles in 1857. We find the sepoys slowly moving to Badli and taking up a passive defensive position waiting for the Britishers to come all the way from Simla and bayonet them. We find the Lucknow sepoys failing to capture the Lucknow Residency which was an apology of a fortress. The only leader who was aggressive appears to have been Maulvi Ahmadullah or Tantia Topi. But unfortunately they had very limited forces at disposal. Had he been at Delhi perhaps the sepoys may have done better. The only other two leaders who were aggressive were Subedar Bakht Khan and Feroz Shah, the Mughal prince. The sepoy failure to launch an effective attempt to sever British communications at Delhi and failure to counter attack the British at Delhi on 15/16 September 1857 when they were most vulnerable were fundamentally speaking failures produced due to lack of aggressive leadership. Even the Afghans were very docile in 1857 in the person of Dost Muhammad Khan, while we see that the British were ready to concede them much more than the Afghans may have ever imagined.

This lack of aggressiveness is even today a serious drawback in Indo Pak armies. Thus we see the Pakistanis miserably failing at Khenm Karan where one aggressive armoured brigade commander or an aggressive general commanding their First Armoured Division would have sufficiently demoralised the Indian into abandoning all territory west of Beas river, just like the EEIC was all set to abandon all territory west of Indus to the Afghans.

 It is a simple fact that General Chaudhri did give an order to the commander of Indian western command to withdraw in face of the Pakistani attack at Khem Karan. It was, however, the indomitable Indian General Harbaksh Singh who saved Amritsar for the Indians by refusing to view the situation as pessimistically as Chaudri.





Similarly at Chawinda the Indians could easily have by passed the Pakistani position holding Chawinda. But here again lack of aggressive and imaginative leadership on Indian part saved Pakistan combined with resolute leadership on part of General Abrar who was never promoted after 1965.



Post 1857 British Policy laid the Foundation of Division of India in1947

The policy of EEIC before 1857 did not view Indians as Muslims or Hindus or Sikhs. There was no quota or caste system in the Bengal Army and all Indians regardless of their caste or religion or ethnicity were recruited as soldiers. As a matters of fact before 1857 the EEIC did not even bother to exactly find out as to how many Hindus or Muslims were serving in each Regiment of the Bengal Army. Though it was common knowledge that some three fourth of the Bengal infantry consisted of Hindus while Muslims were about one fourth. Similarly it was an established fact that bulk of the cavalry was Muslim. But this aspect was simply irrelevant. After 1857 “Religion” certainly became important. But the British made it so, not the Indians.

Men like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan who were acting as voluntary consultants for their British masters on how to avoid another mutiny thus advised the British against mixing Hindus with Muslim troops in an army unit in the following words; “Government certainly did put the two antagonistic races into the same regiment, but constant intercourse had done its work and the two races in a regiment had almost become one. It is but natural and to be expected, that a feeling of friendship and brotherhood must spring up between the men of a regiment, constantly brought together as they are. They consider themselves as one body and thus it was that the difference which exists between Hindoos and Mahomeddans had, in these regiments, been almost entirely smoothed away” 480. We find this eminent Sayyid suggesting some measures to communalize the British Indian Army in order to avoid another mutiny!



It is true that before 1857 the British generally preferred men from the northern plains of Oudh, modern UP province etc till 1849. But there was no specific policy nor any laid down regional guidelines about recruitment. The recruiting officer could recruit anyone regardless of any laid down class or caste considerations. After 1849 when the Punjab (including present NWFP) were annexed the British extended the recruiting area to north of Sutlej also. But there was no “Martial Race Theory”. After all the old Bengal Army had conquered the whole of northern India for the British. It was amply proved in the First Afghan war that with good leadership an army comprising two or three odd European regiments and nine or ten regiments comprised of 75%, Oudh Hindu Rajput, Brahmans led by British officers could capture Kabul.


The myth of the invincibility of the Muslims had finished with the success of the brilliant as well as indomitable Sivaji's and his successors rise inside India.




The myth of Afghan invincibility had been shattered by Ranjit Singh once he ejected the Afghans from Peshawar, Bannu and Charsadda first in 1818 and finally in 1823481. The myth of Afghan invincibility was again shattered once Nott and Pollock occupied and burnt Kabul in 1842. there was no “Martial Race Theory” in vogue but after 1857 this theory was created.

After 1857 once the government of India was directly assumed by the British Crown the British decided to take special precautions to control India. Thus it was after 1857 that the policy of “Divide and Rule” was seriously enforced. Recruitment in army was now strictly controlled by a clear cut policy laying down the number and ratio of various races and religions in each arm service and regiment. The Gurkhas who were a non entity in Indian army before 1857 were now specifically enrolled since racially speaking they had proved to be the most reliable race on which the British could rely in times of crisis. Statistically speaking, the rebellion was a combined Hindu-Muslim effort. Most of the regiments which rebelled in 1857 were Hindu majority regiments.

It is true that leadership wise the Muslims were more active in all outbreaks, specially in the decisive Meerut outbreak led by 3rd Light Cavalry comprising Muslim Ranghars and Hindustani Pathan Muslims from Rohailkhand and upper Doab. Actually, the northwest Muslims had proved to be the most loyal subjects of EEIC and at least half of the loyal native troops which captured and looted Delhi consisted of Punjabi Muslims and Pathans.



Thus, 1857 was a mixed affair, there were Muslims on both sides “Rebel” as well as “British”, there were Hindus on both sides, the Madras Army which stayed loyal had a large percentage of Muslim. Yet the British very cleverly turned it into a communal affair.




They boosted the ego of the Punjabi Muslims by cleverly classifying them as a “Martial Race” and degrading the “Hindustani Muslims” as unreliable soldier material481a. The transfer of Delhi and Hariana to Punjab province 482 was as another brilliantly conceived measure to increase the Punjabi - Hindustani hatred. People of Delhi and Rohtak had to travel all the way to Lahore, the Provincial capital and the Punjabi's were patted that Delhi had been made a mere division of Punjab as a reward for “ Punjab Loyalty”.

Thus the “Peel Commission” constituted after 1857 to study and analyse the future composition of the Indian Army recommended that the native army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule mixed promiscuously through each regiment483! Such system had existed in the Madras and Bombay armies but these were much smaller as compared to the Bengal Army. However, India was now viewed as loyal and disloyal. Most favoured were the races west of Jamuna since these had stood loyal to the British during the crucial siege of Delhi.


A deliberate policy was laid out to pamper the Punjabis by establishment of an elaborate irrigation system, tax exemption and other rewards. After Partition in Pakistan exclusion of Bengalis and Sindhis was justified on the grounds that they were non martial. In reality the Bengalis were previously not selected simply because the Hindustani Hindu Rajput or Jat or Muslim was much taller and imposing than the Bengali and from 1905 onwards the Bengalis were viewed as politically unreliable 484!

The British did not immediately do as Sir Sayyid had advised them, i.e. having one religion regiments. However, they divided men within a regiment, religion wise at platoon level. From now on all men from a platoon were to be from the same religion. Before 1857, even platoons were mixed and there was no such communal divisions. The seeds of separate electorates were thus laid once Indian Bengal Army was reorganised following the rebellion of 1857!



The quota system was enforced not only in the army but also in the civil service. Thus Indians were manipulated into looking at each other as “Hindus”, Sikhs” and “Muslims”. There are many myths about this policy in present day Indo Pak sub continent. It is generally, but most incorrectly thought in Pakistan that the British were anti Muslim. It were the Muslims of Punjab and Frontier who were the most loyal British subjects of the EEIC in 1857. The British policy was more subtle. It was pro Muslim in Punjab and Frontier. It was pro Muslim even in UP as far as the civil government jobs was concerned.


For example, in 1911 out of the seventeen Indians at various levels in the elite Indian Civil Service (ICS) there were ten Hindus and six Muslims. But this is not all, the fact is that all ten Hindus were there in the ICS because they had gone to England and passed the ICS examination and duly entered the ICS on their own steam. Out of the six Muslims in the ICS only one had actually passed the ICS entrance examination. The other four were men nominated by the British to the ICS in order to ensure Muslim presence and of course also keeping in mind the dictates of the “Divide and Rule” policy. The fifth Muslim ICS among these who came through the backdoor was a judge who became one after being slowly promoted through the lower courts 485.

Similarly the Muslim proportion in the provincial Civil Service in UP was over double their proportion of the population486. Again in the UP police 49.8% of the officer cadre was Muslim while 42.0 percent of the total police force was Muslim487! Thus UP Muslims were as a policy discouraged on an all India level from joining the army but within UP were encouraged to compete with Hindus in the provincial police and provincial civil service.


 In terms of percentage in the army the Muslims were regarded as the most loyal and reliable race, but only the Punjabi Muslims in greater numbers and settled districts, Pathan Muslim to a lesser degree. Followed by the Muslims the Sikhs were considered the most reliable race in India. (It must be noted that the Gurkhas who were the most reliable were a non Indian Mongoloid Himalyan race). In Punjab the Muslim landlords and even common cultivators were greatly protected by British civil servants who even influenced legislation to ensure that Muslim estates should not pass into the hands of Hindu money lenders.

A note must be made here by recording the fact that apart from the policy of “Divide and Rule” which like most British policy was an unwritten policy, there were many absolutely genuine Britishers like Edwardes and S. Thorburn who genuinely admired the Muslims particularly the Punjabi and the Pathan Muslims, since they had served most part of their service in Punjab and Frontier. These Britishers genuinely sympathised with the plight of Muslims in Punjab. Thorburn as a matter of fact genuinely hated the Hindus and was bitter about the Hindu money lenders negative role in Muslim majority Punjab. Thorburn, actually authored a book titled “Mussulmans and Money lenders” published in 1886488. This book was instrumental in influencing the opinion of many British civil servants into becoming more pro Muslim at least as far as Punjab and Frontier were concerned.

Notable among the British laws was the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900. This Act greatly helped the Muslim land holders of Punjab since it forbade the passing land from agricultural to non agricultural castes. Few people in today's Pakistan that much more than Muslim League, it was Septimus Smet Thorburn (1844-1924) who was the actual saviour of Punjabi Muslims and even Pathans at least in the economic sense!



Coming back to our main line of discussion, a deliberate policy of “Divide and Rule” was followed after 1857. Recruitment in the army was fixed under “Muslim” “Hindu” and “Sikh” lines and further even among the Muslims and Hindus a clear cut policy was instituted which slowly and steadily replaced the east of Jumuna races by north of Ambala races. Muslims were seen as “Hindustani” “Punjabi” “Trans Indus Pathan” “Independent Transborder Pathan” etc. Even Muslim Rajputs were specifically divided into “Kaim Khani Rajputs” and “Ranghars”. The Muslim Pathans were divided into “Afridis” “Mahsuds” etc. Even Pathans were divided on sectarian lines, i.e. the “Kurram Milita” was a Shia sect force from Turi Pathan tribe which was used with devastating success against non Shia sect other Pathan tribes. These are subtle structure railways, road, canals, which we see even today. But they also divided us, something which most people do not realize. They were doing this to Indo Pak sub continent at a time when other countries like USA were integrating others races like Irish, Italian, Polish, Russian etc with the main steam of the Anglo Saxon American society.

It is a strange aspect of history that policy makers never really visualise the long term effects of their policies. The policy of “Divide and Rule” adopted as a tangible and deliberate policy after 1857 so devastatingly divided India that even today its deadly effects can be seen in both India and Pakistan. The divisions were not merely on religious lines but even within Muslims on sectarian, ethnic, caste and class lines. A Pandora's Box was opened by the British and even today both India and Pakistan are merely tragic victims of this fatal policy!

Lord Canning's views about the policy of “Divide and Rule” expressed in 1857 are thought provoking; Canning thus said in a letter dated 9 October 1857:' “the men who fought against us at Delhi were of both creeds; probably in equal numbers. If we destroy or desecrate Mussulman Mosques or Brahman Temples we do exactly what is wanting to band the two antagonist races against ourselves.....as we must rule 150 million of people by a handful (more or less small) number of Englishmen, let us do it in the manner best calculated to leave them divided (as in religion and national feeling as they already are) and to inspire them with the greatest possible awe of our power 489.



Canning went further and very subtly defined certain guidelines regarding employment of various classes after 1857:-

“All exclusion of Mahomeddan, Rajpoots or even of Brahmans should be a matter of management rather than of rule; and indeed that it will be right to take an opportunity, though not just yet, to show by an exception here and there, that the rule does not exist. It is desirable that no class should feel that it had henceforward nothing to expect from the government 490”

The post 1857 British Civil Servants were convinced that the survival of British empire in India lied in carefully widening the communal divide, particularly the Hindu Muslim divide. The subsequent British agreement to the right of separate electorate was also a part of this policy. The Muslim leaders of that time favoured separate electorate for personal rather than communal reasons. Regardless of advantages or disadvantages, the Muslim feudal's aim was to get into the viceregal or provincial council!!

In 1879 the Eden Commission set up to review the reorganisation of Indian Army observed and duly reported that the principle of “Divide and Rule” was being enforced as a policy and its implementation was being constantly scrutinised.

Thus, slowly and steadily they divided the Indo Pak subcontinent on communal lines. Politicians of pre 1947 failed to realise that mere religion cannot make a nation. Punjabis, Bengalis, Pathans, Rajputs and South Indians are too culturally different as a race. Thus the reason for lack of progress of modern day India and Pakistan essentially lies in being organised on a fundamentally unrealistic concept. The ‘two nation theory’ drowned in the Bay of Bengal in 1971 and the Akhand Bharat theory will also be destroyed in the coming decades. At least we cannot say with satisfaction that the India of 1857 was sane enough not to believe in the two nation theory or the Akhand Bharat theory! The grand British aim after 1857 was to make Indians like the Europeans of Thirty years war and the Crusades as far as bigotry and obscurantism was concerned. They succeeded in 1947. And since then the leaders of India and Pakistan have proved to be even more irrational.

Progressive Policies of Dalhousie were reversed





1858 proved to be a major watershed in the history of modern Indo Pak sub continent. On 2nd August 1858 “The India Act of 1858” consisting of 85 sections became a law492. Vide this act the British Crown assumed direct Government of India. The English East India Company and its private army and navy were abolished. The progressive anti feudal, anti princely state, and anti outmoded religious practice's policies of Lord Dalhousie were reversed. The princely states, which Dalhousie had most correctly regarded as an anachronism and a contradiction were now left alone. Annexation of princely states by Dalhousie did antagonise the people but the principal cause of success of the rebellion was the overwhelming number of natives in the Indian Bengal Army. Now that the Bengal Army had been effectively destroyed, what were the princely states? But these had been loyal and had been of great assistance to the British during 1857. So these dinosaurs were given a new life. We salute Nehru and others for abolishing them in post 1947 Indo Pak sub continent. The outwardly brilliant but essentially pedantic British policy makers whose opinion mattered drew erroneous conclusions from essentially fallacious premises. Thus they lost land revenue by decreasing taxes and condemned India to remain socially and politically backward. Religion was given undue importance in the name of Divide and Rule and communal hatred increased after 1857. Enlightenment was no longer a priority and maintenance of “Law and Order” because the essence of future British policy in India.

Feudalism was strengthened, since the British realised that feudals were good partners in controlling India. Their assistance rendered the British administration more cost efficient and economical. Small peasants were helped but the Feudals were the top priority.

The non annexation policy of post 1857 British government in India created serious problems like the Kashmir problem of 1947-48 which till this day has led to constant conflict in the Indo Pak sub continent and has consistently ensured that both the countries should remain economically backward and spend a disproportionately and irrationally large percentage of their national income on their armed forces.

END NOTES

468 Pages-32 & 33-India's Struggle for Freedom-Department of Information and Cultural Affairs-Government of West Bengal-Howrah-1987.

469 Page-448-J.W Fortescue-Volume-III-Op Cit.

470 Pages-190 & 191-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

471 Pages-84 & 85-Ibid.

472 Page-129-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

473 The British force used to capture Kabul in 1842 was as following:-- (1) Nott's Force:-- Two European Infantry Regiments, Six Native Infantry Regiments, Two Native Cavalry regiments (2) Pollock's Force:-- Four Native Infantry Battalions and Two Native Cavalry Regiments i.e. a Total of:-Twelve Infantry Battalions and Four Cavalry Regiments. (Pages-189 & 190-Lieut F. G Cardew-Op Cit). The Force that invested Bhurtpore consisted of 18 Battalions of infantry and 8 Regiments of Cavalry supported by a Siege Train of 112 Heavy Guns and 50 Field Guns (Page-130-Philip Mason-Op Cit)

474aPage-612 & 613-Henry Beveridge-Vol-III-Op Cit. Pages-374 to 378-The Decisive Battles of India-Colonel G.B Malleson-Oxford-1883.

474Page-193-Cambridge History-The Indian Empire-1858-1918-Op Cit.

475Ibid.

476Page-413-A Brief Political History of Afghanistan-Dr Abdul Ghani-Najaf Publishers-Lahore-1989.

477Page-271-J.W Fortescue-Vol-XII-Op Cit.

478Page-114-Punjab Military History in the 19th Century-Op Cit.

479Page-169-The Realities Behind Diplomacy-Paul Kennedy-Fontana Press-London-1985. Page-479-Cambridge History-The Indian Empire-1858-Op cit. Page-411-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

480Pages-66-Causes of the Indian Revolt-Op Cit.

481Pages-541 to 544-Cambridge History-British India-1497-1858-Op Cit.

481a This was not an immediate consequence but gradually became an unwritten policy under Roberts who became the C in C Bengal Army and India in 1885. Roberts was on record for having condemned the Hindustani recruitment in the army. As per Roberts (because the Hindustanis had taken an active part in the rebellion), discrimination against Hindustanis in recruitment was justified on the ground that they had degenerated as a result of the benefits of British rule, not having been exposed to enough adversity! (Page-441 & 442-Forty One Years in India-Volume Two-Lord Roberts-Richard Bentley and Son-London-1897. More of this aspect is discussed subsequently under another heading in the "Analysis".

482Page-46-Gazetteer of Delhi-Op Cit. the exact wording used in the Gazetteer was "and the political punishment was pronounced of transfer to the Punjab" (Page-46-Ibid)

483Quoted by T.A Heathcote-Page-87-T.A Hethcote-Op Cit.

484 The experiments to recruit Bengalis in WW One and WW Two failed because the Bengalis were temperamentally volatile and not as easy to control as many other communities (Pages-281, 302 and 449-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit). The Bengali units were disbanded because of murders and mutiny in WW one and Two.

485Page-328-India's Partition-Process, Strategy and Mobilisation-Edited by Mushir ul Hassan-Oxford University Press-New Delhi-1994.

486Page-328-Ibid.

487Page-329-Ibid.

488Mussulman's and Money Lenders-Septimus Smet thorburn-London-1886.

489Letter Number-93-Letters to the President of the Board of Control-January to December 1857-Canning Papers-India Office Library.

490Letter Number 18-Letter to Governor of North Western Provinces-March 1856 to February 1862-Canning Papers-Op Cit.

491Page-87-T.A Heathcote-Op Cit.

492Page-868-Henry Beveridge-Vol-III-Op Cit.