My Dear Friend Dr Hamid Hussain on Indian army brass

February 16, 2010

 

Following was sent to me for comments.  My response below the news item.

 

Hamid

 

Tainted generals face heat from the Army

 

A top army general is likely to face a general court martial while three others are being served show-cause notices for their role in facilitating a dubious land deal near an army base in Sukhna, West Bengal.

 

Army chief General Deepak Kapoor has ordered disciplinary action against Lieutenant General PK Rath — formerly the commander of a crucial frontline formation. He now faces punishment that could include court martial and jail.

 

Gen Kapoor has also issued directions to serve show-cause notices for administrative action on three other generals: his Military Secretary Lieutenant General Avadhesh Prakash, 11 Corps commander Lieutenant General Ramesh Halgali and Major General P Sen.
 
Lt Gen Prakash, however, seemed to have got off lightest, given his key role in the land scam, army sources said. Eastern Army Commander Lieutenant General VK Singh had recommended his immediate dismissal.
 
Prakash retires on January 31. He can still be dismissed but he has been saved the ignominy of a court martial.
 
The scam involved helping a Siliguri-based businessman Dilip Agarwal acquire 70 acres of land on the fringes of Sukna, near Siliguri in Northern West Bengal. The army probe found that Agarwal had floated an educational society - for which ostensibly he had acquired the land - falsely claiming that it was affiliated the renowned Ajmer-based boarding school, Mayo College. In fact it had nothing to do with Mayo College.
 
Land transfer near sensitive installations require clearance from the military.

General Rath was commanding Sukna-based Headquarters 33 Corps when a no-objection certificate was given by reversing a previous decision, allegedly at the behest of Prakash.
 
Rath was to take over as a deputy chief in Army headquarters on November 1 but the defence ministry scrapped his appointment after his name cropped up in the land scam.

 

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Dear …………;

 

Thanks for forwarding the piece.  The story is a bit more intriguing.  Lt. General Vijay Kumar Singh (he is from 2 Rajput nick named Kali Chindin) has no authority to recommend dismissal of a senior officer which holds the same rank.  Singh has his own anger to vent.  He is set to become next chief of army staff (COAS) in the end of March 2010.  Earlier (about two years ago) some senior officers tried to play a mischief by casting a doubt on Singh to make room for another contender for COAS by decreasing the tenure of COAS.  A controversy erupted when it was disclosed that V. K. Singh had discrepancy in his date of birth in different documents (May 10, 1950 vs. May 10, 1951).  Records from Military Secretary's and Adjutant General's branches were leaked showing different dates of births.  Singh would still be the senior most general in the race for the top slot but a year difference would shorten his tenure as army chief.  On a more serious note, if it was proved that Singh has deliberately lied about his date of birth then he would have been forced to resign thus throwing the race open for another senior Lt. General to become COAS.  It is alleged that some senior generals who may benefit from a shorter tenure of V. K. Singh may have leaked the information.  If Singh's tenure was shortened by a year, this will make room for a senior Lt. General to be chief prior to retirement. India strictly adheres to the set rules of seniority and remaining service prior to promotion to avoid legal battles.  There is a long history of prolonged legal battles on the issue of promotions.  

 

I discussed in detail these issues about two years ago in a 2008 piece.  I'm attaching it with this e-mail which may give you a detailed background about these issues. I still believe that it is a good move by Indian army brass to openly punish the culprits.  That is how you improve institutions.  I only wish that Pakistan army follow the suit. 

 

Regards,

Hamid

 

 

 

 

Indian Military Command Structure & Senior Brass

Hamid Hussain

 

India has one of the largest armed forces in the world.  It has about a million men under arms in three services.  Army, Air Force and Naval headquarters control their respective services for day to day management.  Army chief is responsible for day to day management of the army.  He is the first among equals of chiefs of three services.  There is competition between three services for resources and on the issues of protocols. 

 

Indian army is firmly under civilian control and Ministry of Defense (MoD) bureaucrats jealously guard their territory.  MoD is the buffer between armed forces and politicians.  Army brass resents the bureaucrats of MoD and see them as obstructionist and detrimental to the smooth functioning of Indian army.  There have been many sanguine battles fought between senior officers and MoD bureaucrats with a number of careers shortened.  Guarded attitude of politicians and bureaucrats towards army dates back to 1958 when General Ayub Khan took control of neighboring Pakistan in a coup.  Fearful of a similar scenario in India, politicians and bureaucrats joined hands to keep army in its box.  They kept strict control of the financial purse of the defense budget and steadily reduced the precedence and protocol of army officers in comparison with civilian bureaucracy. 

 

Higher Defense Organization

 

Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) consists of all services chiefs and headed by one of the chiefs.  The position of Chairman of COSC is rotated between three services.  Current Chairman of COSC is Admiral Suresh Mehta.  Friction in relationship between three services about command, control and allocation of resources has significantly impeded the development of joint commands with integrated warfare capability.  There has been a long debate about creation of Chairman of Defense Staff (CDS) but fear of MoD of loosing control and inter-service disagreement has prevented any significant progress.  Even at conceptual level there is ambiguity whether CDS will look more like a powerful entity in line with U.S. model of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff or resemble Pakistani version which is primarily ceremonial.  Several committees including 1998 and 2000 Arun Singh Committee advocated creation of CDS.  Committee's interaction with sixteen retired services chiefs showed different perspective of three services on the issue.  All along Air Force and Navy have been at the forefront in opposition to CDS for the fear that army being the big brother will dominate this body.  Air Force tried to keep some chips in its own hands and proposed the idea of creation of Strategic Air Command for control and delivery of nuclear weapons.  It also advocated that nuclear missiles should also come under this command.  As expected army rejected this idea as they didn't want to part away with their control of nuclear capable missiles (Pirthvi).  Navy fearful of loosing its prestige jumped in with the argument that both land based and air force platforms were not reliable for second strike capability and therefore nuclear submarines should be considered.  They argued that submarines are less likely to be detected and therefore ideal for second strike capability. 

 

In view of these difficulties as an interim measure an Integrated Service Command (ISC) was created in October 2001.  It is currently headed by Lt. General Hardev Singh Lidder.  Lidder is sword of honor winner and was commissioned in Deccan Horse. ICS has an administrative structure consisting of Strategic Nuclear Command, current joint command at Andaman and Nicobar and planning, doctrine, administrative, intelligence and technical branches.  However, lack of coherent strategic consensus among various players has prevented its evolution into a true joint and integrated command.  There is an intermediary layer between Army Headquarters and MoD.  This entity is Defense Planning Staff Directorate (DPSD). It is headed by a senior officer at the rank of Lt. General or equivalent.  The other two members are from other services at the rank of Major General or equivalent.  DPSD liaison with COSC.  A Military Wing of the cabinet headed by an officer at the rank of Major General or equivalent coordinates with the cabinet.  Political decisions of the government made in parliament and cabinet are implemented through MoD which has various sections dealing with three services.  In addition, financial part of the puzzle is handled by finance expert at MoD.  There is an Appointment Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) headed by Prime Minister which has final say in promotions and postings of senior rank officers of all three services. 

 

Operational Command Structure

 

General Headquarters headed by army chief manages the large military bureaucracy.  Army Chief heads Principal Staff Officers Committee which helps him in day to day running of the army.  Members of committee include Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS), two Deputy Chiefs of Army Staff (DCOAS), Military Secretary (MS), Adjutant General (AG), Quarter Master General (QMG), Master General of Ordnance (MGO) and Engineer-in-Chief (E-in-C).  Indian army has six operational commands and one Army Training Command (ARTRAC).  Training Command is based in Simla.  The commander of each command is a Lieutenant General and is called General Officer Commander-in-Chief (GOC-in-C).  Southern Command headquarters is at Pune and it has one XXI Corps.  Corps headquarter is in Bhopal and it has 54^th Infantry Division in Sikandarabad, 31^st Armored Division in Jhansi and 36^th RAPID Division based in Saugor.  Corps also has independent artillery, Air Defense and Engineers brigades.  Eastern Command headquarter is at Kolkata and it has three corps.  III Corps is based in Rangapahar in Nagaland.  This corps has 23^rd Infantry Division based in Ranchi and 57^th Mountain Division based in Silchar.  IV Corps is bases in Tezpur, Assam.  This Corps has three mountain divisions: 2^nd  in Dibrugarh, 5^th at Bombdila and 21^st at Rangia.  XXXIII Corps based in Siligari in West Bengal.   This Corps consists of three Mountain divisions; 17^th Mountain Division in Gangtok, 20^th Mountain Division in Binaguri and 27^th Mountain Division in Kalimpong.  Corps also has an independent artillery brigade.    Central Command headquarter is at Lucknow and it has only one I Corps.  Western Command is the largest command with it's headquartered at Chandimandar in Chandigarh and has four Corps.  II Corps is based in Ambala and consists of 22^nd Infantry Divisions at Meerut, Ist Armored divisions at Ambala and 14^th RAPID Division at Dehradun.  IX Corps based in Pathankot consists of 26^th Infantry Division in Jammu and 29^th Infantry Division in Pathankot.  Corps has three independent armored brigades; 2^nd, 3^rd & 16^th.  X Corps based in Bathinda consists of 16^th Infantry Division in Ganganagar, 18^th RAPID Division in Kota and 24^th RAPID Division in Bikanir.  It also has 6^th Independent Armored Brigade.  Northern Command is responsible for Kashmir with its headquarters at Udhampur.  This command has three corps.  XIV Corps headquarter is located at Leh and it has 3^rd Infantry Division in Leh and 8^th Mountain Division in Dras.  Corps also has an independent artillery brigade.  XV Corps is based at Srinagar and its two infantry divisions; 19^th and 28^th  located at Baramula and Gurais respectively.  This Corps  also has an independent artillery brigade.  XVI Corps headquarter is at Nagrota and it has 10^th Infantry Division at Akhnur, 25^th Infantry Division in Rajuri and 39^th Infantry Division in Yol.  Corps has one each independent artillery and armored brigades. South Western Command was created in February 2005 with headquarter at Jaipur.  This command has one XII Corps based in Jodhpur.  This Corps has two infantry divisions; 11^th at Ahmadabad and 12^th at Jodhpur.  Corps has 4^th Armored Brigade and 340^th Mechanized Brigade. 

 

Indian armed forces posture is mainly oriented against Pakistan.  Northern Command with its three corps is fully involved in anti-insurgency operations in Kashmir for the last fifteen years.  Eastern Command's III Corps is mainly involved in counterinsurgency operations in Nagaland for the last several decades.  Assam based IV Corps is also engaged in internal security duties.  At the height of Sikh insurgency in 1980s, Western Command Corps were reoriented to tackle that problem.  X and XI Corps were involved in sealing the border, patrolling major cities and restraining rebellious Sikhs.  Even elements of Ambala based II strike Corps were reoriented for counterinsurgency operations.  Government and army high command realized that for the foreseeable future army will be used for internal security duties therefore paramilitary units named Rashtriya Rifles were vastly expanded.  These units are manned by large number of officers, Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and soldiers form armed forces on secondment.

 

Indian Navy has three operational commands.  Eastern, Southern and a joint command called FORTRAN.  Each command is headed by a Vice Admiral who has the title of Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief (FOC-in-C).  Air Force has its own regional commands each headed by an Air Marshal.  Southern, Central and Eastern Air Commands are operational commands and its commander is called Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C). 

 

 

Promotions and Postings

 

Like any other army, Indian army has a well established system of promotion and posting of senior officers to various command, staff and instructional appointments.  Indian army is a stickler of seniority and usually senior most officers gets the available spot.  The task of promotion from Major General to Lieutenant General is assigned to a special army selection board headed by army chief and consists of six Army commanders and VCOAS.  The list is approved by COAS and forwarded to MoD and ACC for final decision.  Defense services regulations stipulate that if government wants to change the list, they must consult COAS.  There is only one General rank officer in Indian army which is army chief.  Lt. General rank postings to various positions do not go through any specific board.  GOC-in-C of Army Command is a prestigious appointment and previously as a general rule senior most officer was given the command regardless of the residual service before his retirement. The problem was that even if an officer had only two months of service left, he got the command and it caused significant problems regarding efficiency.  In 1985, rule was introduced that the officer should have at least one year of residual service before consideration for the Army commander post.  A year later, residual service requirement was increased to two years.  In view of seniority principle, at Lt. General rank it is a matter of simple calculation and every officer knows where he stands on that ladder.  However, unexpected events can turn the applecart.  On November 14, 1994 army chief General B. C. Joshi died with his boots on.  This opened up unexpected openings and future army chief General V. P. Malik owes his rise to the unexpected demise of Joshi.  In 1998 when government increased the retirement age to 60, army had to throw away the list of officers recommended for promotion to Lt. General rank as there were no available vacancies in view of continuation of the old lot.  Officers had to wait a year to get into the race again. 

 

Army Headquarters and MoD are usually at loggerheads about promotions, postings and financial matters. MoD bureaucrats use technicalities to achieve their goals.  In 1998, twenty one Major Generals were kept in limbo for ten months while MoD bureaucrats juggled with their jargon.  Many careers are affected by unnecessary delays in the labyrinth of MoD.  This creates resentment among officers as delay at MoD can affect careers.  In an unprecedented move, in 1998 three service chiefs wrote a letter to Prime Minister asking for removal of Defense Secretary Ajit Kumar.  They cited his obstructionist ways which were hampering the smooth function of military matters.  MoD bureaucrats take their revenge by tinkering with rules and regulations of precedence and protocol to embarrass generals.

 

In the last two decades, an unhealthy precedent has been set where officers who have been rejected for the next appointment by army leadership have won their appointment either through statutory complaint or through court order.  One example will show the absurd situation prevalent among senior ranks.  In 1990s, four senior officers of the 1962 batch who became Lt. Generals went through a bizarre episode of musical chairs.  Brigadier S. S. Grewal was rejected by the army promotion board for his promotion to the rank of Major General.  Through a statutory complaint he won his case and rose to become Lt. General and even commanded a Corps.  Major General H. R. S. Kalkat was rejected by the board for promotion to Lt. General rank.  His statutory complaint was rejected by army chief.  He won his promotion through a statutory complaint to MoD.  Kalkat rose to become Corps commander and then army commander.  Major General B. S. Malik was twice rejected by selection board to the next rank of Lt. General.  Government hell bent on his promotion threw all procedures in dust bin.  Army chief even met with Prime Minister to convey his point that such measures would undermine the discipline of the army.  MoD first gave Malik a three month extension as he was due to retire and then just prior to expiration of the extension he was promoted.  Fourth officer Raj Kadyan had to go through a hurdle race resorting to statutory complaints and even went to high and supreme court to get the post of army commander.  He lost his case for the army commander post but ended his career as Deputy Chief of Army Staff.  In 1997, another absurd situation arose when Major General H. S. Bagga was not found fit for promotion to the rank of Lt. General.  He went to Delhi High Court to get his promotion.  In an unprecedented move, court ordered that all promotions to the rank of Lt. General in army had to be put on hold until Bagga was promoted.  This move affected careers of many and caused much resentment among senior officers.  After two months, Bagga was promoted and newly promoted Lt. Generals were let off the hook.  In 1996, when Lt. General H. B. Kala was appointed Army commander, one of junior officers Lt. General M. R. Sharma filed a statutory complaint asking that his career profile should be compared with Kala as he was more eligible for the post.  Sharma's case was rejected.

 

There have been several conflicts between army chiefs, MoD and political masters represented in ACC.  In 1959, army chief General K. S. Thimaya (Kumaon Regiment) had difficult time getting along with Defense Minister Krishna Menon.  Thimaya tendered his resignation over Menon's interference in military affairs but Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru persuaded him not to resign.  Officers were happy when Thimaya resigned but his reputation suffered when he went back on his decision.  In the aftermath of humiliation of Indian army at the hands of Chinese in 1962, army chief General Pran Nath Thapar (Ist Punjab) was forced to resign.   In 1960s, then COAS General J. N. Chaudry (7^th Light Cavalry) approved only conditional promotion of Brigadier D. K. Palit (nick named Monty).  Government overruled Chaudry and Palit was given the command of a division on his promotion to Major General.  In 1975, government wanted to appoint Lt. General S. L. Menezes as army commander against the wishes of army chief General T. N. Raina (14^th Kumaon Regiment).  Raina and Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram met behind the scenes and it was agreed to appoint Menezes as VCOAS and not as army commander.  In 1997, Defense Minister gave extension to a Major General.  Army board and COAS had found him not fit for promotion to next rank.  On the last day of his extension, Defense Minister promoted him to Lt. General.  Two Major Generals who were not promoted went to Delhi High Court to get their promotions to the next rank.  Army Chief General V. P. Malik had difficult relations with then Defense Minister Mulyalam Singh Yadav who tinkered with army promotions and postings. 

 

Religion, ethnicity, balance between various arms of the army, battalion affiliation and personal likes and dislikes play a role in selection of officers to senior ranks.  As an ethnic group, Sikhs are over represented in the army where they make about 10 percent of the million strong army.  For decades there has been whispering that India has not chosen a Sikh army chief despite their significant contribution to armed forces.  In 2005, India appointed its first Sikh army chief, General Joginder Jaswant Singh.  Some said that the decision was several decades late.  A well respected and bright Sikh officer Lt. General Harbakhash Singh (he was heading Western Command and credited with defying the order of the army chief General J. N. Chaudry to withdraw during 1965 war thus saving large part of Punjab) reportedly stated before his death that Indira Ghandhi had promised him army chief post but instead gave it to Sam Manekshaw.  J. J. Singh was commissioned in 9^th Marhatta Light Infantry (MLI) and he won the top slot being slightly senior to another bright officer Lt. General Hari Prasad.  Incidentally, Prasad was also from MLI.  Few years ago, the fine regiment of MLI created a history when eight serving generals of Indian army were from this regiment.  Eight out of about 30 infantry Lieutenant General officers belonging to the proud regiment was a shining moment for MLI.  The list included then VCOAS Lt. General Vijay Oberoi, GOC-in-C Eastern Command Lt. General H. R. S. Kalkat, three Corps Commanders; Lt. General J. J. Singh, Lt. General S. B. Satpute and Hari Prasad, Master General of Ordnance Lt. General J. S. Dhillon, DG Assam Rifles Lt. General G. K. Duggal and Commandant of Infantry School Lt. General D. B. Shekatkar.  Muslims represent a very small fraction of soldiers and officers of Indian army.  Usually one Muslim general officer is kept as a token.  Currently, Lt. General Zameerudding Shah (he is brother of famous actor Naseeruddin Shah) is serving as Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Planning and Systems.  Shah was commissioned in the regiment of artillery. 

 

It is normal to have friction between senior officers on various issues.  The most embarrassing episodes have occurred over the issue of promotions and postings.  Sometimes battles between senior brass are fought in courtrooms and media and these fights have been very ugly.  All services are plagued with this ailment.  Officers who are not promoted routinely approach courts for redress which severely strains working relations between senior brass.  Recently, when Lt. General H. C. S. Panag was transferred from prestigious Northern Command to Central Command, he protested against the transfer.  He alleged that he had started several investigations about irregularities in procurement for the troops under his command.  These irregularities date back to when his predecessor General Deepak Kapoor was in command who is now army chief.  He met Defense Minister A. K. Antony to present his side of the story.  Government wisely stayed away from the fray and Panag was moved.  In 1998, when Lt. General H. R. S. Kalkat (2^nd MLI) was appointed GOC-in-C of Eastern Command, a senior Lt. General Raj Kadyan (19^th Rajputana Rifles) went to court.  The case lingered on for several years in high court and supreme court. 

 

In 1998, conflict between two Vice Admirals; Harindar Singh and Madanjeet Singh over position of Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) became a famous case which later cost Naval chief his job.  In view of the potential complications, Navy appointed Madanjeet Singh as officiating deputy CNS subject to court verdict and approval by ACC.  In December 1998, CNS Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat was dismissed from service.  He had refused to appoint Vice Admiral Harindar Singh as Deputy Chief of Naval Staff for Operations as recommended by the government.  Singh used religious card accusing Bhagwat of having poor opinion of the Sikhs.  Singh attributed this dislike to an incident when Bhagwat was commanding officer of a naval vessel.  In the aftermath of the Operation Blue Star, a Sikh had shot an officer on the vessel.  Bhagwat's wife Nilofar is Muslim and Singh also accused Bhagwat of having sympathies with Muslims and Communists.  He went out of his way and even accused Bhagwat of having links with Kashmiri separatists.  Singh cited the proof of his allegation the fact that Bhagwat had elevated a Kashmiri Muslim to become the senior most officer in Indian Navy.  Singh was accused of having links with arms dealers.  This was an ugly episode and sullied the image of Indian armed forces. 

 

Admiral Sushil Kumar became CNS in1998 after dismissal of Bhagwat.  He is Christian and his last name is Issac.  He had dropped his surname a while ago for a different reason but rumors were circulating in the naval ships, messes and facilities that he dropped his Christian surname for the sake of promotion to avoid unnecessary difficulties.  Real reason for dropping the surname is that his brother Sudhir Kumar Issac was also in Navy.  Both brothers were at the rank of Commander and used their names as S.K. Issac.  A transfer order was issued  for Sudhir to report to a ship and instead Sushil ended up there.  Mistake was found out because both brothers had different expertise.  Sushil dropped the surname for this reason but many people still believe that he didn't want his religious identity to be a hurdle on his way to the top slot.  Kumar had fought his own battles not with the enemy but his own brass.  He was Vice Admiral and appointed to a non-operational command.  After six representations to CNS Bhagwat, he went straight to MoD demanding that he deserved an operational command.  When Bhagwat came to know about this, he was furious and even threatened Kumar of a court martial.  Kumar persisted in his endeavors and was successful in getting FOC-in-C of Southern Command from MoD and ACC despite resistance from Bhagwat. 

 

Indian Air Force (IAF) is riddled with technical and personnel problems.  Aging air fleet is making flying a risky business and Air Force is now finding difficult to find good pilots.  From 1991-97, IAF lost 147 aircrafts while 63 pilots lost their lives.   Between 1991 and 2000, one hundred MiG aircrafts have crashed taking India on top of list of air forces loosing such a large number due to mechanical problems.  To keep officers happy, the promotion ladder is kept open.  IAF is becoming top heavy and now has about 22 Air Marshals.  In 1997, Air Vice Marshal S. Raghavan went to court for his next rank.  MoD pushed his case up and he was promoted Air Marshal.  It was later learned that his brother-in-law was an additional secretary at MoD dealing with Air Force.  Air Vice Marshal P. K. Ghosh who was denied his promotion because there was no vacancy now, he challenged this in court.  He argued that he was senior and more suitable and he had been denied his right.  Delhi court came hard on MoD accusing bureaucrats of presenting one sided picture to ACC. Then Secretary Defense Ajit Kumar was even issued a court contempt notice.  Court gave a decision in favor of Ghosh and he was promoted Air Marshal.  Now Air Force was stuck with three Air Marshals for one command. 

 

In 2002, Air Marshal Manjeet Singh Sekhon then AOC-in-C of Southern Command wrote a letter to former Punjab Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal soliciting his help to get transfer to prestigious Western Command which could make him eligible for the top slot of Air Chief.  Sekhon had earlier written a letter to Defense Secretary Yogandra Narain arguing that he was the best choice for prestigious Western Command.  Narain sent the letter to Air Headquarters and an irate Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy gave Sekhon a stern warning.  When Sekhon's letter to Badal was leaked, Sekhon argued that he had not done any thing wrong and everybody used political connections for desired posting and promotion.  Krishnaswamy and Defense Minister George Fernandez forced Sekhon to resign.  Later, Sekhon divulged that the letter was leaked by a senior officer to divert attention from an inquiry which Sekhon was heading.  Few months earlier, an AN-32 aircraft carrying AOC-in-C Western Command Air Marshal V. K. Bhatia crossed Line of Control in Batalik sector and was hit by a missile fired by Pakistanis.  Luckily, it did not explode only damaging the wing and aircraft safely landed in Leh.  An inquiry was ordered by Air Quarter headed by Sekhon.  Sekhon stated that he was pressurized to change the findings of the inquiry to absolve Bhatia but he refused.  The letter was leaked in the next few days to divert attention from inquiry.  In the aftermath of this episode, Sekhon was forced out while Bhatia was shifted to one of the back rooms of Air Quarters where he spent the remainder few months of his career.  Such incidents tarnish the image of armed forces and senior officers loose their respect in the eyes of their subordinates. 

 

Senior Officers

 

Current army chief General Deepak Kapoor is from artillery.  He went through the usual course of command, staff and instructional appointments at various ranks.  In 1994-95, as a Brigadier, he served as Chief Operations Officer of the second phase of the United Nations Operation for Somalia (UNOSOM II). In that capacity he interacted with Pakistani troops stationed in Somalia.  There are many photographs of Kapoor with  Pakistani officers who were his hosts.  He then commanded 161^st  Infantry Brigade based in Uri, Kashmir.  On promotion to Major General he commanded 22^nd Infantry Division in Meerut  He then became Chief of Staff of 4^th Corps based in Tezpur.  In this capacity he was actively involved in the counter-insurgency operations in Assam.  He was promoted Lieutenant General and given the command of 33^rd Corps in Silgiri in West Bengal.  On his promotion to Army Commander, he became GOC-in-C of ARTRAC.  Later, he became army commander of prestigious Northern Command.  In his anticipation of taking over as army chief, he was appointed Vice Chief of Army Staff in January 2007 and he took over from General J. J. Singh as 25^th  Chief of Indian army on September 30, 2007. Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) is Lt. General Milan Lalit Kumar Naidu.  Naidu was commissioned in Rajput Regiment and commanded 5 Rajput in Sri Lanka.  He has served in Military Operations Directorate and XIV Corps.  He commanded 4^th Infantry Division based in Allahabad.  He also served as commandant of Army War College and GOC-in-C of ARTRAC.

 

ARTRAC is based in Simla and currently headed by Lt. General Jayanta Kumar Mohanty. Mohanty was commissioned in a Dogra Regiment.  He commanded his battalion in Kashmir and he was actively involved in counter-insurgency operations.  Under his command, battalion earned three highest peace time gallantry awards in a single operation.  He later commanded an infantry division and a Corps (XIV) in Kashmir.  He was Commandant of Army War College in Mhow prior to his elevation in 2007.  GOC-in-C of Western Command is Lt. General Tej Kumar Sapru.  Sapru took command for Lt. General Daljeet Singh on his retirement in October 2007.  Sapru was commissioned in Ist Battalion of 4^th Gurkha Regiment.  He commanded his battalion from 1989-92.  He commanded a brigade in Kashmir during 1999 Kargil Crisis.  He commanded Nagrota based XVI Corps prior to his elevation to the post of army commander.   GOC-in-C of Southern Command is Lt. General Nobel Thamburaj.  He is from the Corps of Engineers and was commissioned in Bombay Sappers.  He is the only sapper officer who commanded a Rashtriya Rifles sector during the Kargil Crisis in 1999.  He later commanded an infantry division and a Corps (XI Corps) prior to his elevation to the post of Army Commander. Lt. General Vijay Kumar Singh took command of Eastern Command on March 01, 2008.  He was commissioned in 2^nd Rajput nick named 'Kali Chindi'.  He proudly commanded his battalion from 1991-94.  He was commanding Second Strike Corps (nick named Kharga Corps) prior to his elevation to the post of army commander.  He took over Eastern Command from Lt. General Kuldip Singh Jamwal on his retirement.  Jamwal is from artillery and during his career he commanded a desert Corps and served as GOC-in-C of ARTRAC before becoming army commander.   If all goes well, V. K. Singh is all set to become army chief when Kapoor retires in 2010.  A controversy erupted when it was disclosed that V. K. Singh had discrepancy in his date of birth in different documents (May 10, 1950 vs. May 10, 1951).  Records from Military Secretary's and Adjutant General's branches were leaked showing different dates of births.  Singh would still be the senior most general in the race for the top slot but a year difference will shorten his tenure as army chief.  It is alleged that some senior generals who may benefit from a shorter tenure of V. K. Singh may have leaked the information.  Some of them have raised written objections about the issue and we may see some mudslinging in near future.  

 

GOC-in-C of South Western command is Lt. General Parmendra Kumar Singh.  He was commissioned in artillery regiment.  Lt. General Harcharanjeet Singh Panag was GOC-in-C of most important Northern Command since January 2007.  He was to complete his tenure in December 2008 but in an unprecedented move army chief General Deepak Kapoor announced Panag's transfer to a non-active Central Command effective February 29, 2008.  Panag protested against  his transfer and wrote a five page letter to Defense Minister A. K. Antony.  Panag was granted a meeting with Antony bypassing army chief which raised many eyebrows.  However, civilian masters refused to overrule army chief.  Panag was moved to Central Command where he replaced GOC-in-C Lt. General Om Parkash Nandrajog who retired.  Panag belongs to Mechanized Infantry Regiment and has commanded XXI Corps based in Bhopal (nick named Sudharshan Chakra). GOC of XIV Corps Lt. General P. C. Bhardwaj took over as GOC-in-C of Northern Command when Panag was moved. 

 

Second tier commanders of army consist of Chief of Staffs of Army Commands and Corps Commanders.  These officers have gone through the usual command, staff and instructional appointments. Lt. General Rajindar Singh is Chief of Staff of important Northern Command.  He had earlier commanded III Corps in Nagaland.  Lt. General Narindar Singh Barar took command of Bathinda based X Corps nick named 'Chitak Corps' in April 2006.  Lt. General R. K. Karwal of Rajput Regiment took command of Nagrota based XVI Corps.  Karwal has served as Military Attaché in Pakistan and commanded an infantry division in southern command.  Chief of Staffs of various army commands including Lt. General K.S. Shiva Kumar, Amar Nath Aul, Rajinder Singh, Deepak Harishchandra Summanwar, Kiron Kishore Kohli are in line for GOC-in-C of army Commands.  Current lot of Corps Commanders including GOC I Corps Lt. General Prakash Chand Katoch, GOC of II Corps P. S. Singh, GOC III Corps Manbir Singh Dadwal, GOC X Corps Narindar Singh Brar, GOC XI Corps S. S. Kumar, GOC XV Corps Mukesh Sabharwal and GOC XVI Corps R. K. Karwal are in line for next level of appointments if they have required residual service of two years left if an appointment opens up.  There are a large number of third tier officers of Major General rank who are in run for further promotions.  It is difficult to predict who will come at the top.  A number of bright officers including Major Generals Jasbir Singh, Shri Krishna Singh, Nand Kishore Singh, Rameshwar Roy, Naresh Chandra Marwah, Gyan Bhushan and Soli Noshir Pavri of infantry, Major Generals K. R. Rao, Vinod Nayanar, Gurdip Singh of artillery and Major General Anil Chait and Dalbir Singh Siddhu of armored corps may be leaders of  Indian army in near future.

 

Way Forward

 

Indian army has become stagnant in terms of strategic thought and this is partly due to mediocre senior brass.  One example will show the deep malaise and breakdown of working relationship among senior brass.  At the height of Kargil Crisis when army was engaged in large scale operations, Corps Commander of I Corps Lt. General Raj Kadyan had been fighting his appointment case in Delhi court.  His writ petition was against his own army chief General V. P. Malik, Military Secretary and GOC-in-C of Eastern Command Lt. General H. R. S. Kalkat.  Kalkat was serving as commander of an Army Command which had been termed illegal by Delhi High Court and had ordered that Kalkat be removed and Kadyan appointed in his place.  One example of challenging a posting by a senior officer can give some glimpse of the institutional malaise.  In 1992, Lt. General V. P. Airy then serving as DG Infantry in Delhi was posted as DG Assam Rifles.  Airy went to Delhi High Court stating that he should have been made Principle Staff Officer and retained in Delhi.  He alleged that he had been overlooked for an important post and shunted away to Assam.  One does not need to be a rocket scientist to figure out how such relationship among senior brass will affect the morale of the organization and its operational preparedness. 

 

The original intent of giving a legal recourse to army personnel against unjust measures was good but the end result has been nothing less than disastrous for the armed forces.  Since 1980s, there has been steady rise of court cases against army leadership regarding promotions, retirement, dismissals and even postings.  Armed forces have become the biggest defender in cases in courts.  A common joke going around military circles is that Delhi High Court should attach a special bench to Military Secretary's branch.  The rot has reached a level where in one case a military cook went to court against his dismissal.  He had made Indian army chief as defendant.  No army can function efficiently in such an environment.  The result is that military bureaucracy has devised its own way to avoid complications.  If they smell a problem they write down words such as 'pending court decision' to normal promotion and posting orders.  Such uncertainty will surely cause significant anxiety among senior officers who would feel insecure in their position which will have an impact on their function.  Army has embarked on creating duplicate posts to accommodate a top heavy brass.  In 1985, there were three Vice Chiefs of Army Staff instead of one authorized post.

 

 The best option is to have a special tribunal for each service where officers can take their grievance.  These special tribunals should have members from armed forces and judiciary to dispose these cases outside normal court system.  If government has an objection to any promotion, the views of MoD and army headquarters should be reviewed by ACC before final decision.  Postings of senior officers should be the sole prerogative of the army chief.  Any interference of government in this regard will undermine the authority of the chief.  Chief should discuss promotions with Defense Minister and Defense Secretary and any disagreement should be sorted out.  In November 1999, army headquarters forwarded names of nine Major Generals for promotion to next rank.  When final list appeared, five more names were included in the list some allegedly at the interference of political parties.  Advancement of favorites at the expense of others and breach of norms will further erode the professionalism of the army.  Civil military relations have an element of friction when there is difference of opinion about a certain issue.   Prolonged involvement of army in internal security duties erodes the professional ethos from bottom to top and negative effects are becoming visible in Indian army.  Political leadership is responsible for the political solution of the problem and the task of military leadership is to keep reminding the politicians of their task.  In near future, it is likely that even if violence decreases, Indian army will continue the same posture.  CDS is still a long way down the road and modernization of Indian armed forces and its orientation towards a network centric warfare is still decades away.  There is an old saying in military that the task of removing an old idea is more difficult than introducing a new one.

 

Dr. Hamid Hussain is an independent analyst based in New York.  For comments and critique humza@dnamail.com.

 

Hamid Hussain

New York

March 28, 2008