Comments on Radins Afghanistan Strategy Article-Major Agha H Amin

Comments on Radins Afghan Strategy Article by Major Agha H Amin (Retired)

16 February 2010

I was recently in Afghanistan in January 2010.I travelled to Camp
Bastion near Nad i Ali,I travelled to Camp Leatherneck near
Khanishin,I travelled to Camp Dwyer near Garmser.All in connection
with a diesel and logistics sub sub contract.My observations are as
following :---

1-The US Forces do not seem to be burning with fire to destroy the
enemy.What they are doing cannot be called decisive warfare.

2-The Taliban are moving freely east to west and north to south all
along from Pakistani border in Quetta Chaghai and Dalbandin Districts
and in between Kandahar and Nimroz.

3-The US Forces have made no attempt to inderdict these talibs
carrying both drugs and logistics.

While all drone attacks are taking place on some 5 % of talibs in FATA
some 95 % of Talibs in Afghanistan are at virtual peace with US Forces
and Pakistani military calls them good Taliban.

Incidentally security was so bad that we had to travel with men who
call themselves talbs and pay taxes to talibs for carrying US supplies
to all the four camps mentioned.

We travelled back straight by GPS from Khanishin to Nushki in
Pakistani Balochistan.

Finally I am glad that my assessment of the Taliban Hoax has been
published for the layman readers by Edwin Mellen Press New York titled
as Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The military strategy in Afghanistan
By CJ Radin
Feb 14 2010

Since 2006, the Taliban have made a dramatic comeback in Afghanistan
after being driven from the country in 2002. As security has
deteriorated, they have steadily taken control of more and more
territory. In response, a new strategic plan for Afghanistan has been
formulated by General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of ISAF and US
Forces - Afghanistan. On Dec. 3, 2009, this plan was approved by the
Obama administration. While there are several important aspects of the
strategy, such as political development, economic development, counter
narcotics, and the police and justice system, this article will focus
on the military aspect.

The strategic environment

The US military has identified three major Taliban groups as
representing the primary threat to Afghan security: the Quetta Shura
Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin.
According to the US military and General McChrystal, These groups
often operate together, coordinating activities loosely, but they do
not share a single formal command and control structure. Nor do they
have a single overarching strategy or campaign plan. Each group has it
own methods of developing and executing plans and each has adapted
over time.

The Taliban groups have made significant inroads in Afghanistan,
especially in the southern and eastern portions of the country.
Violent attacks constitute the most visible part of this insurgency;
targets are the ISAF forces, Afghan security forces, and the civilian
population. These violent attacks are designed to further recruiting
and financing efforts, to provoke reactions from ISAF that further
alienate the population, and to weaken the government by demonstrating
its inability to provide security.

In addition, the Taliban wage a silent war of intimidation and
persuasion to gain control of the population. These efforts make
possible the existence of Taliban shadow governments in virtually
every province that actively seek to control the population and
displace the national and local governments and traditional power
structures.

The Taliban currently have the initiative in Afghanistan. As a result,
the ordinary Afghan civilian's confidence in the Afghan government has
been declining.

In spite of these gains, however, the Taliban have a significant
weakness. They are not supported by a large portion of Afghans. The
core elements of the insurgency have previously held power in
Afghanistan, and popular enthusiasm for them was and is limited.

Traditionally, the main strength of an insurgency comes from its
support among the local population. Without it, insurgents are
vulnerable to being identified and attacked by larger and more capable
regular forces. This fact is of central importance to the new plan.

The overall military strategy

The McChrystal military plan covers the short term, the next 12-18
months. The plan's main goal is to halt the progress of the Taliban,
to reverse it in key areas, and to regain the initiative.

The first part of the strategy de-emphasizes the counterterrorism
strategy and institutes a counterinsurgency strategy. This means
reducing efforts on going after Taliban combatants and increasing
efforts to provide security to the population. While the insurgency
can afford to lose fighters and leaders, it cannot afford to lose
control of the population.

For the short term, the US does not consider it necessary to control
the entire country but rather to secure a few key areas and population
centers. The goal is for the people of Afghanistan to first see an
opportunity for a normal, better future, and then to start to
experience it.

The key areas that General McChrystal has identified are:

• Helmand province, particularly the Helmand River valley
• Kandahar City and the areas surrounding the city
• The provinces of Paktika, Paktia, and Khost

The second part of the strategy is to develop the Afghan National
Security Force into a force that is capable of providing security for
the country. Although ANSF development will not be completed in 18
months, it needs to demonstrate both substantial progress and that the
long term goal of the ANSF providing for security for the entire
country is achievable. A major review will be held in December 2010 to
assess progress.

ISAF and OEF forces

Since its basis rests on providing security for a population,
counterinsurgency is a labor-intensive strategy. A substantial
increase in troop strength has been deemed necessary. On Dec. 3, 2009,
President Obama announced that 30,000 US troops would be added to the
Afghanistan war effort during the course of 2010. This is in fact a
continuation of a buildup that started in January 2009, when 21,000 US
troops began deploying to Afghanistan under the order of President
Bush. An additional 16,000 non-US forces have also been committed to
the force increase by NATO and allied countries. The total number of
ISAF and OEF troops will increase from 80,000 in early 2009 to 150,000
in summer 2010.

The military strategy details

Some details concerning the implementation of the plan have already
been announced. The plan focuses on three strategic regions: the
southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, the traditional
strongholds of the Quetta Shura Taliban, and the eastern provinces of
Paktika, Paktia, and Khost, the bastion of the Haqqani Network.

The Helmand River Valley

The Helmand River Valley is the province's most significant feature
and its strategic center.

• It is a fertile agricultural area where the majority of the
population of the province resides. It contains the provincial capital
of Lashkar Gah and the province's eco¬nomic center of Gereshk.
• It is the center of the Taliban's drug operations. Sixty percent of
the opium production in Afghanistan comes from this area. This
provides substantial financial resources for the Taliban.
• Helmand contains important lines of communication. For the Taliban,
it is a route for the movement of foreign fighters and weapons from
Pakistan's southwestern province of Baluchistan. The Taliban have also
refined and stored narcotics within Helmand and moved them through the
province's southern border to Pakistan. Helmand also facilitates the
refining, storage, and eventual movement of narcot¬ics, again, mainly
through the province's southern border with Pakistan.
• There is a hydroelectric dam at Kajak at the northern end of the
river valley. If it can be put into operation, it could be a major
resource for development for the region.

The main threat in the area is the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), as
described by Jeffrey Dressler in a report released in early January
2010 at the Institute for the Study of War:

QST is the "intellectual and ideologi¬cal underpinning of the Taliban
insurgency in Afghanistan. The enemy is determined, well-organized,
and entrenched in the province. In recent years, the enemy has shown
its ability to adapt to the evolving conflict by developing and
executing coherent campaign plans.
QST sought to target Afghan and coalition units, mobile convoys, and
supply routes, and widened the campaign against diplomatic centers,
high-ranking government officials, members of parliament, defense
officials, and members of the interior and national security
ministries. Furthermore, the Taliban sought to tighten their
encirclement of key coalition centers, particu¬larly Lashkar Gah.

From 2006 to 2009, British forces controlled the main cities of
Lashkar Gah and Geresk and several villages in the northern Helmand
River valley. But these were unconnected islands of security; the
British had too few troops to control all of the province's population
centers or the areas between them.

The plan is to provide security over the entire length of the Helmand
River valley.

• Push the Taliban out of the population centers and agricultural
areas, significantly reducing Taliban influence over the population.
• Reduce opium cultivation and thereby reduce the Taliban's financial income.
• Currently, the Helmand River Valley contains only isolated pockets
of security.. In addition to being secure in their homes, it is
necessary for the Afghans to be able to move to places that are
important to them, such as to sell farm produce. So an additional goal
is to expand the secure areas and improve the civilian population's
freedom of movement.
• Develop the hydroelectric dam in Kajak to produce electricity, and
begin to distribute it throughout the province.

Prior to 2009, ISAF forces numbered about 7,000 troops and consisted of:

• one British brigade
• one Danish battalion

By spring 2010, this force will be reinforced to about 24,000 troops
and consist of:

• two British brigades (equivalent)
• two US Marine regiments
• one Danish battalion
• one Georgian battalion

The current ANA force in the province is the 3rd Brigade of the 205th
Corps, about 3,000 troops. This force is to be expanded to a corps of
3 brigades, about 12,000 troops.

Kandahar City and surrounding area

Kandahar City is the strategic center of Kandahar province. It is also
important to the Taliban as their spiritual center. Kandahar City also
sits astride the main logistics route from Kabul to Helmand province
and western Afghanistan. It is the only place [I still have question
whether the words "in Afghanistan" should be inserted here] where the
main ring road passes though a major urban area.

In the eyes of the Pashtun, the situation in Kandahar City will define
their perception of security and their future.

As in Helmand, the main threat in the area is the QST. They have been
steadily increasing their hold on the province, most significantly by
expanding control in the areas surrounding Kandahar City. Their goal
is to set up staging areas there from which to project attacks into
the city itself.

Securing Kandahar City requires securing the approaches to the city:
Arghandab in the north, Zari-Panjwayi in the west, and Dand in the
south. These districts are where the insurgents have their safe havens
that allow them to project power within Kandahar City itself.

In addition to opening up roads that run from Helmand through Kandahar
City and to the town of Spin Boldak on the border with Pakistan, the
Coalition will also work on securing the major highway that links
Kandahar City with Kabul.

Before 2009, the ISAF forces in Kandahar constituted 3,000 troops
total, consisting of:
• two Canadian battalions
• one US battalion

By the spring of 2010, this force will be reinforced to about 7,500
troops, consisting of:
• two Canadian battalions
• one US Stryker brigade
• one US light brigade

The current ANA force in the province is the 1st Brigade of the 205th
Corps, or about 3,000 troops. This brigade will be reinforced to about
4,000 troops, but even the expanded force will still be too small to
secure the area. However, with Helmand province being the higher
priority, further reinforcements may not be available until late 2010.

Paktika, Paktia, and Khost provinces

The eastern provinces of Paktika, Paktia, and Khost are adjacent to
the Taliban-controlled tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan
in Pakistan. The Waziristans are the base from which the Haqqani
Network, the best led and most violent of the Taliban groups, operates
in Afghanistan. North and South Waziristan also are home to three
large Taliban groups that are also active in aiding the Afghan
insurgency and that host al Qaeda and allied foreign fighters.
The Haqqani Network is seeking to regain control of its traditional
base in Afghanistan's Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces. They
currently control some of the key terrain around the city of Khost as
well as Gardez in Paktia. The Haqqanis exert significant influence on
the population in the region.

The McChrystal plan is to secure the region is to protect the cities,
the communication centers, the transportation hubs, and the
surrounding areas essential to the city markets and local farmers
selling their crops.

Prior to 2009, the ISAF forces in eastern Afghanistan numbered 3,500
troops and consisted of one US light brigade. By the spring 2010, the
force will be reinforced to about 7,000 troops, or two US light
brigades.

The current ANA forces in the area consist of the three brigades of
the 203rd corps, or about 9,800 troops. The 203rd Corps is one the
best corps in the ANA. By October 2010, the size of the 203rd Corps
will be increased to about 12,000 troops.

ANSF Development

From a long term point of view, developing the ANSF is the most
important strategic goal. If this cannot be accomplished, everything
else is of little use, since the ANSF force must be adequately
strengthened in order for the ISAF to be able to leave. In the short
term, the ISAF needs to provide sufficient security to give the ANSF
time to develop. At the same time, the development of the ANSF has to
make enough progress so that, by July 2011, the ISAF can begin the
process of turning over security responsibility to the ANSF.

Currently the ANSF consists of about 200,000 ANA and ANP troops. The
plan is to accelerate growth so that 240,000 troops could be fielded
by October 2010, rising to 305,000 by October 2011. This is a very
rapid increase in troop size in an extremely short time. To achieve
this goal, significant changes to the original ANSF development plan
have been made.

• Force generation will now concentrate on fielding the maximum number
of light infantry companies and combat service support units. These
units are the most critical to counterinsurgency. They are also the
most straightforward to build.
• Forces that require more extensive training and equipment will be
delayed. This includes artillery, engineers, and motorized
quick-reaction units. The shortage of these units will be made up for
by increasing support from ISAF units.
• Training time for troops and officers will be reduced by about
20-25%. The resulting reduction in expertise will be compensated for
by increasing the number of ISAF mentoring teams.
• Equipment provided will be the minimum combat-essential equipment.
Heavy equipment will be delayed, while light weapons that are "good
enough" for counterinsurgency will get priority. Retirement of older
equipment will be delayed. Facilities will be minimal. Acquisition of
tactical transport helicopters will be accelerated.

Caveats:

This article describes the ISAF strategy for the next 12-18 months;
the longer term strategy is not covered here. Nor does the foregoing
discussion address the entire plan for the next 12-18 months. There
are major aspects that have not been discussed in this article,
including development of the Afghan National Police, counter
narcotics, civilian resources for development, and governance and
information operations.

This plan entails significant risks. Some aspects will work, some will
not. The enemy will adapt, and the plan will have to be adapted
accordingly.

--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear
of punishment and hope of reward after death." --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN