Bara Pind-Charge of Pakistani Heavy Brigade

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INDIAN SOLDIERS STANDING ONE OF PATTON TANKS OF 13 LANCERS IN THE BATTLE















54 Indian Division advanced two brigades up both supported by tanks from 16 Armoured Brigade with 47 Brigade on the right and 91 Brigade on the left while the third brigade ie 74 Brigade in reserve. 47 Brigade was assigned the mission of contacting Basantar Nala opposite general area Lagwal-Jarpal and establishing a bridgehead on the west bank of Basantar Nala through which 74 Brigade was to breakout towards Zafarwal.








91 Brigade was to move on the east flank of 54 Division. By 15th December the 47 Infantry Brigade (three infantry battalions) closed with Basantar Nala opposite Lagwal and made a successful assault across the minefield laid in the bed of Basantar Nala on night 15/16 December15. A tough infantry fight took place and one of Indian infantry battalion commanders was killed during this operation16.










The 47 Indian Infantry Brigade was tasked to establish a bridgehead in general area Sikandarpur-Lalial-Barapind17. It captured Siraj Chak and Laleal Forest at 8.30 p.m and Jarpal at 11.30 p.m18. Stiff fighting took place at Jarpal; and Major Hoshiar Singh a hardy Sikh Jat from Sisana in Hissar district was awarded a Param Vir Chakra; India's highest gallantry award18a.




The Indian infantry reported at 2.00 p.m. that they were being attacked by Pakistani tanks and sent an SOS for tank support.This forced Indian 47 Brigade Commander to ask 17 Poona Horse to move into the bridgehead at once. As per the Indian armoured corps historian, the situation was so desperate that one squadron of Poona Horse was rushed across part of the minefield even though a lane had not been cleared18b.




A firefight followed and Indians claim that they destroyed a Pakistani Sherman despite having no night firing capability!The forward extent of the bridgehead was east of the Lalial Reserve Forest and this forced the Poona Horse tanks to cross the forest at night and establish themselves on its western edge, so as to be able to effectively engage any counter attack force the next morning.








The Lalial Reserve Forest was thus cleared by a night assault launched by 'C' Squadron 17 Poona Horse immediately followed by an APC mounted company of 18 Rajput. The CO of 17 Horse also joined C Squadron along with RHQ Troop. The rest of the regiment followed and by first light the whole 17 Poona Horse was deployed; 'C' Squadron opposite Lalial village and to the south of it on the forward edge of the forest, 'B' Squadron less two troops south of 'C' Squadron opposite Ghazipur and 'A' Squadron in reserve in area Siraj Chak a village east of Ghazipur on the eastern side of the reserve forest.




Two tank troops of 'B' Squadron were deployed in Jarpal area in the defences of 3 Grenadiers. 16 Madras which was the right forward battalion in the assault was deployed in line with the tanks in the north, in area Lalial-Ghazipur, 6 Madras which was in reserve in the assault phase was also brought forward and deployed in the middle and 3 Grenadiers which had played a major role in the initial assault as the right forward battalion in Jarpal and east of Barapind. It is significant to note that the Indians were all praise for the Pakistani infantry defending Jarpal; unlike the Pakistani infantry on the north i.e. opposite 6 and 16 Madras18c.

THE 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE COUNTER ATTACK ON BARAPIND JARPAL -16 DECEMBER 1971

It appears that Headquarters 1 Corps did not seriously appreciate the gravity of 54 Indian Division's advance towards Zafarwal. 8 Armoured Brigade was concentrated in general area Qila Sobha Singh-Pasrur from 11th December onwards. On 15th December the brigade was told to be prepared for ' a brigade attack east of Bein Nala to recapture lost territory up to River Ravi'!19 It may be noted that no effort was made to impose caution on the advancing enemy who leisurely breached all three minefields from 5 to 15 December maintaining a rate of mile on an average one and a quarter mile per day.




This was not because of paucity of reserves, but paucity of resolution and decisiveness in the 1 Corps Headquarters or in the GHQ to spur 1 Corps! General Fazal Muqeem very accurately described 1 Corps conduct of the defensive battle as 'passive defence of 1 Corps' 20.8 Armoured Brigade was preparing for the grand counter attack that it was supposed to launch east of Bein Nala to recover all lost territory up to River Ravi which it was supposed to launch in Nainakot area when it was suddenly informed at 0430 hours 16th December by the infantry formation in defence that the enemy had breached the minefield on Basantar Nala at Lagwal21.




At 0515 hours the armoured brigade headquarters issued a warning order assessing an enemy tank squadron and an infantry battalion which had crossed the Basantar Nala and was established in area Lalial Forest and was being 'contained by own infantry and an independent squadron'22. On the other hand the infantry brigade commander of the area i.e. Brigadier Sher Ali Baz (24 Brigade) assessed the enemy in Jarpal as one tank troop and one infantry company!23




Lieutenant General Irshad the 1 Corps Commander ordered 8 Independent Brigade Commander to 'Restore the situation with minimum force'24.8 Armoured Brigade Commander earmarked 13 Lancers one of its three tank regiments to deal with the situation and gave the following instructions/orders:-'Approximately squadron of tanks and infantry battalion in village Siraj Chak area on the west bank of Basantar.








This penetration has been contained by own infantry/tanks...and directed 13 Lancers to establish a counter penetration position25 in area Pindi Channian west of village Jarpal immediately 26'13 Lancers along with other 8 Brigade units was located a little south of Zafarwal. It concentrated in Jabal-Mehla area by 0745 hours along with its affiliated armoured infantry company. 'A' Squadron which was earmarked for the 'Counter Penetration' task was briefed by the CO 13 Lancers and crossed road Zafarwal-Shakargarh at 0800 hours. While on the move it was ordered on wireless by the CO to move towards area Sikandarpur and destroy a few enemy tanks which were breaking out from area Lalial. (It may be noted, that this must have been a false alarm, since no Indian account mentions any such offensive movement at eightish in the morning).








This modification in plan resulted based on new orders from 8 Armoured Brigade Commander who had received these from 24 Infantry Brigade Commander. The brigade commander had asked CO 13 Lancers to 'send a squadron to contain enemy penetration' but the CO decided to 'attack north and destroy enemy tanks'27. 'A' Squadron moved to Sikandarpur and was fired at by enemy tanks/anti-tank guns from Ghazipur village.








The squadron formed up and attacked losing in the process 8 tanks and two officers killed and wounded. The remaining six tanks withdrew and deployed along with Pakistani infantry holding defences at Sakror Bund. Meanwhile at 0830 hours while 'A' Squadron was moving towards Ghazipur CO 13 Lancers, entirely on his own judgement, also ordered 'C' Squadron to take a 'Counter Penetration Position' in Pindi Chanian area and while 'C' Squadron was preparing to do so changed his orders, ordering both 'B' and 'C' Squadrons to 'proceed to Barapind and attack six to seven enemy tanks and infantry company in Jarpal area'28.All that followed was disastrous and both the squadrons were engaged by heavy enemy anti-tank and artillery fire, losing twenty tanks and in the process, three officers killed and two officers wounded.



MAJOR HOSHIAR SINGH CHEEMA A JAT FROM SISSANA IN HISSAR DISTRICT OF HARIANA FIRED WITH AN ANTI TANK GUN HITTING SOME TANKS AND LIVED TO WIN A PVC , A UNIQUE HONOUR,NORMALLY AWARDED POSTHOMOUSLY












It was during this action that Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal a Punjabi Hindu from Sargodha exhibited extreme valour and saved the Indian position as per the Indian Armoured Corps historian; an action which was acknowledged by grant of a posthumous Param Vir Chakra; India's highest gallantry award. 13 Lancers claims that the enemy fell back from Barapind29 .(which was of no consequence to both Indians and Pakistanis in any case) while the Indians claim that they had never occupied Barapind30 (again of no consequence even if they had done so).We will briefly discuss the Indian position during this whole affair.








The Indians were holding the bridgehead as we earlier discussed with two tank squadrons with a third in reserve (it has been erroneously claimed that there were two or three Indian tank regiments defending the bridgehead); 'C' Squadron Poona Horse on the right holding area Lalial and south , 'B' Squadron less two troops holding area Ghazipur and south and two troops of 'B' Squadron beefing up the defences of 3 Grenadier Battalion in village Jarpal. It was essentially 'C' Squadron Poona Horse which faced 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers and 'B' Squadron Poona Horse which faced 'B' and 'C' Squadrons of 13 Lancers.















Once 13 Lancers brought in its two remaining squadrons the Indians reinforced Jarpal with half squadron of its 'A' Squadron which was in reserve in Siraj Chak area. Once 31 Cavalry attacked the Indians brought the remaining tanks of 'A' Squadron in Jarpal area.By 1200 hours 13 Lancers which was praised by the Indians for its tremendous valour, keeping aside all the foolhardiness of their modus operandi,31 was written off from the order of battle of the 8 Armoured Brigade!














The issue now was no longer containment since the Indians were also considerably shaken, having suffered a large number of tank and infantry casualties in the process. Such was the elan and dash of this attack that the Indian armoured corps historian admitted that 'the only occasion that a breakthrough could have occurred was when two squadrons of 13 Lancers (following Major Nasir's exhortation described in the previous sentence) attacked together in the afternoon, but a gallant last-ditch stand by three tanks of the Poona Horse averted the danger' But the Indian historian went further and instead of making ridiculous claims that the Indians were more martial frankly admitted that the Pakistani failure had a direct connection with incompetent leadership. Gurcharan Singh thus said: 'Pakistani armour suffered casualties because of bad use of ground and tactical ineptness'31a.














8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters now ordered its second tank regiment 31 Cavalry to attack the Indian bridgehead from the direction of Marara Wazirpur in the gap between the place where 'C' and 'B' Squadrons 13 Lancers had attacked. The Indians admitted that the attack of 31 Cavalry was more methodical and deliberate32 than 13 Lancers, with the regiment attacking as an entity; two squadrons providing static fire support and one assaulting.














The deliberate manner in which the attack was launched could not compensate for the nominal artillery support and the frontal approach and the attacking squadron of 31 Cavalry was beaten back with a loss of ten out of fourteen tanks destroyed and a squadron commander and another officer killed. 31 Cavalry now did what 8 Armoured Brigade may have done at 8 O' Clock in the morning; ie it went into a counter penetration position around Marara Wazirpur at about 1400 hours.33



AFTER 13 LANCERS FAILED , 31 CAVALRY REGIMENT WAS LAUNCHED TO ATTACK THE INDIAN BRIDGE HEAD-CLICK TO ENLARGE









It was after this second attack of 31 Cavalry that the Indians reinforced the bridgehead with approximately 12 tanks from Brigade headquarters, and half squadron 4 Hodsons Horse. The situation now was well in control with 27 Cavalry and 35 FF of 124 Brigade in reserve and the Indian threat (that is if there was any despite Pakistani numerical tank superiority of three to one or three to two in Barapind-Jarpal area) was removed.














Remnants of 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers remaining tanks were in counter penetration position opposite Ghazipur, 'B' and 'C' Squadrons in counter penetration position opposite Barapind and Jarpal and 31 Cavalry in the middle.On night 16/17 December the 8 Brigade and 24 Brigade commander decided to attack the bridgehead which had been most disastrously contained with the third tank regiment 27 Cavalry and 35 FF, both of which were to attack and capture Jarpal (another mud village of no tactical consequence).














The infantry battalion was delayed and the armoured brigade commander called off the planned attack34 which was originally scheduled to be launched at 0430 hours 17 December35. The infantry brigade commander who according to many officers of the 24 Brigade rarely left his headquarters however insisted that 35 FF, a newly raised but highly integrated and motivated foot infantry unit to launch a daylight attack without tank support on a bridgehead which two tank regiments had failed to dent !














Due to some phenomenal command blunder artillery fire support was not coordinated and 35 FF attacked without artillery fire support36 at 0530 hours. The commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja led the senseless attack and it is best to quote the Indians who were all praise for the gallantry of this indomitable battalion and were shocked at the senselessness of the whole affair; 'At dawn 39th FF launched its attack for the recapture of Jarpal. The attack was doomed to failure.














Launched in broad daylight as it was over open ground in full view of one tank squadron plus and one infantry battalion and covered by their combined weapons. Tanks and artillery opened fire when the Pakistanis emerged from cover from their forming up place.It was a foolhardy venture,the attackers were literally massacred but they persisted in their attempt to close until the few remnants fell only about 50 metres from tanks of 4 Hodsons Horse. At about that time the news of Pakistani acceptance of ceasefire was received. The whole of this gallant battalion was sacrificed to no purpose...ceasefire became effective at 8.00 p.m. and guns fell silent on both sides.














The next day 80 dead bodies of the 39th Frontier Force including their commanding officer, second in commands and adjutants were handed over to the Pakistanis'37'
Hail Indomitable Heroes Hail! Despite of all your Generals and Brigadiers ye prevailed!
The Indians rightly awarded two of their highest gallantry awards to their soldiers, but nothing beyond an SJ was granted to the brave men who died at Barapind-Jarpal! The Indians even awarded their highest award to Major Hoshiar Singh Cheema who survived the battle but many equally brave soldiers of 13 Lancers, 31 Cavalry or 35 FF were not considered worthy of being awarded a Nishan-i-Haidar. Perhaps there is something seriously wrong with the whole system of the award of gallantry in our army?














What is the basis;is it that an officer has won the Sword of Honour or is from an old regiment, or that his citation was written well, or that he was liked by his brigade or divisional commander before the war?Fazal-i-Muqeem well summed up at least 8 Division's performance (commanded by Major General Abdul Ali Malik) when he said: 'The few counter attacks, which 8 Division tried during the war were most noticeable by their lack of planning. The units were hurled into battle without having been given enough time for planning and preparations'.38














ANALYSIS














Impact of Experiences of 1965 War on the Principal Decision Makers' Minds.














Most analysis of Barapind-Jarpal are unfortunately superficial because they concentrate on the superficial aspects of the whole affair. The principal reason for the failure at Barapind was neither the artillery factor, nor the assessment of situation, nor incompetence of the armoured brigade commander but something much deeper. This was the deep impact of experiences of 1965 war on the principal decision makers' mind.














First of all we will discuss Brigadier Ahmad the commander of 8 Armoured Brigade. Brigadier Ahmad, had distinguished himself as a squadron commander at Gadgor in 1965 war a few miles west of Degh Nala and had played a major role in the failure of the Indian 1st Armoured Division's failure to achieve a major breakthrough on 8th September. It appears that this experience at Gadgor shaped many of his actions in 1971.














The Battle of Gadgor was a peculiar battle in which Pakistan's 25 Cavalry had clashed with two tank regiments of the Indian Army, with both units on the march and with both deploying in a line formation in a most impromptu manner without knowing the strength or composition of the enemy in front. The Indians had the potential to outflank 25 Cavalry by virtue of having nine tank squadrons against three of 25 Cavalry but failed because their armoured brigade commander (who ironically commanded 1 Indian Corps in 1971) was unnerved due to reports of a false alarm on his flank.














The action at Gadgor was a glorious feat as far as 25 Cavalry and then Major Ahmad were concerned. But it was one of those unique incidents which rarely occur in military history!Both sides did not know, who was opposing them; 25 Cavalry having no clue that they were opposing the whole Indian armoured division and the Indian 1st Armoured Division thinking that they were opposed by an armoured brigade!














Artillery was of no consequence in this action since both sides clashed by accident and artillery fire made a limited impact on the battle! At this time there were no armoured brigades in Pakistan 6 Armoured Division and the Battle of Chawinda was fought as a largely ad hoc battle with divisional headquarters directly telling units what to do. It appears that Gadgor experience influenced both Brigadier Ahmad and GOC 8 Division who at that time was commanding 24 Infantry Brigade at Gadgor. Later on artillery played a pivotal role in defeating deliberate Indian assaults opposite Chawinda from 12th to 21 September 1965.














However these were downplayed because of the inter arm rivalry and Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Choudhry the architect of artillery plan at Chawinda was sidelined and retired as a brigadier despite having had a brilliant career.














Post 1965 propaganda in Pakistan painted the Battle of Chawinda as a triumph of armour and infantry; hardly ever admitting that artillery played any role in it! This was due to the British inherited legacy in which artillery was despised as an arm by infantry and armour officers!Now we will discuss 13 Lancers.














The experiences of this unit in 1965 war played a major role in conditioning its attitude in 1971. In 1971 this unit was launched in Chamb against an Indian Squadron equipped with AMX-13 tanks which had no potential to oppose the six to one tank superiority concentrated against them by Pakistan in Chamb during Operation Grand Slam.














Even technically AMX-13 was a matchbox with extremely thin armour as compared to the Patton/Sherman tanks employed by Pakistan against it. 13 Lancers was conditioned by the Grand Slam experience when it was opposed by an enemy which was outnumbered, as well as surprised. This experience conditioned their behaviour in 1971 and they had faith in the tank charge which had succeeded in Grand Slam in front of AMX-13 but had no chance of success in front of Centurions of a tank regiment as illustrious as 13 Lancers!














DOCTRINAL AND OTHER TACTICAL FAILURES














The conduct of the two tank regiments clearly point towards doctrinal procedural and tactical failures particular to the armoured corps.Brigadier Jahangir Karamat (later General) who was from 13 Lancers categorically said that the armoured briagde commander asked both 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry to attack as soon as possible implying that there was no need to cut short the batle procedure and there was no need to panic;but both the units and specially 13 Lancers cut through various parts of the battle procedure like liaision with infantry,preliminary recce etc leading to the phenomenal tank losses that it later suffered.Even the method of attack of both units was different;which proved that even at brigade level;tactical thinking was whimsical and differed from unit to unit;even in important things like basic drills of operations of war!














CRUX OF THE WHOLE ISSUE














There is one fact which is missed in most analysis’s of the Battle of Barapind and most other tank battles of Indo-Pak war.This refers to handling of units above regiment level.There is one striking parallel between Battle of Gadgor fought in 1965 where 25 Cavalry checked the 1st Indian Armoured Briagde(ie 1st Indian Armoured Div) and in Barapind where 16 Light Cavalry stopped the whole 8 Armoured Brigade.














The fact that stands out is that handling of unit till regiment level was good in defence while handling of units beyond brigade level was extremely poor and especially in offensive operations! Even the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division which did well in Chawinda fought an essentially defensive battle.














In Gadgor, 25 Cavalry did extremely well as a unit but the Indians failed miserably as a brigade at Gadgor;despite a four to one superiority; and the same happened at Barapind.The conclusion is that both the armies failed to function as dynamic entities beyond regimental level!The troops and the young leaders till squadron were equally brave and leaders beyond unit level almost equally weak in handling more than one unit!














Even in Khem Karan Pakistani armour succeded till unit level but failed misearbly beyond in attack; which is a far more difficult operation to coordinate, execute and synchronise than attack. Thus Khem Karan was triumph of 6 Lancers and failure of 4 and 5 Armoured Brigades in attack!The same tendency was present at the Corps level, althoughn the Indians improved over it since they had the system of corps in vogue earlier than Pakistan Army.














They learnt it from 1965 when their 1 Corps had miserably failed to function as a Corps. Even in Shakargarh the Indians failed to concentrate more than one armoured regiment at any one place at a particular time. The Battle of Barapind was the triumph of one unit over a brigade in defence but proved that the Gadgor experience;ie inability of both armour commanders to handle more than one tank regiment was valid even in 1971!














The only man in the subcontinent who came close to succesful handling of more than one tank regiment in offence was an infantry general (like Rommel) ie General Eftikhar who despite near parity successfully handled an armoured force of more than two tank regiments. A small feat in western military terms but a big one in the Indo-Pak military scenario. Praval the Indian writer hit the nail on the head when he observed that in Shakargarh bulge the Indians failed to concentrate at any one time more than one tank regiment and that at no time was more than one tank regiment in action, or in contact with the enemy.














EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES














Clausewitz clearly and repeatedly stated many times in his book 'On War' that a strategic reserve that had no bearing on the decisive battle was a negation of the whole idea of having a strategic reserve. Thus what was the use of 6 Armoured Division or 17 Division when they did nothing and had no bearing on the whole battle of Shakargarh!














There is some truth in Iqbal's verse 'Man never suffers defeat, without perishing he goes into retreat'!














ROLE OF HEADQUARTER 1 CORPS














The only role of 1 Corps Headquarters was handling of Corps reserves but commander 1 Corps abdicated from this responsibility taking no interest in what 8 Armoured Brigade did or what it was supposed to do. 1 Corps Headquarters was as a matter of fact overtaken by the friction of war. The gears of whole higher command mechanism of 1 Corps were jammed and Commander 1 Corps did not have the powerful iron will to overcome this friction, nor did he have the coup d oeil or operational vision to supply the much needed oil to lubricate the gears of 1 Corps operational ability.














1 Corps possessed numerical superiority over the Indians in armour, the arm of decision and had the potential to make the Indians react to its moves rather than reacting to their moves. As Fazal Muqeem rightly described 1 Corps assumed a passive role and merely kept reacting instead of seizing the initiative; which was well within its capability; keeping in view the relative superiority in tanks. So disgusted were the officers with the army high command, that the revolt which finally resulted in the exit of Yahya Khan started from 6 Armoured Division, which was not utilised at all throughout the war.














1 Corps Headquarters was vacillating and indecisive, unable to even assess as to which was the most dangerous enemy threat, and till 15 December was thinking of employing 8 Armoured Brigade for a raid at Nainakot, more than 20 miles east of Barapind!1 Corps Headquarters was also directly responsible for keeping the artillery out of the planning of operations.














Shaukat Riza the official historian of Pakistan Army noted this anti- artillery bias of Headquarters 1 Corps in the following words: 'When Headquarters 1 Corps was established in Gujranwala, its artillery component was driven out nine miles away to Nadipur.














Even for the capture of Dharam Enclave Headquarters Artillery I Corps was kept out of picture'39. Instead of ensuring that artillery, armour and all arms worked as a team, Commander 1 Corps established a precedence which aimed at increasing the inter arm rivalry which both Pakistan and Indian Armies had inherited from the British (but which had been reduced in Indian Army, by virtue of having an artillery C in C etc).







Thus when commander 8 Armoured Brigade made his counterattack plans he did not consult the corps artillery Commander or any other infantry divisional artillery commander at all.40














ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION














Barapind-Jarpal was essentially a failure in assessing a situation correctly. There was no doubt from 5 December onwards that the principal threat to Pakistani 1 Corps was from the 54 Division which although very slowly was surely advancing towards Zafarwal-Pasrur complex, possession of which was vital for anyone who wanted to hold the initiative in Shakargarh Bulge. 1 Corps Headquarters failed to assess this simple fact and did not function at all as an operational headquarters except as a post office processing requests for reinforcements.














The crossing of Basantar should not have come as a surprise at all on the morning of 16 December, but it appeared that the corps headquarters was not prepared for this eventuality. Instead the situations assessment was relegated to the holding infantry battalion and the infantry brigade commander made no serious attempt to keep a close liaison with either the armoured brigade headquarters.














Even as late as the morning of 16 December he insisted that enemy strength across Basantar was no more than a tank troop and an infantry company. The armoured brigade commander also made no independent effort to confirm or disregard the assessment of the infantry commander and assumed that a tank regiment could deal with the situation without utilising divisional or corps artillery's fire support.














The CO of 13 Lancers who should have been the most concerned person made no effort to assess the situation and was confident that one tank squadron could deal with the enemy! The engagement that followed was impromptu and 13 Lancers, was committed as a unit of sheer reflex action while conducting fire fights with individual Indian tanks.














ROLE OF 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE HEADQUARTER VIS-A-VIS ITS UNITS














8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters' failed in three counts; i.e. was the assessment of the situation, ability to employ the tank resources correctly and in incorporating artillery to support its offensive operations. The headquarters was formed in 1970 and the concept of an independent brigade fighting in the environment of a corps was new at least as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned.














The operational situation in 1971, was far more complex than the one in 1965 when the 6 Armoured Division was fighting a battle on a twelve mile frontage with an enemy which was only attacking it frontally. In 1971 1 Corps was dealing with an operational situation in which Shakargarh Bulge was being attacked from three distinct directions over a frontage which was more than 60 miles wide with no clear cut operational plan to counter it. 8 Armoured Brigade had worked on about 25 contingencies and operated in an environment in which its corps headquarters was already paralysed by indecision and vacillation.Later on it became fashionable to criticise Brigadier Ahmad and to state that it was a failure of one man. Brigadier Ahmad was one of the finest officers of the armoured corps and was therefore placed in an independent command. The failure of 8 Armoured Brigade was not failure of one individual but that of the whole Pakistan Armoured Corps! The blunders were committed at all levels and 13 Lancers lost most of its tanks, not because of Brigadier Ahmad but because of the erratic attitude of its CO who on his own decided to reap some glory by ordering an attack when he had been ordered by his brigade commander to go into counter penetration position. 8 Armoured Brigade Headquarter's major failure was in failure to utilise artillery; but we must remember that at that time and to some extent till even now at least in armoured corps, artillery was despised as an arm, and any other man in Ahmad's place would have acted no differently41.














It appears that 8 Armoured Brigade Headquarters was unnerved once 13 Lancers was decimated and ordered 31 Cavalry to attack at once without realising that the one tank regiment attacking at the same place where another had just failed was against all tactical principles! It is possible that Brigadier Ahmad was forced to bring in 31 Cavalry since the high losses of 13 Lancers had created a grave situation which could be remedied only by bringing in another tank regiment, to deter the Indians from exploiting their tremendous success against 13 Lancers. Even the contrast between 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry's conduct was glaring. 31 Cavalry despite being a new unit conducted its attack in a far more deliberate manner than 13 Lancers; something which was noticed; as we have already discussed even by the Indian armoured corps historian.














The unnecessary losses that 13 Lancers suffered were entirely avoidable had its CO followed the instructions he had received and went for a counter penetration position. The Indians fought well, but they did so out of sheer desperation!It is ironic that while armour was singled out as an arm for the Barapind failure,the disease which had led to it was not diagnosed.It was a disease born in the Ayub-Musa era and had a deep connection with the British military legacy afflicting the whole army.














Brigadier Ahmad was not promoted after the war, but this had less to do with Barapind and more with personal likes and dislikes! GOC 8 Division whose conduct as we have discussed was complimented by Fazal Muqeem was promoted! Another Brigadier who did not have the moral courage to join his brigade in Chamb and evaded active service on the pretext of martial law duty, was promoted and became a full general!














GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION














The failure at Barapind was later rationalised by saying that the Indian threat was grave and that the blunders committed were a natural result of the confusion caused because of the gravity of the threat! We will examine this extremely fallacious assertion in brief. The principal decision makers as we have seen assessed that the enemy in front was a troop of tanks or a squadron and thought in a most cavalier manner that it could