Ayub Khan's early career-Dr Hamid Hussain

March 8, 2010

 

Dear All;

 

Someone asked my two cent worth opinion about controversy about Ayub Khan's early career which was probably going on in media and following was my response.  When I finished and reviewed it, I saw myself as some kind of nutty professor still engaged in archaic details which no one is interested but then again few who care about facts keep my own brain cells working.

 

Regards,

Hamid

 

March 7, 2010

 

Dear Sir;

 

I reviewed the two pieces as well as Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan's letter regarding Field Marshal Ayub Khan's career and other issues related to armies of India & Pakistan during that time period.  Facts are like prisms and depending on from which angle you are looking at the prism you may see a different color.  In addition, sometimes the color of our own glasses gives a particular color to the objects we are seeing.  It is perfectly reasonable and acceptable that two people may reach quite different conclusions looking at the same set of facts.  I'll try to answer some of the controversial issues about Ayub Khan's career to the best of my knowledge based on my own limited research.  No human effort is perfect and I for myself will greatly appreciate if any error in my narrative is pointed to me.  This relates only to the military history aspect of the debate leaving aside the political issues.   I'm not qualified to comment on the political aspect.  Even if Ayub had a stellar service record, he can still be held accountable for his acts of omission & commission as army chief as well as President of the country. 

 

I'll give facts along with references (I must admit that my own notes on history of various battalions & officers were collected from different published and unpublished sources as well as personal interviews and sometimes I don't have exact reference and therefore some of these may be subject to correction) and then give my interpretation separately to keep two things apart for the readers to make their own conclusions;

 

Ayub Khan & First Burma Regiment:

 

-          In 1944-45, Ayub Khan was Major and serving as Second-In-Command (2IC) of First Burma Regiment.  On January 10, 1945, Commanding Officer (CO) Lieutenant Colonel W. F. Brown was killed and Ayub Khan assumed command.  On March 07 (some accounts give the date of March 15), 1945 Lt. Colonel Hugh Parsons (Lt. Colonel Mohtaram calls him Steve Parsons which could be his middle name) took command from Ayub.  Parsons was originally from 5/6^th Gurkha Rifles and had served with First Assam in the past.  Ayub stayed in the tent of Risaldar/Honorary Captain Ashraf Khan of Hazara until his departure to India on April 18.  (These facts are based on my own personal notes on career of senior officers, Lt. Colonel Mohtaram's letter to Colonel S. G. M. Mehdi reproduced in Air Commodore Sajad Haider's memoirs 'Flight of the Falcon' and Personal papers of Major D. E. Lloyd Jones MC who was a company commander of First Assam during the same time.  These papers are at Cambridge University.  I have looked at the summary of his diary entries and dates of COs death, Ayub taking command and then handing it over to Parsons is from Major Lloyd's diary.  The dates may not exactly match to the events as Jones may have made entries of events not on the same day but summarized events which occurred few days earlier.  Still, this should not affect the general time frame).  Ayub's service with First Assam is an accepted fact corroborated by all the evidence given above.  If someone is accepting Lt. Colonel Parson's testimony then there are no two views that Parsons was with First Assam and which will place Ayub fairly and squarely in First Assam.  In fact the parade ground of Assam Regimental Center in Shillong is named Pasrons parade ground and called even today by this name.  Similarly, if we are accepting Lt. Colonel Mohtaram's testimony then he very clearly states that Ayub was commanding First Assam.

  My View:   From the facts above we can now reach different conclusions in the absence of access to Ayub's original service record of that time.  Ayub Khan was 2IC of First Assam and after the death of CO was probably given the temporary command of the battalion with temporary rank of Lieutenant Colonel.  When a permanent CO is appointed about two months later, Ayub hands over the command and reverts back to the rank of Major.  This is corroborated by Lloyd Jones diary who writes that 'Major' Ayub transferred back to India.   In this capacity, he serves with the battalion until the end of the year until he comes back to India (this will corroborate with Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan's timing that Ayub was with the battalion until December 1945).  If we accept Lt. Colonel Mohtaram's (I was unable to identify Mohtaram's battalion but from his letter it is clear that he was in the same theatre and met Ayub Khan during the time period we are discussing which makes him a very credible witness) time and fact line, then it seems that Ayub Khan as CO in temporary rank tells his commanding officer Major General T. W. Rees that for the assigned task his battalion is not fit. This is seen as 'tactical timidity' by Rees and he orders Lt. Colonel Parsons to take over the command.  However, if we accept Lt. Colonel Mohtaram's account that Ayub left in April 1945, then we are unable to find Ayub during the rest of the year until he appears again in early 1946.  Where was Ayub from April 1945 to December 1945? 

 

Now the question of why would Ayub considers his battalion 'not fit'?  I hazard o guess two reasons for that.  First, battalion suffered horrible casualties during the battle of Kohima a year earlier when they fought Japanese 31 Division against heavy odds.  Casualties were replaced by new recruits and from other battalions.  Second, not only British but almost all of Indian officers were also staunch believers of 'martial race' theory in vogue.  Ayub was not confident about his own troops who were mainly local Ahoms, Mizo, Nagas , Kukis with some domiciled Gurkhas and battalion being raised in 1941 (the fact of the matter is that First Assam was one of few battalions of Indian army fighting to protect their own territory from Japanese assault and gave a stellar performance.) An officer raised his whole life on martial races mantra and eulogizing and serving with battalions with over a century long history and long list of battle honors may get quite shaky when given command of troops who in his mind are not the best.  This can be interpreted as tactical timidity by the commanding officer.  On the other hand, if a CO is fully appreciative of the deficiencies of men under his command and clearly communicates it to his superiors rather than 'can do it Sir' or 'will do it Sir' is considered a professional and upright officer  in all armies.  Another commanding officer may see such a CO as candid and professional.  In the end it comes out how one is going to interpret the action or statement of an officer with all the hindsight. 

 

Ayub Khan & First Chamar Regiment

 

-          The authority quoted on Ayub's association with First Chamar is General Jogindar Singh who is referred as Ayub's batch mate or battalion mate.  Ayub was commissioned from Sandhurst in February 1928 and joined 1/14 Punjab (now 5 Punjab).  There are two Jogindar Singh's during the time period we are discussing.   First is Lt. General Jogindar Singh Dhillon (nick named Jogi) who was commanding XI Corps in 1965 and later commanded Central command.  Jogi was commissioned in February 1936 from Dehra Dun and joined Bengal Sappers (a first rate officer who holds the distinction of winning both the sword of honor and Gold Medal).  He could be neither Ayub's batch mate nor his battalion mate.  The other is Major General Jogindar Singh who was Chief of Staff (COS) of Western Command in 1965 war.  This officer joined Indian army as a sepoy and was commissioned through Y Cadet scheme in 1937. He joined 5/14 Punjab Regiment (now 16 Punjab).  These facts make Jogindar nine years junior to Ayub, commissioning from Dehra Dun and serving with a different battalion.  I could not find Jogindar serving in Burma theatre in any of the battalions in question i.e. 1/14 Punjab, 5/15 Punjab, First Assam or First Chamar and to the best of my knowledge he was probably doing a staff course in Quetta in 1944-45 time frame. Having said that we should remember that during the whole sale slaughter of second world war, it was not unusual for large elements of battalions being decimated, captured, reorganized and officers ending up serving in different battalions and this make the task of matching an officer with a particular battalion quite difficult.  The only possibility which comes to my mind is if we carefully scrutinize the history of 5/14 Punjab during the war.  Jogindar was not with his parent battalion 5/15 Punjab during the war as this battalion was captured by Japanese in February 1942.  This battalion was not re-raised and elements of this battalion were assigned to 1/14 Punjab when later was re-raised.  (My records & http://orbat.com/site/history/open1/pakistan_punjabregt.html) This may make Jogindar as Ayub's battalion mate in technical sense.  However this happened in May 1946 much later than the era we are discussing and even if this is the case Jogindar may have heard it from others as part of the mess talk.  5/14 Punjab (now 16 Punjab) was re-raised after partition in October 1948 by Lt. Colonel Dost Muhammad.

My View

 

No evidence exists which associates Ayub with First Chamar.  The only remote possibility is that if we accept that when he was replaced by Parsons in March 1945, he was also transferred to First Chamar where he spent the time from March to December 1945.  In my view this is very unlikely.  Now the question is that why Jogindar associated Ayub with First Chamar?  I think that Jogindar has made an honest mistake and the reason is that there were three battalions with the designation First.  Interestingly, all these three battalions were not part of any higher formation i.e. Brigade, Division but were directly controlled by XXXIII Corps as Division or Corps defense battalions.  These battalions were First Burma Regiment, First Assam Regiment and First Chamar Regiment.  Anyone can easily get confused due to this close proximity of all battalions in the same theatre and with similar initial designation. 

 

Like many newly raised regiments, First Chamar was disbanded after the war.  I think all authors have used First Chamar association in a derogatory sense against Chamars.  This is only due to the fact that remnants of 'Martial Race Theory' are still in the back of many minds.  Men & officers of First Chamar served honorably and if there is any evidence of lack of performance against an individual or a community then it should be criticized openly.   Any one regardless of his religion, caste & color when trained well and led well can be an excellent soldier and what better proof is than the early history of Indian army.  Brahman Hindu majority army (with the exception of some Muslims of Rajput origin in cavalry) of East India Company fought and subjugated all future martial races of India for their masters.  The long list includes Gurkhas, Marhattas, Muslims of all classes & varieties (Hindustani, Punjabi, and Pathan etc.), Rajputs of all varieties and Sikhs. 

 

Ayub Khan's ACR & Command Controversy

 

-          Different words have been used to describe Ayub's ACR but these are all subjective in the absence of access to original ACR. 

-          It is alleged that Ayub was sent to another battalion because he was not fit to command his own battalion.  Ayub served with First Assam as 2IC at the rank of Major as narrated above and took command on the death of CO.  Commanding one's parent battalion is the most desired and probably the highest honor for any officer and there are no two views about it among soldiers.  In Second World War, Ayub's parent battalion 1/14 Punjab went through a roller coaster ride.  1/14 Punjab commanded by Lt. Colonel L. V. Fitzpatrick went to Malaya in March 1941.  It was captured by Japanese in February 1942 in Singapore.  The battalion went out of commission throughout the rest of the war therefore there is no question of Ayub or anybody else commanding it.  Many officers and soldiers of 1/14 Punjab joined Indian National Army during Japanese captivity.  The most famous ones were Captain Shah Nawaz Khan and Lieutenant Mohan Singh Deb.  The battalion was re-raised in May 1946 in Mir Ali Waziristan.  It was re-raised and commanded by none other than Ayub Khan.  In 1946, Ayub also commanded 15/16 Punjab; it was wartime raised new battalion and was later disbanded.

-          Ayub's role in Punjab Boundary Force has been criticized mainly for failure to protect the refugees and I'm not aware of any looting allegation.  If the authority of this charge is Abdul Rab Nishtar then it will be useful to have the reference of his report or where it can be found. 

My View

 

I think 'tactical timidity' was the most likely comment in Ayub ACR after the Burma incident.   If report was very serious in nature, in the post war large scale retrenchment of officers, Ayub would have been retired from service.  In addition, an officer with a 'horrible ACR' was not likely to be given the command of a battalion on the frontier followed by entrusting him to re-raise and command his parent battalion.  In October 1947, Ayub was Brigadier and commanding Gardai Brigade Group in Waziristan Area command.  If the assertion that Mr. Jinnah was not happy with Ayub is true then it does not make sense that Ayub is promoted Brigadier against Mr. Jinnah's wishes and given the task of execution of Operation Curzon; a project which was the brainchild of Mr. Jinnah ordering the withdrawal of troops from tribal areas in Waziristan against the advice of all British officers.   Similarly, Ayub was promoted Major General in January 1948 and posted to East Pakistan when Mr. Jinnah is very well in full control of all affairs.  In summary, Ayub like all other of his contemporaries was an average officer and his career followed the same path as others with ups and down.  In 1951, you could have picked anyone from the top four or five senior generals and no one would be better or worse than other.  The same holds true today when everybody is holding his breath as General Ashfaq P. Kiyani is heading towards his retirement in November 2010. If anyone is looking for Rommel or Guderain in Pakistan army or for that matter in any army he will be disappointed.  The only difference is that senior officers of most of the armies have some humility but Pakistani senior brass (off course with some exceptions) has more than fair share of generals who walk very close to the line which separates grandiosity from delusions (many have commissioned life sized self portraits with dress style and posture copying famous generals of world).

 

Senior Officers in 1947

 

It is stated that following officers were Brigadiers at the time of partition including Mohammad Akbar Khan, Muhammad Iftikhar Khan, Faiz Muhammad, Fazlur Rahman Kallu and Nawabzada Agha Mohammad Raza. 

 

I can recollect that Akbar was the only one with the rank of Brigadier but I could be wrong.  He was promoted Major General and given the command of 8 Division (then headquartered in Karachi) on August 15, 1947.  I don't know anything about Faiz and will hazard to guess that Iftikhar & Raza were Colonels.  I'm sure about Fazlu Rahman Kallu as he was Lt. Colonel at the time of partition and was commanding 5/8 Punjab (now 5 Baloch) from March 1947 to November 1947.  He was promoted to Colonel and Brigadier rank after partition and he commanded Rawalpindi sub area as Brigadier from January 1948 to May 1951 (Major General Shaukat Riza.  The Pakistan Army 1947-1949) Again the sequence of events can be quite confusing because many officers jumped one or even two ranks in months during that time.

 

General Cariappa

 

Cariappa was a fine officer & gentleman.  He passed out of Daly Cadet College in December 1919 with temporary commission (later permanent) which makes him nine years senior to Ayub. 

 

The statement that Cariappa commanded 26 Division against Japanese is probably not correct.  I could not corroborate it from any source.  26^th Division fought in Burma and later served in Sumatra after Japanese surrender before it was disbanded in 1945.  It was commanded by Major General C. E. Lomax and later Major General H. M. Chambers.  36^th Brigade of this division was commanded by Brigadier K. S. Thimaya which may have caused some confusion. (In addition to my own order of battles I have used this link which has excellent order of battle of this division with brigade and battalions. http://www.burmastar.org.uk/26thind.htm)

In March 1942, Cariappa was 2IC of 7/7 Rajput (later designated 17/7 Rajput) at the rank of Major which he later commanded in April 1942 when he was promoted Lt. Colonel.  He was promoted Brigadier in November 1944 and served as member of reorganization committee under Lt. General Sir Henry Wilcox. A year later in November 1945, he was given the command of Bannu Brigade. His later career can be quite confusing for ordinary reader because there was quite rapid turnover in view of tumultuous days of partition and subsequent events.  In January 1947 he went to London for Imperial Defence College course. He came back in July 1947 without completing his course for reorganization of armed forces in view of impending partition of India. He was promoted Major General on the day of independence of India August 15, 1947 and appointed Deputy Chief of General Staff.  He served only for three months at this post as he was promoted Lt. General & appointed GOC-in-C of Eastern command in November 1947.  Here he stayed only for a little over a month when in January 1948, he was appointed GOC-in-C of Delhi & East Punjab Command (predecessor of Western Command). In this capacity, he ran Kashmir operation of Indian army.  On January 15, 1949, he got fourth star and became first native C-in-C of Indian army.  A cursory look at his career shows that he rose from Major to Lt. General in five years and from Major to four star General in nine years (Details of Cariappa's career are from my own papers and from Major General V. K. Singh's Leadership in Indian Army which is the most authentic account of lives of some senior officers of that time based on first hand information and access to personal papers of the officers).  At the time of partition, a handful of senior most Indian officers were at the rank of Colonel.  In both armies, almost all officers reached dizzying heights in the span of few years.  Rapid rise of officers of Indian and Pakistan armies was due to cataclysmic changes in the subcontinent during that time and departure of British.  It is open for discussion whether this made things better or worse.

 

'All barbarous histories have fabulous beginnings'.     Vico

 

Warm Regards,

Hamid