TRIBALS IN 1947-48 WAR AND MR JINNAH

THE ESSENTIAL FACT IS THAT FIGHTING IN KASHMIR STARTED FROM AUGUST 1947.INDIAN GOVERNMENT HAD ASSISTED PATIALA STATE FORCES IN CRUSHING THE LOCAL INSURRECTIONS WHICH HAD STARTED FROM AUGUST 1947.

JINNAH HAD TASKED HIS PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET TO DEAL WITH THE KASHMIR MATTER.

THE PAKISTANI CABINET WAS FULLY INVOLVED AND PART OF THE TRIBAL INVASION.

HERE THE SPLITTING OF HAIR ENTERS.

KHALID HASSAN OR HIS SISTER ARE NOT RELIABLE PRIMARY SOURCES.

THE PRIMARY SOURCES ARE MAJOR GENERAL AKBAR KHAN , SARDAR SHAUKAT HAYAT,BRIG A.A K CHAUDHRY WHO STATE THAT THE PAKISTANI CABINET WAS INVOLVED.

WHAT THE PAKISTANI CABINET WAS DOING WAS SOMETHING THAT THEY HAD BEEN TASKED BY JINNAH TO DO, AT LEAST AS A BROAD MISSION.THE TRIBALS WERE A MEANS TO DO IT AND THE ROLE THAT THE TRIBALS PLAYED WAS CRUCIAL.THAT IS ADVANCE IN KASHMIR WITHOUT INVOLVING REGULAR PAKISTAN ARMY WHILE REGULAR INDIAN ARMY WAS NOT INVOLVED.

ONCE INDIAN ARMY ENTERED , NOT ORDERING THE PAKISTAN ARMY IN KASHMIR TILL APRIL 1948 WAS PAKISTANS ENTIRE GOVERNMENTS FAILURE AND THIS INCLUDES JINNAH , HIS PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET.

 

1. Theoretically, a Princely state could join any state i.e. India or Pakistan or stay independent. The British policy in this regard was not precise. A Princely State could join one of the two states i.e. India or Pakistan, with regard off course to physical propinquity. The choice of country was left entirely to the rulers of the princely states. This was Jinnahs major strategic failure when he did not agree to Mountabattens idea as discussed in H.V Hodsons book The Great Divide that princely states join India or Pakistan based on Muslim majority for Pakistan and Hindu Majority for India.

2. The Muslim League's high command had tasked Mian Iftikhar ud Din Minister for Refugees to prepare a plan aimed at ensuring that the Muslim majority state of Kashmir should join Pakistan. Brigadier Akbar Khan then serving in the Pakistani GHQ  wrote an appreciation 'armed revolt inside Kashmir ' on Mian Iftikhar ud Din's request. It appears that Mr Jinnah had  tasked Liaquat  to handle the Kashmir business.
3. Liaquat in turn earmarked Mian Iftikhar ud Din. Iftikhar  requested Sardar Shaukat Hayat and Brigadier Akbar Khan  for advice. A conference presided by  Liaquat  was held at Lahore in September 1947. This was attended by Akbar whose appreciation had already been shown to Liaquat by Iftikhar ud Din earlier. Ghulam Mohammad the Finance Minister who was a contemporary of Liaquat at MAO College Aligarh4 and at this time was foremost in playing sycophant par excellence with Liaquat also attended the conference.
4.  Brigadier Akbar recalls that everyone was enthusiastic but no one including the Prime Minister  had any concrete idea about the tangible and concrete aspects of the actual plan of operations, specially as far as the logistic and armament aspect was concerned. Shaukat  was appointed as overall incharge with Major Khurshid Anwar (Retired) commanding the northern tribal force which was as per Akbar's appreciation to attack on Muzaffarabad-Srinagar axis and  Major Zaman Kiani of the INA to command the southern force tasked to operate against  the Kathua  area in the south. Shaukat Hayat was not in favour of appointing Khurshid Anwar since he was a non-fighting arm soldier. Shaukat states in his book that Liaquat under Ghulam Mohammad's influence appointed Khurshid Anwar, then commander of the Muslim League's semi-military national guard to command the main northern invasion force.
5. Brigadier Akbar was to provide logistic support to the tribesmen which were to be employed for the invasion.
6. There were three principal parties in the whole invasion affair. On one side was the Muslim League leaders like Shaukat Hayat (an ex-major) Iftikhar ud Din and Khurshid Anwar who had been ordered by Mr Jinnah to do something to help the Kashmiri Muslims. Now Jinnahs role shall forever remain shrouded in mystery although stating that he was unaware of the tribals gives the impression of a man not in control.
7. Then there were the tribesmen who were concentrating at Batrasi opposite the Kashmir border and there was Brigadier Akbar Khan a Burma DSO who was Director of the newly formed  Weapon And Equipment Directorate at the General Headquarters, tasked unofficially to support the tribal raiders logistically, using all resources at his disposal in GHQ as Director Weapons and Equipment without letting the Britishers controlling the Pakistan Army know!
8. The tribesmen were brought from the NWFP tribal areas on trucks requisitioned by Government of Pakistan and concentrated in Batrasi north-east of Abbottabad. The invasion was to commence from 20th October 1947; the main northern tribal force invading Kashmir under Khurshid Anwar on Abbottabad-Garhi Habibullah-Muzaffarabad-Srinagar axis with a smaller auxiliary force advancing along Murree-Kohala-Muzaffarabad axis.
9.  The official history does not mention the Lahore conference presided by Liaquat but merely states that 'Major Khurshid  Anwar (as a  result of some divine revelation!) undertook to organise and lead (whether voluntarily or on someone else's orders is left to the readers' imagination!) the tribesmen into Kashmir when the opportunity arose' !.
10. It may be noted that Mr Jinnah had ordered General Gracey the British Acting  C-in-C  (Messervy being on leave) of the Pakistan Army to attack Kashmir. Gracey who had been handpicked by Mr Jinnah on the grounds that Field Marshal Auchinleck the Supreme Commander of both the armies did not allow it!13 Auchinleck flew to Lahore the next day and convinced Mr Jinnah to retract his order. Auchinleck's threat that all British officers would be withdrawn in case such an order was pressed further convinced Mr Jinnah into retracting this order14.
11. Mr Jinnah was unlucky unlike Nehru in having no Patel by his side. When Bucher the British C-in-C of the Indian Army advised the Indian government not to attack Hyderabad till the Kashmir War was over,and Patel insisted otherwise, Bucher threatened to resign. Patel simply told him on the spot that he could resign and then ordered Sardar Baldev Singh,the Defence Minister 'The Army will march into Hyderabad as planned tomorrow morning'15.
12. Mr Jinnah was undoubtedly; by virtue of having taken an iron and  most resolute stand on the division of the Indian Army; the father of Pakistan Army. It was remarkable that as a very sick 71-year-old man in 1947, Mr Jinnah possessed the tremendous Coup d Oeil (unusual strategic insight) and resolution to order Gracey in October 1947 to employ two brigades of Pakistan Army to attack Kashmir; one from Sialkot going for Jammu and one from Rawalpindi going for Srinagar !16 It was indeed a pity that he did not possess any adviser, who could be called a 'Man' (A MAN LIKE PATEL) of sufficient ability and  independent judgement to convince him to  override Gracey who was behaving little better than a glorified headclerk and mouthpiece of Auchinleck!
13. It was yet another tragedy that this glorified headclerk was retained and succeeded Messervy as the second C-in-C of Pakistan Army! It is strange that Shaukat Riza who wrote his book in the 1990s did not even mention this incident. A  reflection on the roundabout way in which the book was written and  on the analytical ability and grasp of military history of all the brilliant Principal Staff Officers of Pakistan's General Headquarters whose name are so proudly mentioned in the Acknowledgement section of his book17.
14. There is one extremely important event which has generally been ignored  by most Pakistani military historians including Shaukat Riza.This was a conference held between 30th October and 4th November. Brigadier Akbar Khan the military man incharge of the raiders operations had returned to Pindi after a visit to the frontline at Srinagar. The tribesmen had not yet been repulsed and were planning infiltration operations with the aim of capturing Srinagar airfield. Akbar Khan's analysis about the operational solution to the problem of tribesmen's inability to attack well entrenched Indian infantry, supported by aircraft and artillery was to provide the tribesmen with armoured cars. Major Masud from 11 Cavalry stationed at Rawalpindi volunteered to take his own squadron's armoured cars to Srinagar, on his own initiative, without informing any superior headquarter. Akbar Khan states in his book 'Raiders in Kashmir' that  Major Masud said that the armoured cars would go without official permission, at his own risk and that the men would be in civilian clothes. This fact is proved by two independent authorities who were not from armoured corps and  thus had no  ulterior motivation  or desire to project 11 Cavalry. One was General Akbar who was present at the conference and the other was Brigadier Amjad Ali  Khan Chaudhry who was a gunner, and was also present at the same conference20. Akbar states that as the conference was coming to an end Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan a Muslim League leader and  Central Government Minister entered the room. Brigadier Sher Khan who was the Director Military Operations had also joined the discussion. This, Raja Ghazanfar (despite being from a so-called martial area)  was horrified about the armoured cars proposal, and according to both Akbar Khan and Amjad Chaudhry opposed the idea. He was supported by Brigadier Sher (Lion) Khan! Both the Minister and the Lion Hearted brigadier feared that such a step would lead to an open war between Pakistan and India21. Amjad Chaudhry states that one of the participants at this conference even voiced an apprehension that the unruly tribesmen may get unruly and damage the Maharajas palace at Srinagar22! Thus in the end Akbar Khan who was not directly in charge of the operations of tribesmen was overruled by a  pacifist Minister more keen to enjoy ministerial perks and a paper tiger brigadier wearing the mask of the high-sounding appointment of Director Military Operations!

 

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15. The  only difference between India and Pakistan was not whether one side possessed armoured cars or not, but  the simple fact that while Mr Jinnah did not have any able Muslim deputy to advise him about military affairs (whether Punjabi, Hindustani or Pathan) Nehru was assisted by a much larger team of more resolute, more intellectually capable Hindu deputies like Patel  who ensured that armoured cars of 7th Light Cavalry; under command  Lieutenant N.G David; did reach Srinagar area on 7th  November and inflicted on the poorly armed tribesmen equipped with bolt action rifles a defeat at what the Indians themselves call the decisive battle of Shalateng! It may be noted that on the night of 2/3 November the tribesmen had successfully infiltrated north of the Indian main position at Pattan and had reached Shalateng in the rear of Pattan and a little to the north of Srinagar. Sen the Indian brigade commander countered this move by ordering 1 Sikh to pull back from Patan and to take a position at milestone four astride the Srinagar-Baramula road.
16. By 6th November a large number of tribesmen who had been slowly infiltrating since 3rd November had gathered at Shalateng. Major Aslam and Major Khurshid Anwar the Pakistani officers in charge of these tribesmen decided to launch their main attack on Srinagar on the night of 6/7 November. The Indian Brigade Commander Brigadier Sen was also simultaneously analysing this threat and  had  decided to launch a deliberate  attack on this force supported by 7th Light Cavalry's squadron on 7th November. Sen's plan was to launch a frontal attack supported by  aircraft  while one troop of 7th Light Cavalry  under Lieutenant David which had already been sent towards Bandipura on a recce mission and was already in the tribesmen's positions rear was ordered by wireless to attack the tribesmen from the rear23. The result was the battle of Shalateng on the morning of 7th November.
17. The tribesman had started their main attack  by infiltration on the  night of 6th November and were fighting on the northern outskirts of Srinagar when the Indians launched their main attack at first light. David's troop had already got into the rear of the tribesmen as planned; thus while the tribesmen were attacked frontally by Indian infantry supported by armoured cars and aircraft, armoured cars were attacking them from the rear. This was too much for men armed with bolt action rifles. The tribesmen were routed and it was with great difficulty that the situation was finally stabilised at least temporarily at Rampura a narrow defile halfway between Baramula and Uri24.
18. The abandonment of the conduct of war to tribesmen armed with bolt action rifles; while the Indians attacked them with Spitfires, Tempests, Harvards and Daimler/Humber/GMC Armoured cars was without any doubt  one of the most disgraceful acts in Pakistani military history. Even in the whole of 1947-48  War in all probability no regular Pakistan Army officer beyond the rank of captain was killed!
19. Baramula was recaptured by Indians on 8th November and the Indians aided by their airforce which was attacking the entire tract of road between Baramula and Muzaffarabad27 continued their advance towards Uri. The Indian Prime Minister Nehru visited Kashmir on 11th November and travelled in an armoured car of 7th Light Cavalry till Baramula28. Compare this with the attitude of the Pakistani politicians. Neither Liaquat the Prime Minister nor any single of his ministers; Hindustani, Punjabi, Sindhi, Bengali or Pathan  crossed river Jhelum29.
20. The attitude of Gracey in not agreeing to commit the army to Kashmir, however disgraceful and negative can be explained by saying that he was a foreigner! What kept the Pakistani political leadership from visiting the tribesmen who had won a territory that to this day has been ruled by Pakistan is hard to explain. Akbar Khan was not wrong once he said that fear prevented these leaders from visiting Kashmir while the war was on30! Liaquat eventually fell victim of an assassin in 1951. Had he died because of enemy action while visiting Kashmir, posterity would have remembered him as a much greater man. According to  Akbar, Messervy was the main culprit for spreading a fear of Indian reaction in Pakistan Army. 'Messervy addressing a meeting of G.H.Q officers warned us against hostilities with India. He said that, in his opinion, in case of war India would overrun Pakistan within ten days' 31. Compare this negative attitude with the Israeli Army which defeated far better armed and well organised Arab armies in the 1948 War. Just 30,000 Jews had served in the British Army  in the second world war32. More than 600,000 Muslims, more than half of them from areas which constituted Pakistan had fought in the Second World War and yet the Pakistani leadership was unwilling to stand on its own feet preferring the two unreliable British crutches i.e. Messervy and Gracey!
21. Mr Jinnah had already done too much for the army by insisting on the division of Indian Army, against tremendous opposition on part of the Britishers. The great tragedy was that Mr Jinnah was surrounded by men of  zero military insight and devoid of all independent judgement. The Secretary of Defence, Mirza being a man who had never fought in actual war and the Muslim League politicians who were only good followers!
22. According to General Akbar  Khan the tribesmen were so demoralised and disappointed by lack of  Pakistan Army support that they withdrew from the frontline opposite Baramula on  31st October and 10th November, and withdrew to  Uri area, contemplating about returning to the tribal area34. Had the Indians possesses sufficient resolution or a commander with coup d oeil there was nothing stopping them from capturing Muzaffarabad between 31st October and 10th November. The same viewpoint is advanced by the official history35.  The probability that Akbar Khan who wrote the famous book 'Raiders in Kashmir' or Major Aslam, whose personal  account  was one of the many personal accounts used by the official historians who compiled the official history dealing with operations in Kashmir, were  exaggerating their own  role cannot be ruled out.
23. There is one fact, however, that stands out as the crux of the issue, and which still raises the stature of the tribesmen higher than both Akbar or Aslam; i.e.  the fact that the initial shock of the tribal onslaught on Srinagar was so traumatic that it imposed a 'once bitten twice shy approach' on the mind of the Indian Commanders. This ensured that  the Indians despite the absence of any tribals in front of them; (as Messrs Akbar and Aslam allege) were in no mood to advance hurriedly  towards Muzaffarabad after having captured Baramula.
24. After 10th November according to Akbar Khan the Mahsud and other tribesmen returned and played a major role in stabilising the front between Uri and Muzaffarabad36. As one advances westwards from Baramula to Uri the Jhelum Gorge becomes narrower and the defenders task becomes easier while the attackers task becomes more difficult. The Indian Army although supported by aircraft artillery and armoured cars was too psychologically shattered to advance rapidly westwards, despite the fact that most tribesmen were not fighting the battle, at least temporarily few demolitions and a few snipers who were too motivated to withdraw stopped the Indian advance approximately 3 miles west of Uri37. 
25. The official Pakistani history is hell bent upon giving the credit for this to Aslam Khan, while Akbar Khan also claims the credit for having stopped the Indians. The tribesmen who did the actual dirty work of fighting were never consulted by the authors of the official account! The start of snowfall from first week of December ensured that no major fighting took place between December 1947 and April 1948.
26. We must also remember that the tribals did the actual fighting between 20th October and in November 1947,while books were written by Pakistan Army officers from 1970 onwards, some 23 years after the war. The Indian behaviour after capture of Uri showed that their higher commanders lacked the initiative, which was the only commodity required to capture Muzafarabad as far as the Indians were concerned. Instead the Indians wasted three infantry battalions,two artillery batteries and a squadron of armoured cars in passively defending Uri38.
References
1. Pages-271 & 272-Shaukat Riza-The Pakistan Army-1947-49-Op Cit.
2. Page-19- Raiders in Kashmir-  Major General Akbar Khan-First Published-1970-Reprinted by Jang Publishers-Lahore-1992.
3. Page-34 -Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
4. Pages-295 , 296 & 297- History of the MAO College Aligarh-S. K Bhatnagar- First Published-1969-Reprinted—1975-Book Traders-P.O Box 1854-Lahore. Liaquat and Ghulam (ie Ghulam Mohammad) Zakir Hussain (later India's President), Umar Hayat Malik (later an ambassador) authors paternal grandfather (from Indian Secretariat Service/Ministry of Defence) were contemporaries at the MAO College Aligarh during 1916-1919. Ghulam Mohammad excelled in academics and was awarded the Morison Medal for being the best student in MA Economics.Umar Hayat Malik again excelled in academics and was awarded the Crosthwaite Medal for being the best student in BA Mathematics. Zakir Hussain was awarded the  Iqbal Medal for being the best Muslim student in the Allahabad University examinations.  Zakir Hussain was the Vice President of the MAO College Students Union (Siddon's Union) 1918  while the author's grandfather Mohammad Amin was also an office-bearer in the same body with the appointment of Librarian (Refers Group Photograph of Students Union 1918 facing page- 321). Nawabzada Liaquat was noted for hospitality in throwing parties (Page-252). It appears that Ghulam Mohammad later made good use of the MAO College old boy net with Liaquat in the Pakistani cabinet. By 1951 later however as per Liaquat's Secretary; Liaquat was planning to sack Ghulam. Ghulam was a Kakkezai from Jullundhur born in Lahore. The readers may note that the MAO College at this time was a meeting place of all Muslim Classes. Liaquat being a rich Nawabzada from Karnal. The authors grandfather being from a rural/service background (son of an official of the Punjab Police) was born at Dinga in 1896 and received his basic education from Gujrat, Jhelum Chauntra Gujar Khan and Satiana and finally joined the MAO College in 1913 coming all the way from a remote village of Lyallpur near Satiana. Umar Hayat was from a Punjabi feudal background and Ghulam from a Punjabi urban background.
5. Facts/ Information given in this paragraph is based on the details given in the following accounts/books:— Page-214 ,215 and 216  The Nation that Lost Its Soul —Major Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan (Retired)-Jang Publishers-Lahore-1995 , Pages- 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25- Raiders in Kashmir-Op Cit and pages —58, 59 and 60 - The Kashmir Campaign-1947-48 —Historical Section-General Staff Branch-General Headquarters-Rawalpindi-December 1970. The reader must note that the Kashmir Campaign was a  very meticulously written book, not in terms of analysis, because of being an official history, but in layout, presentation of facts and in terms of continuity and clarity. Shaukat Riza simply reproduced a large number of maps from this book without bothering to improve them! Compare this book with Shaukat Riza's  relatively substandard triology on Pakistan Army history, and one can safely conclude that the quality of intellect and efficiency as far as producing military history works was higher in the Pakistani GHQ in 1970 than in 1986-90 when Shaukat Riza assisted by a whole team of staff officers and with the blessings of Zia and  of two of Zia's Vice Chiefs of Army Staffs produced his monumental three books on  what the Pakistan Army did, or did not do! It is important to note that both the official history and Akbar's book were published in 1970. Akbar wrote his book after reading the official history which disgusted him! Publication of Akbar's book was made possible only because of Ayub's exit from power. During Ayub's government an unofficial ban was imposed on all books .
6. Page-35-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
7. Page-36-Ibid.
8. Page-216-Sardar Shaukat Hayat-Op Cit.
9. Ibid.
10. Pages-39, 40 & 41-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
11. Page-42-Ibid and Page-42-Akbar Khan-Op Cit.
12. Pages-40 & 41-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
13. Page-343- Report of November 7, 1947- Mountbatten's 'Top Secret' Personal Reports as Viceroy of India—India Office Library-L/PO/433. Page-154- Looking Back- Mehr Chand Mahajan- Asia Publishing House London-1963- and Pages-91 & 92-Fazal I Muqueem-Op Cit.
14. Page-343-Mountbatten Top Secret Report-Op Cit.
15. Page-115-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
16. Page-154-Mehr Chand Mahajan-Op Cit.
17. Page-3 of 'Acknowledgementî Section where Shaukat Riza thanked all those who assisted him in writing the book and read the draft of the book!-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. These are  Generals K.M Arif, Mirza Aslam Beg, Zia ul Haq etc.
18. Pages-42 , 43 & 44-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit and Pages-66 & 67-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.
19. Page-44-K.C Praval-Op Cit.
20. Page-44-Major General Akbar Khan-Op Cit and Page-6 - September 65 —Before and After —Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry-Ferozesons Lahore-1977. Akbar Khan was born in December 1912 and joined the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst after studying at Islamia College Peshawar. Commissioned in 1934, he joined 1st Hampshire Regiment and subsequently the FF Rifles. Saw active service in Waziristan operations (1937-38) and in WW Two in Burma in the 20th Indian Division where he was awarded the DSO. A man of immense drive Akbar while a lieutenant colonel  served as one of the members of 'Army Sub-Committee' which  supervised the process of division of the Indian Army. After partition Akbar took over as  Deputy Director Weapon and Equipment Directorate till 1948 when he was posted full time in Kashmir. He was unofficially associated as  a volunteer  with the Kashmir War right from October 1947. He was described by Shaukat Riza  as 'an impatient man with an almost uncomfortable drive and initiative' (See - page-158-Shaukat Riza-1947-1949-Op Cit) something which most Pakistani senior officers of that time as well as till to date terribly lack! Akbar commanded the 101 Brigade in the Kashmir War where he conceived and executed the Pandu operation which was described in Pakistani Official history published in 1970, nineteen years after Akbar had been dismissed and sentenced to Jail; as: one of the most humiliating Indian defeat in which one complete Indian battalion was wiped out (See—page-207-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit). Akbar was anti- British and thus disliked by British officers who held the highest posts in the army of the so-called independent Islamic state till 1950! Akbar was, however, promoted to the rank of Major General and Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan Army  in December 1950. Akbar was disgusted with the timid policies of the Pakistani political leadership and planned a coup but was arrested in March 1950. Akbar's arrest led to reduction of the Pakistani officer's status in legal terms to that of a clerk; making him vulnerable to dismissal from service without any reason; as a result of the new laws instituted by Prime Minister Liaquat. Akbar and a large number of officers and some civilians were tried by a  secret court and sentenced to fourteen years jail. Akbar served his jail term for four years till 1955 on bail by the  high court on a habeas corpus petition. Akbar qualified as a lawyer in 1964 and practised law from 1968 at Karachi. He became Bhutto's National Security Advisor in 1972 and played an instrumental role in sacking General Gul Hassan and the Air Chief. Bhutto later became aprehensive about Akbar and sent him abroad to Czechoslovakia as an ambassador. Akbar died in Karachi in 1990. Akbar was a thorough bred Pathan but married in Lahore's famous Baghbanpura Arain family of Sir Mohammad Shafi. As a result he came in contact with various Punjabi intellectuals like the great poet Faiz, Mazhar Ali Khan etc. One of Akbar's associates was the indomitable Major Ishaq who fought against the NC type stinking hypocrite Jullundhuri  usurper Zia and spent a great part of his life in jail .
21. Page-44-Major General Akbar Khan-Op Cit.
22. Page-6-Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry-Op Cit.
23. Page-45-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit and Page-276- The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-1971—Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1994.
24. Page-68-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.
25. Page-52-Major General Akbar Khan-Op Cit.
26. Ibid.
27. Page-46-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
28. Page-47-Ibid.
29. Pages-175 & 176-Raiders in Kashmir-Original Edition-Pak Publishers Limited-Karachi-1970.
30. Pages-174 & 175-Ibid.
31. Pages-90 & 91-Ibid.
32. Page-18- The Arab Israeli Wars — Chaim Herzog-Vintage Books-Random House-New York-1984.
33. Pages-56 & 57-Major General Akbar Khan-Raiders in Kashmir- 1992 Edition-Op Cit.
34. Pages-52 & 53 to 66-Ibid.
35. Pages-68 & 69-Ibid.
36. Pages-67 & 68-Ibid.
37. Page-69-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.
38. Page-278-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.
39. Page-503-Philip Mason-Op Cit.
40. Pages- 76 ,77 , 78 & 79-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit and Pages-47 & 48-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
41. Page-281-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.
42. Page-56-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
43. Pages-284 & 285-The Indian Armour-Op Cit and Page-64-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
44. Page-282-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.
45. Pages-58 & 59-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit.
46. Pages-4 & 5-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.
47. Page-5-Ibid.
48. Page-291-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit-
49. Page-10-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.
50. Page-30-The Kashmir Campaign-Op Cit.
51. Ibid

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