The Case for Army Commands in Pakistan Army

This article was initially published in Command and Staff College Quettas Citadel Journal in 1998.

This article advanced the view that Pakistan Armys higher organisation was outmoded and derelict and that the army should be organised in army groups or command headquarters above corps.

This suggestion was finally implemented and now PakistanArmy has commands since 2008.

The man who made sure that this article published was then LTC Tariq Khan Chief Editor of Citadel.

His successor LTC Abdul Aziz Tariq found my ideas controversial.

Time vindicated who was right.

Agha H Amin

My contribution to the Pakistan Army continued at the strategic and intellectual level ! My article recommending major higher command changes in the armys strategic grouping was published by the Citadel Journal of Command and Staff College Quetta in mid 1998 and my recommendations regarding creating army commands were actually implemented by the Pakistani military in 2005 or so !

This was at least an intellectual vindication of the fact that my motivation to serve was not material but purely internally motivated which continued even many years after retirement from an institution which pays only 7000 Rupees pension to a major ! Soldiering is a profession far superior to counting cherries in the garden or in removing elected prime ministers by coercion !

The relationship of organisation to doctrine and conduct of war 

Major Agha.H.Amin (Retired)

Organisation and Warfare

Organisation has a deep and direct connection with success or failure in battle. It is agreed by all and sundry that a superior generalship, high morale, sophisticated equipment and logistic stamina do play a major role in battle. Likewise, it is felt with an equal conviction that superiority in organisation from the lowest tactical to operational and strategic levels plays a major role in the performance of an army, a formation, a unit or even a sub-unit in war. In fact, at certain times, the organisational superiority or inferiority has played a crucial role in the victory or defeat of an army.

Historically, the Greek Phalanx and the Roman Legion stand out as examples of battle formations that played an important part in the victories of their armies. Nevertheless, both these organisations had their limitations and thus faced extinction. Again, the Mongol tactics of employment of cavalry were at one time invincible before they too became obsolete. In a later history, Frederick the Great s revolutionary, Oblique Order tactics also met their fate. Napoleon’s divisional and corps system that formed a guarantee for victory could also not stand the test of time. His opponents' imitation of this model and other calculated organisational counter measures rendered it ineffective with the passage of time.

Moltke the Elder introduced a concept of controlling the armies organised under various army/corps commanders in a single theatre, by means of a single general staff system. In these the command and co-ordination was done by means of telegraph, whilst movement was radically improved through railways. Still, within the next four decades his system as well was subjected to organisational modifications.

The German Experience in Organisation as a Case Study

Moltke's success in the Franco-German war of 1870-71 developed a false feeling of superiority in the German Army. While his campaigns were analysed and elevated to the pedestal of the formula for victory, no effort was made to appreciate that the growth in the size of armies necessitated changes to their organisation. The necessity of a general staff for the control and co-ordination of the Eighth and Ninth Armies that advanced into France as part of the famous Schlieffen Plan was dismissed and allusion made to Moltke’s successes of 1866 and 1870. It was assumed that the two general officers whose armies, trained in like manner, would, when advancing abreast, co-ordinate and function effectively and understand an operational situation in a context larger than their own individual progress. The Battle of Marne fought in 1914 proved the contrary and showed that the two army commanders followed their own personal whims. The reason for this failure was the organisational flaw:-

• The German General Staff Headquarters located many hundred miles in the rear could not co-ordinate the movement of various armies advancing towards Paris right from the D-Day till the Battle of Marne.

• Absence of an army group headquarters to co-ordinate the actions of two or three armies advancing side by side led to the following setbacks:-

• Failure to exploit the opportunities to encircle or outflank the French and British formations.

• Lack of co-ordination created gaps between the armies only to be exploited by the Franco-British Armies who launched successful counter-strokes. The most notable of this was the fateful battle of Marne of 1914.

It has been fashionable to attribute the German failure to defeat France in 1914 to non-adherence of the original Schlieffen Plan. While it is true that Moltke the Younger’s cautious personality, by altering the force ratio, robbed the Schlieffen Plan of its inherent boldness and dynamism, the fact that the Germans missed many opportunities to inflict a decisive defeat on the French during their advance towards Paris stands out as a hard historical reality. Failure to do so was largely organisational. Had the Germans possessed an intermediate headquarters to co-ordinate the operations of two or three armies, they may have been able to encircle one of the French Armies on their way to Paris. They would have then created an operational imbalance that may have seriously jeopardised the stability of French dispositions long before they were able to successfully retreat to the Marne and stabilise the operational situation. The following two examples prove that the presence of an army group headquarters to co-ordinate at least two or three German Armies may have produced a decisive German thrust long before reaching Paris or the line of Marne and Oise Rivers.

The Lost Opportunity of 20 August 1914

On 20 August 1914, following was the operational situation:-

• Lanzearac's 5th French Army was holding a defensive position south of Sambre River and west of Meuse River.

• Bulows German Army was holding the line of Sambre River north of Lanzearac's 5th French Army.

• On Bulows right another German Army, i.e. Kluck's Army was facing the numerically much weaker British Expeditionary Force (BEF) which Kluck could easily have outflanked had he wanted to. Another German Army, i.e., Hausen's Army was on Lanzearac French Army's deep southern flank across the Meuse River. This army could also easily have marched westwards and enveloped Lanzearac’s 5th Army from the south.

• No army commander was, however, interested in co-operating with the other, since the one preferred German emphasis was to reach Paris. There was no army group headquarters to control and co-ordinate the moves of these three armies while the German General Staff Headquarters was more than 150 miles behind at Colbenz.

• The German Chief, Moltke the Younger, preferred sitting at Colbenz to going personally forward to converge the movement of these three armies to encircle the French 5th Army.

Thus a golden opportunity of inflicting a crushing defeat on the French and BEF was lost on 20 August 1914. The simple reason for this failure was again organisational.

The Lost Opportunity of 24 August 1914

The situation of 24 August 1914 was as under:-

• The 5th French Army and the BEF were mauled heavily, were in retreat on 24 August 1914.

• There was a gap to the south of Lanzearac's 5th French Army between the 4th and 5th French Armies. An area of some 10 to 15 miles between Rocroi and Mezieres was not held strongly by French.

• General Hausen was aware of this gap and asked the OHL (the General Headquarters) for permission to exploit it. Moltke the Younger hesitated in giving permission and procrastinated, allowing Hausen to exploit this gap only on the morning of 28th August. It was all too late although Hausen did start the projected advance.

General Bulow on Hausen's right was a much more cautious and timid commander. He was overly confounded by a corps level counter attack by the exhausted and desperate 5th French Army. He thus sent a very panicky signal to Hausen to help him. In actual fact the situation was not as worse, but Bulow had overreacted. Hausen, not truly knowing Bulow, believed his signal and abandoned his outflanking attack and readjusted northwards to help Bulow Hausen later explained why he had decided to assist Bulow, which forced him to abandon his originally planned attack on Lanzearac’s line of communication. Hausen thus states, one, after all, had the right to suppose that a commander so experienced and of such a reputation as him, at the head of the 2nd Army (Bulow’s Army) would only ask for immediate help in the event of an absolute necessity. Bulow's panic was without any basis since just a few hours later the 5th Army again started retreating.

The two above mentioned examples illustrate that the absence of an intermediate army group headquarters stood out as the principal German organisational negligence because of non-existence of which the Germans failed to exploit many fleeting opportunities in 1914 including the two examples cited above.

The French and German Organisational Response in World War II

The French won the World War I, and as such did not appreciate the necessity of organisational or doctrinal reform in their army. This particular response had a remarkable similarity to the Germans' disposition following Moltke the Elder's victories of 1866 and 1870. On the other hand, the history of the World War I was viewed differently by the German Army since they lost it. The Germans introduced radical changes in their organisation and doctrine. The rise of Hitler to power led to the adoption of a radical organisational model proposed by Guderian for organising tanks into tank corps and tank army groups.

• Numerically, Allied had more tanks than Germans. However, all German tanks were grouped into some ten German Panzer divisions organised either as Panzer group or Panzer corps. Two Panzer corps were grouped as Panzer Group Kliest, while the others as the corps co-operating with various armies.

• According to varied estimates, the French had a large number of tanks ranging from 2554 to 3615. Out of these, only 468 tanks were concentrated in the French armoured divisions. The remaining tanks were dished out in penny packets to the French infantry divisions. Thus, because of this very organisational blemish the French could not have launched any meaningful counter-stroke to defeat the German armoured thrust.

The French and their allies were confronted with a unique and unprecedented organisational and doctrinal dilemma. Such a grand level envelopment manoeuvre, as that of 1940 had not been successfully accomplished since Ulm.

Till 1940, the German doctrine of Blitzkrieg and their organisation, i.e., the Panzer corps and groups were compatible. In 1941, this relationship between organisation and doctrine was again seriously affected by Hitler's decision to increase the number of armoured divisions to 21. This reduced each Panzer division to 160 tanks. Thus while in France, a country much smaller to Russia, a German Panzer division had some 320 tanks; in Russia, contrary to logic, it were to have a paltry 160 tanks. This reduction in strength seriously weakened the operational potential of the German Panzer division. Thus organisationally speaking, the German plan to invade Russia had become intangible long before the actual invasion. In terms of organisation and grouping, the Germans were again unable to resolve many points of confusion. Thus in Army Group Centre, Guderian and Hoth's Panzer Groups were placed under command the infantry army commanders. Since the arrangement was temporary, various conflicts arose and the infantry army commanders kept a pressure on Guderian and Hoth to slow down. In Army Group North the Panzer Group of Hoeppner was not under an infantry army commander but directly under the Army Group North's commander.

Another major German organisational mistake in Russia was to assign an independent headquarters to control all the three-army groups under a separate Commander-in-Chief and a Chief of General Staff. Thus Hitler, some 800 to 1000 miles in rear, tried to control operations in the east and west much like a tank commander controlling his driver. This organisational failure doomed the German operations in the east from the beginning. Another serious organisational failure was Hitler’s assumption of the appointment of Army Commander-in-Chief following the Battle of Moscow in 1941. A head of state cannot fully do justice to a job as demanding as that of a Commander-in-Chief.

The Indo-Pakistan Experience in organisation

1965 War

The Indo-Pakistan Armies were begotten of the same source, i.e., the old British Indian Army. Nevertheless, the Indian and Pakistani response to their organisational problems was different and led to slightly different results. On the Pakistani side, it was thought till 1965 that a division should suffice as the higher level of operational command in most cases. Pakistan had only one corps headquarters in 1965. Years before the war, a need was felt for founding another corps headquarters. The finance ministry jeopardised this perfectly justifiable operational demand.

Today, it is fashionable to criticise what happened at Khem Karan in 1965. The fact that an armoured division was launched without any integral infantry division supporting it as a sister formation is largely ignored. Notwithstanding the tactical flaws like poor reconnaissance, lack of co-ordination and a blind adherence to the night-leaguer, the presence of another corps headquarters for close monitoring of the divisions may have led to a better performance in the war. The story was no different on the other side of the border. Lieutenant General Gill, the Indian DMO during 1965 War also cites the organisational imbalance that contributed to a reduced combat efficiency of the Indian Army.

Indian armoured division failure in Chawinda despite having a corps headquarters and integral sister infantry divisions to facilitate its operations cannot be attributed to any organisational flaw. In our case, however, the organisational factor played a sufficient role, which now has but a theoretical value.

Another aspect generally ignored during the war centres around the faulty employment of armour. This failure is more of a doctrinal nature than organisational one. The tactical timidity on danger of being outflanked, anxiety about some unknown danger on flanks and the concept of night-leaguer in the rear can be cited as causes that led to the under employment of armour.

The Indian arrangement of having commands to control various corps were effective to a limited extent as the officer exercising this command could not really co-ordinate the actions of various corps that held very large frontages. Thus their system of having headquarters called commands, to co-ordinate their various corps, though slightly unwieldy, proved organisationally to be a relatively better arrangement. General Harbaksh Singh who was commanding their Western Command in 1965 was an exceptionally gifted commander. He had an extraordinarily sharp operational perception and his intervention in resisting the Indian Chief, General Chaudhri's withdrawal order in response to the Pakistani thrust in Khem Karan stands out as a matter of individual military genius and had little to do with his being GOC Western Command. Organisationally, however, the incident vindicates the benefit of having intermediate headquarters.

1971 War

In the 1971 War, the tank casualties suffered at Bara Pind - Jarpal were avoidable, if the independent armoured brigade had possessed an integral reconnaissance unit like a reconnaissance squadron. That would have saved it the reliance on judgement and reports of men who did not pass back a realistic assessment of the enemy in front. The rationale for this argument is to illustrate that organisational insurance by means of a balanced organisation can avoid disasters. Other factors like employment of artillery, poor reporting may have their weightage, but this still does not weaken the case for having integral reconnaissance elements, at least in case of an independent armoured brigade. If an armoured division with just four armoured regiments can have a reconnaissance regiment, a simple numerical logic dictates that an independent armoured brigade with three regiments must have a reconnaissance squadron. Our organisation does flow from the British model of war but the fact ignored is the contrast between the terrain around Tobruk and our own. It may be recalled that geographically the situation was different in North Africa where one, the northern flank was at all times protected by the sea. There were also no man made water obstacles. To us, the most dangerous conceptual quicksand is the intellectual slavery to which ex-colonised nations are vulnerable. In contrast to what is mentioned above, we have the old reconnaissance and support (now light anti-tank) battalion whose effectiveness was not vindicated or validated either in 1965 or 1971.

The concept of holding and striking formations also needs a reappraisal. The fact that their predecessor formations were bulky and unwieldy is indisputable. However, the bifurcation in terms of offensive and defensive role, while outwardly neat and theoretically sound, is historically without a successful precedent. The issue could have been resolved in exercise Zarb-e-Momin in 1989 by subjecting it to the friction of a strenuous training manoeuvre. The ancient Roman Army was once divided into two types of forces, the mobile and garrison forces. The reform failed since the mobile troops who were mostly posted in the cities were pampered with privileges and pleasurable living. The garrison troops became colonists attached to the countryside where they lived. The parallel, though, is ancient but the lesson that bifurcation of command on basis of operational roles proved utopian even in Roman times cannot be refuted. Rommel in North Africa could not be really effective in the crucial Operation Crusader since the Italian troops fighting in the same battle area were not under his command. The optimum results, therefore, could not be achieved. In the World War II, the British introduced a formation called army tank brigade specifically for protecting the infantry divisions. These were equipped with slow speed tanks, which were supposed to support the infantry alone. Given this rigid bifurcation, these brigades never co-operated in the manner that they should have with normal tank brigades. The shield and spear or the hammer and anvil can function effectively only if one head synchronises and co-ordinates their operational functions. As they say that too many cooks spoil the broth, the two formations fighting the same battle in the same operational area cannot fully realise their combat potential unless a headquarters co-ordinates and regulates their operations. How can one main headquarters 200 or 400 miles in the rear, with loads of other matters to take care of, effectively co-ordinate the operations of a hammer and anvil.

Conclusion

Organisations are meaningless without effective human beings but human beings have certain drawbacks that only an organisational framework can remedy or counterbalance. War is an extraordinary affair in which resolution, strength of personality and intellect form the only salvation. The need for an army headquarters to co-ordinate and effectively command the holding and strike corps is an indispensable necessity.

Posterity will forgive those who failed to rise higher in terms of advancement due to excessive pugnacity, drive and courage, but it will not forgive those who squandered the national assets on matters of petty parsimony leading to failures stemming out of faulty or unrealistic organisation. We have come a long way from the sixties when self-styled financial wizards vetoed even one corps headquarters. This, if allowed, might have had a positive impact on the outcome of the war.

The abdication of Moltke was a mistake. The method of command employed by his uncle to the separated, so much smaller battles of 1870-71 was quite inappropriate to three armies that must manoeuvre in a single battle as a single unit. Battles directed by a committee are rarely victorious, and never a substitute for a single driving will.

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