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1965 WAR -A DETAILED ANALYSIS-PART ONE

Major Agha.H.Amin (Retired)

1999

This is a chapter of my book The Pakistan Army since 1965 published in August 1999

CHAPTER FOURTEENÂ Â ANALYSIS -Â 1965Â WAR

Havelock said that ; "In philosophy,it is not the attainment of the goal that matters,it is the things thatÂ are met with by the way".So it is with war.The most important thing for the student of military history orÂ the art of war is not whether a country lost or won the war but how it was fought,how units performed in action,how decisions were made in face of the stress and strain of battle,the difference between practice andÂ precept in short all matters pertaining to strategy tactics leadership equipment etc.In other words to simplyÂ analyse the war to answer the questions like "Whence"? "Whither" ? "Why"? and "How"?In this analysis ofÂ war we have to go beyond probabilities and examine various facets of a particular situation and arrive atÂ conclusions that will assist us in face of a similar crisis situation in future.War is the final audit of an armyÂ in which unit efficiency as well as higher and lower leadership is gauged and no book on an army isÂ complete without analysing in detail the qualitative efficiency of an army in actual War.Unfortunately mostÂ books written on both Pakistan and Indian Armies by foreigners and therefore meekly accepted by theÂ subcontinentals who suffer from a subtle inferiority complex;as the final authority; do not discuss theÂ qualitative efficiency of both the Pakistan and Indian Armies in any actual war; both as British Indian ArmyÂ and as two different armies after 1947!Instead these books beat round the bush discussing vague and largelyÂ irrelevant issues which their authors have decided to highlight,merely because they have decided to write a book and want to write their book without going into the subtleties of actual wars fought by the Indo PakÂ armies.

In the following paragraphs an attempt has been made to analyse the conduct of 1965 war and toÂ answer certain questions about the qualitative efficiency of the Pakistan Army in a detached mannerÂ separating myth from reality and fact from fiction.This analysis is important because a considerable part ofÂ Pakistani military history has been deliberately or inadvertently distorted based on nationalistic parochial personal and inter arm prejudices and jealousies.

THE BRITISH COLONIAL LEGACY

We have already discussed in detail the impact of the British military tradition on the Judo Pak armies in our earlier chapters dealing with the armies of the English East India Company and the pre 1947 BritishÂ Indian Army.This was not something confined to Judo Pak subcontinent alone but an all Asia trend.From theÂ late eighteenth century the "European Way of Warfare" was generally borrowed and follow as the gospelÂ truth by many East European and Afro-Asian armies.The trend of "importing the European way of war"Â started around 1600 when the Ottoman Turks came into contact with the European powers in Eastern EuropeÂ and Russia.Till 1500 the Europeans who had as a matter of fact military failed in the Crusades against AsiaÂ enjoyed no significant military advantage over Asia.Till the invention of gunpowder the cavalry remainedÂ the dominant arm in battle and the infantry was relegated to a secondary role.The ascendancy of EuropeanÂ methods of warfare starts with the advent of Gustavus Adolphus(1496-1560) of Sweden who introduced aÂ renaissance in the art of warfare by "harnessing modern technology to a practical military philosophy"Â .Gustavus principal contribution was the introduction of a relatively superior conceptual framework ofÂ integrating military organisation with weapons and tactics.He created an infantry organised in brigades of two to four regiments each of which had eight battalions of four companies etc.He introduced similarÂ reforms in cavalry and artillery integrating artillery with infantry and cavalry in battle and restructuredÂ infantry formations in such a way that their firepower was enhanced.One of his most important reforms wasÂ employment of cavalryÂ as aÂ "shock weapon". Gustavus's methods were copied by the French and theÂ British.Gustavus 's tactics were improved by Turrene of France and Cromwell and Marlborough of EnglandÂ and were further improved by Napoleon who was able to benefit from the analytical studies of great militaryÂ thinkers like Gribeauval Maurice de Saxe Bourcet Joseph Du Teil and Guibert.Formal military schools were organised in France where the art of war was studied while similar institutions were founded in Prussian and Sweden.By 1600 Russia was the first country outside mainland Europe to realise that there

was something conceptually and organisationally superior in the West European way of warfare whichÂ enabled them to defeat numerically superior but more primitively organised armies.lt may be noted that asÂ late as 1592 the Russians were no match to the Muslim Tartars of the Golden Horde who sacked Moscow inÂ 1571 and managed to penetrate into suburbs of Moscow as late as 1592.1t may seem unbelievable to manyÂ but as late as 1660s the Crimean Muslim Tartars were one of Russia's most feared enemies²..A similarÂ pattern of imitation was followed in the Ottoman Turk Army from approximately 1750 to 1914 when theÂ Ottomans discovered that medieval tactics of cavalry assault were of little utility against relativelyÂ numerically superior or equal strength European armies with superior organisation'.It was adoption of superior West European military tactics which enabled the Russians to defeat the Ottomans during the period 1699-1878.A similar effort was made in the Egyptian Army of Mohammad Ali during the periodÂ I803-30⁴.The Chinese started organising their army on European lines from approximately 1850 onwardsÂ following disastrous military performance in the Opium War of 1840-42.The Japanese learnt a similarÂ lesson from the humbling of China by the Europeans in the Opium Wars and invited a French MilitaryÂ Mission in 1867 to organise and train their army in modern military methods⁵.

We have seen that a similar trend was followed in India when the European companies appeared onÂ the Indian scene as major participants in the struggle for political supremacy in the period 1740-1800 in theÂ situation created because of the vacuum which developed as a result of the decline of the MughalÂ Empire.The Indian native states discovered that smaller armies with a European nucleus and larger numberÂ of Indians trained in the European way of war could defeat numerically much larger armies of the IndianÂ rulers.Thus all Indian states imitated the European companies and imported military advisors from FranceÂ Italy Germany Ireland etc to train their armies on European lines.By 1849 however the English East IndiaÂ Company had defeated all native states employing as we have earlier discussed a largely native army led byÂ British officers and based on a smaller European core element.From 1757 to 1947 for a period ofÂ approximately 190 years India saw an army of Indian mercenaries led by British officers which dominatedÂ India.This army was primarily an internal security army which was theoretically supposed to defend IndiaÂ against a possible Russian invasion from the northwest.Later as w^-e saw the outbreak of first world war forced the British to employ the Indian Army as a desperate remedy against the German invasion of France.After the first world war the Indian Army was once again relegated to its major role of internalÂ security.This was followed by the Second World War which forced the British to once again re equip andÂ modernise the Indian Army in order to fight the second world war.This was followed by the partition when the British Indian Army was divided on religious lines and was bifurcated into two blocks of a tree whose sapling was planted by Clive in 1757.Any discussion or analysis of the performance of Pakistani or IndianÂ Armies based on the assumption that these armies came into existence in August 1947 is meaningless andÂ incomplete.The organisational tactical and social development of both the armies had a 190 year old connection with British rule in India and influenced their conduct in 1948 1965 1971 wars and even todayÂ in many aspects.We will therefore first of all analyse the conduct of Pakistan Army in 1965 with particular reference to the influence of the "British military Legacy".An attempt was made by sycophants in the periodÂ 1958-69 to prove that the Pakistan Army was largely the creation of AyubÂ Khan!There are two types of men in history;ie those who follow the status quo and those who are originators or executors ofÂ dynamic ideas which change the course of history ! Both Indian and Pakistan Armies were dominatedÂ by men of the former category.In India primacy of civilian leadership did not allow the growth ofÂ dynamism in the army while in Pakistan concentration on improving personal fortunes and inÂ perpetuating military dictatorship ,kept the military usurpers attention fixed on non military things!In other words no major change or reform was undertaken in both the armies as far asÂ doctrine staff procedures and military organisation were concernedÂ .The armies which fought the 1965Â war were led by men who were the products of the British Colonial heritage. We will examine the influence of British military colonial legacy on Pakistan Army's conduct in 1965 war in the following paragraphs.

British Indian MilitaryÂ Tradition:-Britains power was never based on its army but on its naval powerÂ and superior diplomacy which enabled it to defeat its various European mainland rivals by coalitionÂ warfare.Thus after Marlborough British Army's role in land warfare on European mainland decreased andÂ during the Napoleonic wars Britain's main contribution consisted in naval warfare or in providing financesÂ for sustaining the various coalitions against France than in actual war against France.Thus Napoleon was destroyed in Russia and in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 in which the British Army had no role.EvenÂ Waterloo was a coalition affair in which the Prussians played as major a role as the British.In short theÂ foundation of British supremacy or British power was not military excellence but other factors like navalÂ power,super.ior diplomacy and an overall superior political system.In this sense the British legacy which the

Indo Pak armies inherited was certainly not the finest in the world.But the difference did not end here.The British Indian Army which was the father of the post 1947 Indo Pak Armies was an even more outdatedÂ organisation than the regular British Army.This was so because the regular British Army was designed toÂ fight Britain's European enemies and thus got more attention in terms of finances equipment and was moreÂ vigorously reformed by a concerned parliament.TheÂ British Indian Army which was primarily anÂ internal security army was far more backward than the regular British Army because it was notÂ designed to face any European foe till 1914 except the Russians whose military potential orÂ effectiveness was regarded as far more inferior than Britains West European rivals like Germany andÂ France and which in any case performed very poorly in the Crimean War of 1854-56 and was laterÂ defeated by an Asiatic power in the Russo Japanese War.InÂ terms of equipment the Indian Army as weÂ have already seen was deliberately kept one generation behind the regular British Army whether it wasÂ infantry weapons or artillery (which was taboo for Indians except few mountain batteries in which Indians could serve as common soldiers).The Indian Army was trained as late as 1900 to fight primarily as battalions or brigades against frontier tribesmen. We have already discussed that the First World War forced the BritishÂ to slightly modernise the Indian Army and the massive Indian contribution to the British war effort forced the British to grant the Indians the privilege of Regular commission in the army.The Indians selected forÂ officer rank were from the most loyal classes with proven record of loyalty to the British Empire.Even Indianisation (introduction of Indian Army Officers) was resisted by the British Indian Army officers and asÂ late as 1939 twenty years after Indianisation had started there were just 333 regular Indian officers in theÂ Indian Army as against 3,031 British officers⁶.We have already seen that after 1918 it was felt that theÂ Indian Army would not be required to fight in a European war and this led to massive reduction in the sizeÂ and resource allocation of the Indian Army.Thus the Indian Army was so outdated in 1938 that GeneralÂ Auchinleck observed in 1938 that in terms of modernisation and equipment it was behind even the IraqiÂ Egyptian and Afghan Armies '!There was another serious misconception in many minds and has beenÂ carried forward till today that the Indian Army was the finest army in the world and played a major part inÂ many British victories.There is no doubt that the Indian Army played a significant role in British Empires wars.However it must be remembered,as we have just discussed, that Britains wars right from the time ofÂ Marlborough were coalition wars and British Army's role in these successively became lesser and lesserinÂ this context the Indian Army's share in the relatively limited contribution made by the British Army in bothÂ the world wars was even more limited.In any case the Indian Army was Indian only as far as the rank andÂ file was concerned and its principal strength was its British officer cadre.Even beyond battalion level eachÂ Indian Brigade was stiffened by one pure British battalion and the Indian Army always functioned as part ofÂ a larger team and mostly in circumstances where the British enjoyed a comfortable numerical material and logistic superiority over their adversaries.The Indian Army at its best was used only as a defensive force inÂ France in 1914.TheÂ British final success in both world wars had a deeper connection with US aid andÂ Russian blood than with the Indian Army.In any case the principal force multiplier of the IndianÂ Army was the British officer and the vast resources of the British Empire rather than the Chakwal Jhelum men who were merely cannonfodder.InÂ this regard there was absolutely no comparison betweenÂ the quality of performance of the pre 1947 Indian Army and the post 1947 Indo Pak armies.In PakistanÂ specially it was mistakenly assumed that the British Indian Army didÂ wellÂ because their soldiers i.e. theÂ Punjabi Muslims were more martial than the HindusÂ !These naÃ¯ve commentators failed toÂ seeÂ the essentialÂ fact i.e. that it was the British officer who was able to organise and lead Indians of all nationalities and religions equally well in battle .The cardinal factor in the whole equation was not the martialÂ race,as has been mistakenly asserted by many Pakistani officers, but the white officer who inspired the espirit de corps and the relatively superior organisation skill that created the Indian Army.

Legacy of inter arm compartmentation and rivalry:-OneÂ of the most negative legacies whichÂ inhibited the performance of both the armies in 1965 and even in 1971 was a purely British inculcated andÂ British inherited legacy of inter arm and even inter regimental rivalry within the same arm.While GermanÂ successes in the WW II had a deep link with emphasis on fighting as a division with intimate coopertionÂ between all arms,many British military failures had a deep link with inter arm rivalry which severelyÂ retarded their ability to fight as combined arms teams.Thus at Gazala in 1942 the 2^ndÂ Highland Infantry wasÂ overrun by German tanks "whilst a superior British tank force looked on"⁸

Lack of leadership tradition:--WeÂ have briefly discussed the fact that the West European way ofÂ warfare was imported by many Asian and East European countries like Russia.There was a major differenceÂ between the other countries who imported the European way of warfare and the British Indian Army.WhileÂ the entire officer corps in the Ottoman ,Russian,Japanese,Egyptian and Chinese Armies consisted of their

own people,there was no leadership tradition in the British Indian Army as far as Indians wereÂ concerned.The English East India Company was very careful in not allowing native Indians from becomingÂ officers in their native Presidency Armies and did not allow even Anglo-Indians to become officers afterÂ 1805 barring few exceptions like Colonel Skinner etc.The objective of the company was simple i.e. notÂ letting a leadership tradition grow in the natives and also not to let the natives master the European methodsÂ of warfare.The US War of Independence convinced the British Government that it was dangerous to let anyÂ colonial subjects from mastering the art of warfare by getting the officers commission.This policy playedÂ rich dividends when the native soldiers of the Bengal Army failed to handle units larger than platoons andÂ companies and were easily defeated by the British despite their relative numerical superiority at least in theÂ initial stages of the rebellion.The Sepoy Rebellion reinforced the British determination not to allow Indian toÂ become commissioned officers and till 1919 there were no Indian officers in the Indian Army.This meantÂ that there was no leadership tradition in the Indians who became officers.TheÂ Indians selected to become officers from 1917 onwards were from classes with proven loyalty and men meant to be groomed forÂ lower level command ranks only.After the formation of Indian Military Academy a large proportionÂ of cadets were from the ranks which never attracted the best available young men in India⁹.Many ofÂ these were sons of rankers or VCOs who had spent their whole lives in serving the juniormost BritishÂ officers and had inherited from their family a narrow approach of a life spent in playing sycophantÂ par excellence with the juniormost British officer who was senior to the seniormost Indian VCO in rank and authority.InÂ future analysis this will be referred to as the Ranker/VCO approach which was foundÂ in plenty in the 1965 Indo Pak Armies!Colmar Von der Goltz spoke of the "aristocracy of education" whichÂ constituted the corps of German officersIn India bulk of the real aristocracy had been eliminated when theÂ British emerged victorious.The new aristocracy which they created was an aristocracy of toadies TheÂ German aristocracy which constituted the bulk of the German officer corps was basically an impoverishedÂ aristocracyâ€žbutrich in tradition of contributed many generations of officers to the Prussian/German Army.InÂ Indo Pak armies bulk of the men who reached the officer rank were neither an aristocracy of education norÂ possessed a long tradition of leadership by virtue of having ancestors in the officer ranks!The Germans on the contrary did not encourage NCO to become officers and Von Seeckt the founder of the Reichswehr which was the iron frame of the Wehrmacht deliberately increased educational qualifications to discourageÂ ex NCOs from getting officer rank.Thus in 1928 just 117 out of 4000 officers were ex NCOs In the IndianÂ and Pakistani Armies a much larger proportion of rankers or rankers sons were in the officer rank.Â Contemporary evidence suggests that the British preferred these over directly commissioned Indian officersÂ with good college or university education since the ex rankers or rankers sons who were educated at theÂ military schools of Ajmer Jullundhur and Serai Alamgir (schools for rankers sons education) were moreÂ pliable and easier to handle material^lÂ°!hÂ is not difficult to understand that the small number of IndiansÂ who joined the army as commissioned officers were viewed as a necessary evil arising as a result of a civilian governments policy to accept Indians in the commissioned ranks.These men were not held inÂ much high esteem by their British superiors and viewed the army as just one career where they couldÂ improve their personal lot and as an avenue of social advancement.What leadership tradition could beÂ expected from such mercenaries.The real hero of the British Indian Army was the British officer whoÂ was from the first thirty cadets in the Sandhurst entrance examination, and was fighting for his KingÂ Emperor!His Indian counterpart was just a mercenary for whom serving the British was just a job!

Conservative Military Doctrine:--TheÂ British Army being an extremely snobbish and class conscious army was the bastion of conservatism.There was no threat to Britain in the period till 1933 and militaryÂ reform or radical change was never serious agenda in the British Army.ThusÂ the British Army that fought the WW Two was an out of date machine which performed extremely poorly in France and NorthÂ Africa till overwhelming material superiority,thanks to US aid finally enabled it to turn the tables atÂ Alamein.Thus progressive and dynamic military thinkers like Fuller were sidelined from the BritishÂ Army before the war in an atmosphere where Polo and social contacts were more important thanÂ strict professionalism.ThusÂ theÂ British approach towards warfare was extremely conservative andÂ outdatedÂ .If this was the case in the regular British Army which was supposed to defend Britain in a war against European adversaries it is not difficult to imagine the rudimentary and primitive approach that dominated the British Indian Army which was designed to imperial policing jobs in countries like Iraq andÂ Persia after the end of First World War.

Lack of Permanent General Staff-TheÂ British Army lacked a permanent General Staff unlike theÂ German Army.This wasÂ aÂ serious drawback and played a major role in relatively poor performance of theÂ British Army in the two world wars.Organisationally the British Army was not as efficient in carrying out

military operations as the German Army.Cardwell the revolutionary British Secretary of State and the fatherÂ of reform in the British Army was in favour of having a permanent General Staff like the German Army but was frustrated in his attempts to do so by the conservative elements in the British Army led by Duke of Cambridge" .JustÂ because the British did not have a permanent General Staff,the post 1947 officers ofÂ both the Indian and Pakistani Armies saw no need to have one.Thus Staff work and procedures stayedÂ as poor and rudimentary in both the armies as in the pre 1947 Indian Army or the BritishÂ Army.There was an ocean of qualitative difference in between the British and German StaffÂ institutions of instruction.The British Staff College at Cambrai in words of Montgomery's biographerÂ Nigel Hamilton was an institution preoccupied with "hunting and socialising"¹².The same was the caseÂ with US institutions like Fort Leavenworth where in words of General Bradley to rose to great heightsÂ in the US Army the system of education was "predictable....unrealistic and did not encourageÂ unconventional tactics"Â ¹³In addition while the German General Staff course lasted for three years that atÂ Staff College Quetta lasted for two years and was later reduced to six months from 1940.Most of the seniorÂ officers who held important command and staff assignments in the 1965 war were graduates of this sixÂ months crash course in which entry was by nomination.ln 1965 as we shall discuss many opportunities wereÂ primarily lost because of poor staff work.inÂ words of a British Army officer ; "The British Army lackedÂ an institution which deliberately cultivated and carefully fostered a self-conscious intellectualÂ existence like the German general Staff.For the German Army this institution became the focus forÂ professional debate and a vehicle for operational innovation.The officer corps to which it gave riseÂ received a thorough grounding in military history and an induction into the critical methods ofÂ historical study.These formidable intellectual foundations conferred on the minds of staff trainedÂ German officers a powerful and sensitive analytic approach to the problems of managingÂ violence"^I4GeneralÂ Von Mellenthin who served as a general staff officer in North Africa noted a majorÂ different in the quality of thinking of the British about their staff officers and the measure of trust that wasÂ placed in British Army in the staff officers; "The officers of the German General Staff were not mere clerksÂ or mouthpieces of their commanders (as was the case with British and their corrupted off shoot i.e. the SubÂ Continental Indian and Pakistani Armies) ,but were trained to accept responsibility for grave decisions andÂ were respected accordingly.In contrast the British fighting commanders tend look down on the staff,and the British show a curious reluctance to appoint capable staff officers to operational commands¹⁵.

Orders Oriented BritishÂ Legacy:-Another legacy common to both the Indo Pak armies was an ordersÂ oriented approach.This was the opposite of the German approach of Auftragtstaktik under whichÂ commanders at all levels were trained to function without waiting for orders in case a tactical or operationalÂ situation warranted it and valuable tactical or operational opportunities were being lost in case one waitedÂ for orders from higher headquarters.TheÂ famous British staff officer Dorman Smith observed that ; "Â Essentially in a professional army the commander is left to carry out an order without wet nursing.In the British system,on the contrary a subordinate will do nothing until he will have the next aboveÂ breathing down his neck.The result is that everyone is doing the proper job of of the next belowÂ instead of his own battle job.This is the main cause of stagnation in the British tactical mind"Â ¹⁶.Â The

Indo Pak armies suffered from another subtle drawback in this case.On one hand the British wereÂ conservative in attitude towards orders and secondly Indians till the second world war were mostly veryÂ junior officers barring few exceptions who commanded companies or battalions or one who commanded aÂ brigade.TheÂ Indian was fighting the White Man's war and took no interest in exercising his initiativeÂ Â always pursuing a safe course of waiting for orders.The same bunch of people who fought the secondÂ Â world war constituted the Indian and Pakistani armies who fought the 1965 war from LieutenantÂ Colonel onwards.These men as subalterns and captains or majors were not trained to take missionÂ Â oriented decisions,nor were they motivated to risk their career by exercising any initiative since theyÂ were fighting the white man's warlA large number of them like MusaÂ Tikka etc were ex rankers whoÂ Â were even more limited and conservative in their typical "ranker approach".Thus when these menÂ became brigadiers and major generals they expected the same from their juniorsJt was the case of aÂ habit getting instilled and internalised as an essential part of ones personality.Thus manyÂ opportunities were lost since all commanders from squadron/company till divisional level preferred toÂ Â wait for orders rather than do anything on their own initiative.GulÂ Hassan's memoirs is full ofÂ examples of approach of senior Pakistani officers using the weight of their rank and intimidating theirÂ juniors by use of court of inquiries and warnings!AnyoneÂ who is keen to know about the "ConspiracyÂ against originality boldness and initiative" should read General Gul Hassans " memoirsÂ which though otherwise not Â wholly accurate provide an excellent image of the attitudes of senior officers of that time as regardsÂ cultivation or rather discouragement of initiative!

Analysis continues.This is just a part of the 120 page chapter on analysis.

AND WHAT WE IN PAKISTAN HAVE . A CULTURE OF BIAS ETHNICITY FAVOURITISM AND PAROCHIALISM

THAT IS IF THERE IS AN ARMY CHIEF FROM PINDI , PREFERENCE IS TO PINDI DISTRICT ,IF A PASHTUN KAKAR WAS CHIEF ANY ONE THAT HIS FAVOURITE FROM NWFP WANTED COULD BE DONE ! MUSHARRAF FAVOURING HIS MOHAJIRS !

NO DOUBT A STONE AGE STATE !

A PROOF IS A BELOW ARTICLE WITH QUOTES FROM MY ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN LEADING PAKISTAN ARMY JOURNALS Â

What was wrong with Assessment of Officers and Military Training-Pakistan Army and What continues to be wrong till to date as research indicates

Click on scanned pages pictures to enlarge

Major Agha H Amin (Retired)

Selection and Assessment of Commanders in Pakistan Army-Pakistan Army Journal-Citadel-Command and Staff College

These articles published in military journals of Pakistan Army endeavour to subject the highly defective system of assessment of officers to criticism despite strict censorship.

One must add that some discussion became possible in the army only after 1988 when General M.A Baig took over .

In the Zia era , with intellectual honesty buried and hypocrisy and sycophancy being hallmark of the army for 12 long years (1976-88) this was impossible.

After 1998 once Brigadier Riaz took over as DG ISPR the situation improved.

Three editors of Pakistan Army Journal were outstanding , all in succession , i.e Colonel I.D Hassan (a chronic bachelor and very cereberal and well read) , Lieutenant Colonel Syed Ishfaq Naqvi (outstanding) and Lieutenant Colonel Syed Jawaid Ahmad (soft spoken but bold as far as publishing articles and extremely knowledgeable).

In the command and staff college there was Lieutenant Colonel Ashraf Saleem (later lieutenant general) , Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Khan (now lieutenant general) and Lieutenant Colonel Ahsan Mahmood (now major general) , all three were well read and had a high intellectual calibre particularly Tariq Khan.

After these three the pedants came and pedants and the conformists off course are in preponderance !

I would say the assessments that I made in faulty and fallacious assessment of military commanders continue !

If Tariq Khan became a three star it was a triumph of destiny over a thoroughly rotten system !

But then we must remember that Moses survived in Pharohs palace and finally overcame the Pharoah !

This unfortunate country Pakistan needs a Moses , a man who purges this rotten country !

If not , then I dont have the least doubt that Pakistan will be destroyed ! It will cease to exist as a country ! This is my conviction !

This country Pakistan has no soft solutions !

If Pakistan has to survive it will have to go through night and blood ! And the blood of the elite !

WHEN ORDERS SHOULD BE OBEYED AND WHEN DISOBEYED OR MODIFIED AS SEEN IN MILITARY HISTORY-MARCH 1991

On the first page a question is raised " if selection and assessment system in an army is realistic" .

There was a big question mark in 1991 when I wrote this , it remained when I retired in December 1993 because the army then was run on whims and likes and dislikes and no one bothered how good an officer was in real command and intellectual ability ! I fear that the large gaps and question marks remain to date ? The very Kargil operation proves that an overambitious man with myopic strategic vision like Musharraf can rise to the highest ranks ,shamelessly abandons bodies of soldiers and then proclaim Kargil as his greatest success ! One could see an ambitious man in him in 1993 , who was obsessed with self projection ! I had asked Lieuenant Colonel Ashraf (then CO 46 Field and my platoon commander in PMA , also GSO 1 , 14 Division what he thought of Musharraf his brother gunner officer .Ashraf an outstandingly honest and straight man hailing from Kalar Saidan near Pindi stated " what can you make of a man who uses generator of his locating unit for his house "

No one in kargil had the courage to point out that the operation was a wild gamble ! Brigadier Simon confided that that General Tauqir Zia was against it but then Tauqir Zia never gave his dissent ?

PROBLEM WITH MILITARY TRAINING , MILITARY EXERCISES AND ASSESSMENT OF OFFICERS

A real soldier in the peacteime environment of jee hazoori and yes man ship hardly has any chance of being promoted ! True in 1992 when I wrote this and true today ! Can Pakistan afford t