The 1971 War in West Pakistan-A Strategic and Operational Analysis

The Western Theatre in 1971

A Strategic and Operational Analysis

A.H AMIN

January 2002


ALL MAPS ARE CONCEIVED AND DRAWN BY A.H AMIN IN JANUARY 2000 AND PUBLISHED IN JANUARY 2002 IN DEFENCE JOURNAL , KARACHI.



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The Western Front in 1971 War has not received the due attention that it deserved from the point of view of lessons learnt and generalship in action. The obvious reasons for this reason lie in the fact that the East Pakistan crisis was the focus of attention and the surrender a Dacca was too large an historical event!


The war on the Western Front is an invaluable study in terms of strategy, operational leadership and battle tactics. The future reorganisation of Pakistan and Indian Army was done based on the experiences of 1971.Historical BackgroundThe 1965 War produced a major change in both Indo-Pak armies.


In Pakistan Army the two key lessons derived from 1965 War were to have more infantry and to have intermediate higher commands between units and brigades based on the corps rather than the division command concept.


Till 1965 Pakistani GHQ had naively hoped that division headquarter was a suitable level of operation command.

Thus in 1965 Pakistan Army had just one corps headquarter and all other formations were divisional headquarters which functioned under higher command of the GHQ.This concept of organisation had broken down in Khem Karn where the main Pakistani attack of the war was launched.

Further there had been lack of cooperation between the armoured and infantry division in this battle since no higher corps headquarter was controlling both the divisions and the infantry and armoured division commander had a personality clash.


The Pakistani GHQ now firmly decided to iron out these contradictions and created three more corps headquarters i.e Headquarter 2 Corps to control/coordinate Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division and its sister infantry formation, Headquarter 4 Corps to control operations of the 10 and 11 Division in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and Eastern Command to command the troops stationed in East Pakistan.


Organisationally the Pakistan Army was now on a sound footing, but this process was soon derailed since political developments, threw the entire post-1965 reorganisation to winds. Developments in East Pakistan in 1971 forced the Pakistani GHQ to move its strategic reserves i.e 9 and 16 Divisions to East Pakistan.These divisions had been raised in 1966-68 soon after 1965 War.




This necessitated the raising of two more divisions to take the place of the reserve divisions sent to East Pakistan i.e the 33 and 37 Divisions.


The 23 Division was raised at Jhelum in June-July 1971 to look after the Chamb-Dewa area thus reducing the 12 Division of the burden of looking after a 200 mile plus area of responsibility.18 Division was raised at Hyderabad to look after the 560 mile stretch between Rahimyar Khan and Rann of Katch.


The Indians also drew significant lessons from 1965 War and increased the number of formations protecting their line of communication between Pathankot and Jammu and in giving greater importance to the hitherto neglected area south of Sutlej starting from Sulaimanke. In addition the Indian High Command keeping the political developments in East Pakistan changed its 1965 Strategy of attacking West Pakistan in strength and decided to launch their major attack on East Pakistan from early 1971.


To do this Indians had to use three corps i.e 2,4 and 33 Corps. Pakistani Forces and Plans-Western TheatreTill 1965 Pakistan Army keeping in view its equipment and training was relatively superior to the Indian Army. India under Nehru was a peaceful country but the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 transformed the whole scenario.


Thus while Indian Army had by and large registered no major expansion since 1947 after 1962 the Indians embarked on a highly ambitious expansion programme.It was Pakistan’s good luck that in 1965 this process was at a very rudimentary stage, however by 1971 the whole strategic scenario had changed from 1965.Indian Army as it stood in 1971 was much stronger vis-a-vis Pakistan Army as compared with the situation of 1965.


Fazal Muqeem was thus not wrong when he stated that “with the almost daily expansion of the Indian Armed Forces since the 1965 war, it had become economically impossible for Pakistan to keep pace with her. The policy of matching Indian strength with even 1/3 or 1/4 in numbers had gradually gone overboard. Under these circumstances all that Pakistan could do was to avoid war with India and to strive to resolve her disputes through political and diplomatic means”.1

The only problem with this quote is the fact that, at that time i.e. the period 1965-71 no one at the helm of affairs was ready to think so realistically and rationally!

Fazal’s wisdom is the wisdom of hindsight, expressed some two years after Pakistan Army had fought the disaster and humiliating war in its history and Pakistan was dismembered into two countries.


Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan took over as the army’s Chief of General Staff and thus Principal Staff Officer to the C in C soon after the 1965 war.

In words of Fazal Muqeem a sharp observer and one who was not lavish in praising anyone “planning had taken a turn for the better when Major General Yaqub Khan became the Chief of General Staff”.2

However, Muqeem adds that the army’s war plans in the post-1965 era were still vague about “what action should be taken in West Pakistan if an attack was mounted against East Pakistan”.3


The two statements somewhat contradictory prove that although planning improved Yaqub did not give a concrete answer or plan to solve Pakistan’s strategic dilemma.

Although no archives have been declassified Fazal Muqeem who had access to various highly classified documents by virtue of being secretary defence armed with semi-official mandate from the then prime minister to write a book on 1971 war states that the plan of mounting a counter-offensive from the Western Theatre centred around “a corps with an armoured division and two infantry divisions” ......while “remainder of the army was to perform mainly a holding role”.




The most significant aspect of the army’s main plan of attack i.e when to launch the attack as per the then Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan Army,General Gul Hassan Khan was left undecided.5 Muqeem states that “There appears to have been a heated discussion on the timing of launching a counter-offensive”.




There were two schools of thought here i.e one who favoured an immediate counter-offensive in relation to any Indian invasion of East Pakistan while the second a procrastinating one maintained that counter offensive should commence only after completion of preliminary operations to fix and divert the attention of the enemy.6


PAKISTANI WAR PLAN IN THE WESTERN THEATRE




Pakistani plan in the Western Front was as following:—


Preliminary/Fixing Operations:—


a. 12 Infantry Division at Opposite Poonch.


The aim was to force the Indians to reinforce Poonch thus weakening their other formations in 15 Corps and 1 Corps areas of responsibility,thus improving chances of success of 23 Division in Chamb and a possible counter attack by 6 Armoured Division in Shakargarh-Sialkot area.


b. 23 Infantry Division in Chamb Sector.


Not allowing the Indians to exploit a jumping area opposite Pakistan’s soft underbelly and crucial North-South line of communications passing via Gujrat.

This division was allotted two additional infantry brigades (111 and 66) an independent armoured brigade(2 Armoured Brigade) for the task.111 Brigade was a reserve brigade while 66 Brigade originally belonged to 17 Division.


c. 18 Division Opposite Jaisalmer-Longanewala.


It was hypothesised that this attack would attack Indian armour southwards thus making Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Divisions task in Ganganagar area easier. Another aim of this attack was to protect the vulnerable Pakistani North-South road link which was just about 65 kilometres from the border in this area.


d. 105 Independent Infantry Brigade Group opposite Fazilka.




This was essential to ensure the safety of the most crucial Sulaimanke Headworks which was just about 1500 metres from the international boundary.




Main Attack-Counter Offensive




a.     Attack with 1st Armoured Division and two infantry divisions (7 and 33) opposite Ganganagar-Anupnagar.




b.     This force after crossing the Bikaner Canal (Gong Canal) opposite Bahawalnagar was to capture Bhatinda and then swing north to possibly threaten Ludhiana. Candeth the Indian C in C Western Command was of the opinion that the main objective of this Pakistani attack was to cut the road Ferozpur-Ludhiana and then isolate/eliminate Indian garrison at Ferozpur.7

The Pakistani official historian Shaukat Riza in line with the pedantic sub continental tradition of hiding what is no longer relevant even two decades after an event states nothing about aims/objectives of this grand counter offensive in his monumental “The Pakistan Army-1966-71”.


Formations in Holding Role

a. 12 Division in Kashmir except in Poonch Sector.

b. 23 Division in Hill Sector North of Dewa.

c. 8 and 15 Division in Sialkot and Shakargarh Bulge.

d. 10 and 11 Division in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.

e. 18 Division in all sectors except Reti-Ubauro.

f. Northern Area Scouts in Northern Areas.




Formations tasked for Counter Penetration or Counter attack Role:---




a.   6 Armoured Division less two armoured regiments detached to command 2 Independent Armoured Brigade Group under command 23 Division in Chamb and 17 Infantry Division less one infantry brigade detached under command 23 Division in Chamb to counter attack in Ravi-Chenab Corridor when ordered.

Both formations were under command Headquarter 1 Corps and were also army reserves.

2 Independent Armoured Brigade Headquarter was given two units of the 6 Armoured Division i.e 11 Cavalry and the newly raised 28 Cavalry.2

 Independent Armoured Brigade Headquarter had been raised following a wargame held in August 1970 which had concluded that “Pakistan had insufficient reserves for a reasonable counter offensive”.8




b.    8 Independent Armoured Brigade stationed in general area Pasrur and tasked to carry out various contingency counter-attack or counter penetration tasks when ordered by Headquarter 1 Corps.

8 Armoured Brigade had been raised based on findings of a wargame held in August 1970 by withdrawing integral armoured regiments from some infantry divisions.




c.   3rd Independent Armoured Brigade stationed in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor under command Headquarter 4 Corps was tasked with various contingency counter attack plans of counter attack/counter penetration.

15 Lancers one of the units of this brigade was assigned the responsibility of looking after the line of Sutlej River from Kasur till north of Sulaimanke.




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