Pakistans Greatest General in Offense
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MAJOR GENERAL EFTIKHAR KHAN , HJ AND BAR , SITARA I PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN
ITS A STRANGE COUNTRY WHOSE GREATEST GENERAL IS A NON MUSLIM BELONGING TO A PERSECUTED MINORITY AND ITS GREATEST SCIENTIST ALSO A NON MUSLIM BELONGING TO THE PERSECUTED MINORITY !
NOTE THAT THE PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER AND LAW MINISTER WHO MADE THEM NON MUSLIMS AFTER 1973 WERE NOT MAD MULLAHS BUT BRITAIN AND BERKELEY EDUCATED SECULAR STATESMEN AND BARRISTERS !
THESE MAPS ARE CONCEIVED AND DRAWN BY A.H AMIN ENTIRELY ORIGINALLY AND ANY ONE WHO REPRODUCES THEM MUST SEEK PRIOR PERMISSION.HOWEVER NOTHING GOOD IS EXPECTED FROM INTELLECTUAL DISHONEST CHARACTERS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN !
The Battle of Chamb
1971
A.H Amin
January 1999
The Battle of Chamb of 1971 stands out as the finest display of an offensive battle in the Indo-Pak operational scenario. Symbolically speaking it was this battle which sustained the morale of the army in West Pakistan and provided much needed credibility to sustain and preserve the armyÕs image in the wake of the traumatic events of December 1971. The Indians justly described it as Òthe most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 warÓ. (refers page.488-the Indian armour history of the Indian Armoured Corps -1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi). It is ironic that Third World countries study Napoleon and Slim when they have great military commanders like Eftikhar, Akhtar and Abrar. The Battle of Chamb of 1971 was an epic feat of arms. Even today it stands out as one of the most instructive battles of all three Indo-Pak wars in terms of operational strategy, small unit actions, handling of armour and above all as a supreme example of the power of personality and leadership in war.Any student of the art of war who wishes to understand the Indo-Pak way of war will find the battle complete in terms of valuable insights and thought-provoking lessons connected with leadership, strategy and tactics. Above all the Battle of Chamb convincingly proves that the major part of pitfalls and drawbacks which inhibit many Third World armies are more connected with leadership morale and conceptual hangovers and have little connection with material factors like equipment or simple numerical inferiority or superiority.
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS
THE BATTLE GROUND
Chamb had become a household name in Pakistan in 1965, thanks to the famous Operation Grand Slam and General Akhtar Hussain MalikÕs lightning advance towards Akhnur. In 1965, however, it was a much easier place to enter since its importance had been realised by the Indians only shortly before the war started.
Thus in 1965 Chamb was held only by an independent Infantry Brigade while in 1971 it was held by an Infantry Division which had been heavily fortifying and improving its defences since 1965, keeping in view the lightning Pakistani advance in this sector in 1965.The sector is bounded by the ceasefire line/international border in the west and south while a range of hills constitutes its northern portion running roughly in an east west line.
Some ridges, however, jut downwards from this range of hills and run along a north south alignment, most prominent of these being the Phagla Sakrana Bridge which perpendicularly cuts the main road/approach to Chamb from west and provides good defensive positions like Point 994 etc. Average relative height of Phagla Sakrana Ridge was 60 to 70 feet and it ran south till a place called Jhanda. The most prominent and tactically most important ground in the entire sector were two ridges known as Mandiala North and South.
These two ridges dominated Chamb and the bridge over River Tawi 2 miles north of Chamb. No attacker advancing towards Chamb or planning to attack the bridge or to bypass Chamb from the north and cross River Tawi could be successful unless these two ridges were captured. Both the ridges ran in a roughly north west-south west direction and were parallel to each other. Both were 60 to 70 feet high. Mandiala North ran along southern bank of Sukh Tao Nullah from its bend near village Kahni till a round hill near 200 R. The southern ridge dominated the town of Chamb and the Tawi bridge. River Tawi and Sukhtao Nullah were the two main water courses running from north to south.
Sukhtao Nullah was a tributary of Tawi and joined it a little north of the Tawi bridge. In the summers River Tawi was a partial tank obstacle with a wide bed steep banks with crossing places at Chhanni Chamb and Mandiala. In the winters, however, tanks could cross the river after recce. There were, however, boggy patches on both sides of the river south of Chamb. (Refers-page. 498-Indian Army after Independence-Major K.C. Praval-Lancer International-New Delhi-1987 and the Indian Armour-Maj Gen. Gurcharan Singh-earlier quoted-page 488).The Tawi was spanned by a bridge built after the 1965 war about 2 km north of Chamb. Average width of Tawi was 150-300 yards (Refers-discussion of the author with various participants of the 1971 operation from 11 Cavalry, 28 Cavalry and 19 Baluch) and was roughly 7 to 8 kilometers east of the ceasefire line/international border.
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The area from the border in the west till Akhnur may be described as a funnel which is wide at its western entrance and gets progressively narrower by virtue of closer successive proximity of lines of hill on the north and the River Chenab to the south. Thus the defendersÕ task became easier as an attacker advanced eastwards from Koil to Jaurian and to Akhnur making any outflanking operation more and more impracticable by virtue of high hills on the north and the unfordable River Chenab to the south. All the ridges in the area followed a north south alignment with a ridge and a nullah (dry water course) alternating each other approximately every 1000 to 2000 metres all the way from the international border till River Tawi making the defenders task easier and the attackers task extremely arduous and time consuming. Most of the area was covered by 8 to 10 feet high grass and wild shrubs and was sparsely populated. The continuous line of hills on the north, however, made the gunners task very easy and this was true specially for area around Chamb Mandiala and Kamali Chappar. Thus a large proportion of casualties were caused by artillery fire.
The most dominating and high features in the sector were however in the north i.e. the red hill lalaea etc. These were however away from Chamb and were of local significance. Their loss or possession had no connection with the advance towards Chamb or Palanwala in direct terms. The main metaleed roads in the area were road Koil-Chamb running from Koil on the border till Chamb and two metalled roads east of Tawi i.e., Akhnur-Jaurian) Chamb and Akhnur-Kalit Mandiala which were parallel the former being south of the latter.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING FORCES
In 1965 Pakistan enjoyed technical superiority over the Indian armour by virtue of having technically superior US Patton tanks. In 1971 this was no longer the case since the Indian army possessed the Russian T-54/55 tanks and the Patton was no longer the best tank in the subcontinent. In 1965 the Indians had a squadron of French AMX-13 tanks in Chamb as compared to two Pakistani armoured regiments in the initial phase. Thus the situation in 1971 was radically different from 1965.
The Indian 10 Infantry Division had been deployed in Chamb since 1965. The Indian units in Chamb knew the area like the palm of their hand and had made extremely thorough preparations for its defence. In 1965 the newly raised headquarters 10 Indian Infantry Division had arrived in Akhnur from the south on 28 August 1965. It is ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. It is ironic that today the common man is not aware that the odds in Chamb in 1971 were much more tough against a successful attack than in 1965. The Indian Military Historian exhibited great intellectual honesty when he rightly said Ã’In 1965 the Pakistanis had succeeded in capturing Chamb with a surprise attack.
There should have been no surprise in 1971 but they succeeded again). (Refers-page 494 the Indian Army after independence -Major K. C. Praval-earlier quoted).The Indian 10 Infantry Division had four Infantry Brigades (14 battalions, two regiments of armour i.e. 9 Deccan Horse (T54) 72 Armoured Regiment (T-55), 2 independent armoured squadron ex-Central India Horse (AMX-13), two engineer battalions, six regiments of artillery (two medium, three field, one light).
The division also had a para-company and a company of ATGM of entac ATGMs. Two BSF battalions manning the border were also under command 10 Division. The Pakistani 23 Division was a five Infantry Brigade Division, however, its fifth Infantry Brigade i.e. 7 AK Brigade (three battalions) was facing largely the 25 Indian Infantry Division deployed north of 10 Indian Division. Thus against 10 Indian Division the Pakistan 23 Division could field four infantry brigades (13 battalions).
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The Pakistani artillery consisted of four field regiments, one field battery, two mountain batteries, one medium battery, a section of heavy guns. The most formidable force multiplier for the Pakistan Artillery, however, was Brigadier Naseerullah Khan Babar who compensated for lack of sophisticated Russian guns on part of the Pakistani artillery.
The 23 Division had two armoured regiments i.e. 26 Cavalry which was its integral armoured regiment (Sherman 11) 11 Cavalry which was placed under command in October 1971 (T-59) was also placed under command. In addition Headquarters 2 Armoured Brigade was also placed under command in end October 1971.Outwardly it appears from the above mentioned information that 23 Division was superior only in terms of armour vis-a-vis the 10 Indian Division. However in actual fact it was vice versa.
All Indian tanks in both the armoured regiments were T-54/55 which were slightly superior to T-59; whereas only 11 Cavalry and 28 Cavalry possessed T-59 while the 26 Cavalry and 12 independent squadron were equipped with the obsolete Sherman 11/M-36/B-2 tanks of world war vintage. Further 28 Cavalry had just 31 tanks. In total 23 division had 129 tanks out of which 55 Sherman 11/M-36/B2 were largely ineffective in operational terms; leaving some 74 T-59 against some 90 T-54/T-55 tanks. Thus though slightly numerically inferior in numbers i.e. 129 versus 104; the Indians were qualitatively superior as far as armour was concerned. (Refers-The Battle of Chamb- Lt. Col Saeed- (GSO-I 23 Div in 1971- P.13 Army Education Press-1979).
In addition the Indian T-54/55 tanks possessed pads ammunition firing capability which was not available as far as the Pakistani T-59 tanks were concerned. The T-54/55 gun had a far superior stabilisation system.In artillery there was relative parity; Pakistan having 130 guns of all calibres while the Indians possessed 126 guns which could have possibly been increased to 144 guns if 19 Brigade Artillery of the neighbouring Indian 26 Division also extended fire support to the 10 Infantry Division.
Three Pakistani battalions i.e. 42 Punjab, 47 Punjab and 33 FF were only 8 to 9 months old. The AK regiments were also not as well trained as the regular infantry. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page.2). On the Indian side the 72 Armoured Regiment was a newly raised regiment having been raised in Ahmad Nagar in July 1971. (Refers-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page. 412)It is significant to note that even General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu has acknowledged the fact that T-59 and M-36 Shermans were far inferior to Indian tanks technically in his history of Indian Armoured Corps.
Thus General Gurcharan stated ÒA major weakness in the Pakistan army at the time was the state of its armour ... The Americans had stopped military aid after 1965 war to both India and Pakistan. The step did not materially affect IndiaÕs capability but Pak armour was seriously handicapped ... she had to resort to alternative sources and imported 225 T-59 tanks from China but the number was not large enough to replace her aging fleet ... Sherman tank destroyers etc. were by 1971 becoming obsolescent. Even Chinese T-59, the latest in the Pak inventory were a Chinese version of the Russian T-54 which the Soviets had discarded and replaced by a much improved T-55 version. (Refers-page 425-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted).
SIGNIFICANCE OF CHAMB SECTOR
The area of Chamb was regarded as territory of crucial significance by both India and Pakistan. For the Indians its defence was of paramount significance since it was the direct approach to the Indian jugular vein of Akhnur Bridge which lay on the main Indian line of communication to the Indian 25 Division holding Poonch and all area west of Pir Punjal Range in Kashmir. Capture of Akhnur by Pakistan could lead to an easy advance towards the Jammu Srinagar Road at least theoretically, although in 1971 the Pakistan army was in no position to carry out such an ambitious offensive.
The Indians based on their harsh experience in 1965 i.e. the lightning Pakistani offensive towards Akhnur were firmly resolved to pre-empt any Pakistani move towards Chamb by resorting to an offensive operation into Pakistan territory from Chamb.The Pakistani military planners on the other hand perceived the Indian position of Chamb as a springboard from which the Indians could launch a swift counterstroke into the soft underbelly of Pakistan and sever the main Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road; which was just 35 to 40 miles from the Indian held territory of Chamb. The Pakistani fears about Indian designs were further compounded by the fact that unlike the area south of River Chenab there was no water obstacle in between Chamb and the main Pakistani line of communication i.e. the Grand Trunk Road running north to south though the towns of Kharian, Lalamusa and Gujrat; all three of which were within striking range of Chamb.
THE BATTLE PLANS
THE INDIAN PLAN
There was some difference of opinion among the various Indian commanders at various levels regarding the proposed Indian design of battle in Chamb. The GOC Western Command General Candeth wanted to initially fight a governing troops withdrawal battle from the border till River Tawi to wear down and exhaust the expected Pakistani attack on Chamb; followed by a change of posture and a deliberate Indian counter attack which would push the attacking Pakistani troops backwards.
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The Indian counter attack was based on employment of a complete Independent Armoured Brigade with three armoured regiments (8th Light Cavalry, Central India Horse, 72 Armoured Regiment) one mechanised infantry regiment (7th Grenadiers) and a fourth Integral Armoured Regiment of 10 Division i.e. the Deccan Horse.
The plan visualised having just one infantry battalion west of Tawi assisted by a tank squadron. The plan was based on the assumption that complete surprise would be achieved by rafting all three armoured regiments of the 3rd Armoured Brigade across the Chenab. (Refers-the western front- Lt. Gen. K. P Candeth-Allied Publishers Delhi 1984-page-75). (refers-history of the Indian armoured corps earlier quoted page-483). It appears that by November 1971 the Indian General Headquarters lost the nerve to launch this formidable plan which keeping in view the great Indian numerical superiority in tanks; had the potential to seriously jeopardise 23 DivisionÕs operational position at worst and at best ensure that Chamb stayed in Indian hands. However by November 1971 the Indian GHQ prevailed upon Candeth to not to resort to the initial unorthodox and bold plan and instead follow a typical Indo-Pak compromise plan of holding territory west of Tawi in strength.
It appears that both the GOC Western Command Candeth and the Corps Commander 15 Corps General Sirtaj Singh were obsessed with launching an attack and did not take the Indian GHQÕs orders to stand on defensive till ordered otherwise. According to Major K. C. Praval this information reached the HQ 10 Indian Division only on the evening of 01 December; primarily because of lethargy in passing down information (refers-the Indian Army after Independence earlier quoted-page. 495). There is an apparent divergence in the accounts of Candeth and Praval and it is obvious that it was not lethargy in passing down orders but overconfidence in the impregnability of their position on account of superior numbers which led the Indian command to underestimate the offensive potential of the 23rd Division.
THE INDIAN PLAN WAS AS FOLLOWING:--
1. Area west of Tawi to be initially held by two brigades i.e. the 28 Brigade holding the hill sub-sector i.e. area Dewa Red Hill Laleal etc. The 191 Brigade to hold area west of Tawi and to the south of 28 Brigade in strength with three battalions holding area west of Tawi and one battalion east of Tawi supported by a tank squadron ex-Deccan Horse and ATGM company with the following dispositions:-
a. 5 Sikh holding area south of Laleali-Dewa and Mandiala.
b. 4/I Gurkha Rifle in the middle holding area Mole and Phagla.
c. 5 Assam defending area Barsala-Jhanda-Munawar and the Darh crossings over Tawi.
d. 10 Garhwal east of Tawi in area Chhati-Tahli Hamirpur.(Refers: The Western Front:- Page 76 and History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Page. 483)
2. 52 Infantry Brigade east of Tawi in area Kalit Troti with be prepared orders to occupy defences on East Bank of Tawi in case of a Pakistani attack and defend the southern approach i.e. Line Hamir Pur-Chati-Tali which was at the moment thinly held on extended frontage by 10 Garhwal. This brigade was also designated to advance into Pakistan territory along with 68 Indian Brigade in case of an Indian offensive mounted inside Pakistan territory from Chamb.
3. 68 Brigade was not deployed fully/partially unlike the other infantry brigades and was held in reserve along with 72 Armoured Regiment to either defend Chamb or Akhnur area as a reserve force or to be prepared to launch the projected Indian offensive inside Pakistan territory.
4. According to K.C Praval the 15 Corps plan was to use 10 Infantry Division to advance along the north bank of Chenab river towards Tanda-Gujrat while 26 Infantry Division was to advance south of River Chenab towards Sialkot. (Refers the Indian Army after Independence-earlier quoted-page. 493).
It appears that Candeth did have grandiose plans of advancing inside Pakistan as amply seen from PravalÕs previously quoted account of 15 Corps plans. However, since Candeth wrote his book more than a decade later he wisely disassociated with his earlier plan and we donÕt find any of what Praval stated in his book about 15 Corps plans in CandethÕs book.5. The RHQ of Deccan Horse was located east of Tawi at Kachreal.
Its A squadron was tasked to cover the approaches to Chamb from the south and west and was located west of Tawi River under command 191 Brigade.
B squadron was located at Kachreal along with the RHQ, C Squadron was tasked to cover the southern approach and was located in the 10 Garhwal area east of Tawi river.
The regimentÕs CO was wounded in an accident and the regiment was commanded by its 2/IC during the entire operation. (Refers-The History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page.483)6.
The Indians had full intentions of launching an offensive and for this reason had left a gap in between the area Barsala- Jhanda which was only covered by a dummy minefield. They had also left a similar gap in the area south west of the southern crossing places near the 20 Pakistan Brigade area. Later on this gap in between Barsala and Jhanda greatly facilitated the advance of the armoured brigade towards Chak Pandit. (Refers - the History of the Indian Armoured Corps-earlier quoted-page-483).
THE PAKISTANI PLAN
The Pakistani GHQ had given GOC 23 Division the primary task of clearing the enemy held territory up to River Tawi. (Refers-PakistanÕs Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal -i- Muqueem Khan, National Book Foundation - Islamabad-1973-page-197.)We have seen that terrain in the northern part of the sector was more hilly and broken than in the south. Before the war started there was a school of thought that the ideal line of advance into Chamb was from the south i.e. from north of Tanda.
However, according to General Fazal-i-Muqeem, General Eftikhar had rejected this idea. The GeneralÕs rationale for doing so was that although in the north terrain was bad; this fact was balanced by the fact that in the south the enemy was much stronger and there was a greater chance to surprise the enemy. (Refers-PakistanÕs Crisis in Leadership-earlier quoted-page.197).
The key idea of General Eftikhars plan was that once Mandiala bridge was captured; the Indians would be forced to abandon Chamb and all area west of Tawi; since the loss of the bridge would outflank their entire position west of Tawi and render it untenable.
In brief 23 Division plan was as following:-1. 66 Brigade and 111 Brigade to secure lodgement in the area between Mungawali-Khalabat Jhil in the north and Ghogi in the south. This lodgement would result in the breakup of the main line of Indian forward defended localities and provide own armour with a firm base for breakout at first light.
This operation was to commence at 2100 hours 03 Dec and the lodgement established by first light on 04 December 1971.2. 11 Cavalry Group comprised 11 Cavalry, a squadron of 26 Cavalry, 4 Punjab, one company 19 Baluch (Recce & Support), 24 field company engineers were to breakout from area Manawanwali in the northern part of the lodgement and advance towards Mandiala cutting road Dewa Mandiala at Kamali Chappar and to secure the home bank of Tawi in Mandiala area on night 4/5 December 1971. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quoted-page-15).
11 Cavalry (old P.A.V.O) Group was theoretically under Command 66 Brigade but practically speaking as we shall see later 66 Brigade HQ had little control if any on the battle fought at Mandiala.3. 111 Brigade to carry out offensive probe towards Chamb and Chak Pandit and draw enemy reserves. On 05 December 111 Brigade was to advance and capture Chamb.4.
Following the capture of Chamb; the 66 Brigade and the 111Brigade were to clear the entire salient up to west bank of Tawi.5. Operations across Tawi were planned but no fixed plan was made and the future plan to do so was to be in relation to the operational situation later. (Refers-Battle of Chamb-earlier quotedÑ page-15).6.
20 Brigade in the south was to hold ground in the south, to make attack demonstrations in area Burjeal-Manawar and Nadala enclave. According to the divisionÕs GSO-I the primary task of the 20 Brigade was to hold ground against a possible counter offensive of the enemy in the southern half of the salient. (Refers-Ibid-Page-15).
Later on once the main attack of 66 and 111Brigade in the north had succeeded; the Brigade was to advance northward as far as possible capturing Jhanda Manawar etc.7. In the north opposite what the Indians called hill sub-sector there were two Pakistani brigades i.e. 4 AK Brigade and 7 AK Brigade.
The GOC correctly appreciated that no major fighting would take place in this area.8. The HQ 2 Armoured Brigade was assigned 12 Independent Armoured Squadron, 13 AK Battalion, 28 Cavalry (A surprise arrival which joined the division after last light 04 Dec), and a company R & S. It may be noted that 13 AK was Reserve Battalion of 7 AK Brigade but had been ordered to march south on 02 December to be part of the main attack in the south as part of 2 Armoured Brigade.
CONDUCT OF BATTLE
THE INITIAL ATTACK AND THE BATTLE OF MANDIALA
The initial two days of the Battle of Chamb proved Moltkes famous saying that no plan survives on contact with the enemy. 66 Brigade started its attack after the preparatory bombardment which had commenced at 2020 hours 03 December and by 0200 accomplished its task of capturing an area of 3000 yards depth. Thus a lodgement area wide enough for 11 Cavalry Group to break out was secured. 111 Brigade, however, failed to accomplish its assigned task to capture a similar 3000 yards deep objective south of 66 Brigade.
It was held up by an enemy company in Moel area.Meanwhile the Indians who had been alerted by the preparatory bombardment took the following counter measures:-
a. Deployed three tank troops of ÒAÓ Squadron Deccan Horse in areas Barsala, Jhanda and Munawar respectively in order to cover the southern approach to Darh crossings on the Tawi.
b. The fourth troop of the A/M Squadron was kept as reserve in depth.
c. The RHQ of Deccan Horse moved to Chamb close to 191 Brigade Headquarters from Kachreal. Two troops from ÒBÓ Squadron Deccan Horse previously east of Tawi were sent to border posts at Moel Add Paur where Pakistani tanks had been reported on the evening and night of 03 December. Squadron Headquarters of ÒBÓ Squadron was deployed along with two troops in depth at Barsala.
d. One troop of ÒCÓ Squadron which was supporting 52 Brigade was detached and sent to defend the Mandiala crossing. (Refers-History of Indian Armour-Page-484)These counter measures taken on night 03 December illustrated that the Indians expected the attack in the south, since no armour was sent to cover the Dewa Mandiala approach.
Meanwhile 11 Cavalry Group had commenced its advance towards Mandiala and by mid-day was reported by Indians in area Gurha on track Mandiala-Dewa. HQ Indian 191 Brigade correctly sensed the threat posed by 11 Cavalry tanks to Mandiala and at 0900 hours ordered Deccan Horse to reinforce the northern axis.
Thus two tank troops of Deccan HorseÕs ÒBÓ Squadron were sent to Phagla and Mandiala ridge respectively. The remaining two RHQ Deccan Horse were sent to take position at Gurha north west of Mandiala.
The sheer Indian desperation may be gauged from the fact that the two RHQ tanks were sent to engage the main enemy attack. At mid-day 11 Cavalry appeared in area Gurha and was immediately engaged by the RHQ Tanks Deccan Horse and B Squadron Deccan Horse tanks at Mandiala.
The Indian tanks were deployed in extremely dominating positions and within few minutes 11 Cavalry lost 7 tanks. It is best in a battle account to quote the enemy and this is how the Indian historian of the Indian armoured corps described the traumatic but epic battle of Mandiala:-
"About mid-day 11 Cavalry made its appearance in area Gurha ... RHQ tanks had selected their position well and within a few minutes knocked out 7 T-59 tanks and two recoilless guns ... 11 Cavalry less a squadron had, however, followed a route further north along the bed of Sukhtao Nullah. 191 Brigade must have been unaware of this thrust. Enemy tanks appeared behind Mandiala north and Gujha ridge along the Nala bed and destroyed a ÒBÓ Squadron tank in Mandiala. They also shot up the squadronsÕ echelons dispersed in the foothills. By three P.M. 11 Cavalry had captured Mandiala north but could not secure the crossing held by a troop of tanks from ÒCÓ Squadron, Deccan HorseÓ. (Refers: History of Indian Armoured Corps-Page-485)
11 Cavalry had suffered heavy casualties on 04 December i.e. 5 tanks destroyed and 9 men killed and 7 wounded. In total 11 tanks were hit.4 Punjab occupied Mandiala north.Meanwhile 28 Cavalry had been assigned to 23 Division and had reached area Assar on the evening of 03 December. 66 Brigade which was supposed to overall control 11 Cavalry operations was stuck up at Phagla and was in no position to provide any infantry support to 11 Cavalry or to control its operations.The 111 Brigade which was supposed to have captured Chamb by 05 December was still near the border many miles from Chamb.
A situation entirely unexpected had thus developed. General Eftikhar, however, remained unruffled and resolute and adopted the following modified plan:-a. 11 Cavalry to go into Leaguer behind Gura and to rest, replenish and recuperate. Resume attack on Mandiala after replenishment.b. HQ 4 AK Brigade along with 6 AK and 13 AK to establish a bridgehead east of Tawi after last light 04 December capturing high ground east of Sahamwan.c. 28 Cavalry to breakout from the Bridgehead secured by 4 AK Brigade at first light 05 December to capture Pallanwala and advance as eastwards as possible.d.
11 Cavalry to stay in reserve on 05 December 1971.e. 66 Brigade to move forward, and follow 11 Cavalry groups advance and close up to River Tawi.f. 111 Brigade and 20 Brigade to continue as per initial battle plan.Meanwhile by mid-day 04 December the Indian commander was clear about the main direction of Pakistani attack.
Thus the Deccan Horse was reinforced by one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which joined Deccan Horse by the evening of 04 December. In addition one squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment and 7 Kumaon (68 Brigade) were despatched from Akhnur to launch a counter attack to recapture Mandiala north.
The regiment along with C Squadron 72 Armoured Regiment, however, reached the east bank of Tawi after last light 04 December and immediately lost its Commanding Officer due to Pakistani artillery shelling along with 4 other officers of 7 KumaonÕs O Group.
Thus the battalion being rendered leaderless could not be immediately deployed. Since it had reached Tawi after last light its mission was changed to take up positions on the east bank overlooking Mandiala crossing. On 04 December only the para company of 9 Commando was guarding Mandiala crossing and Mandiala crossing was only saved, thanks to the tenacious courage of the 5 Sikh and the tank troops of Deccan Horse which were holding Mandiala south.It may be noted that by the evening of 04 December the B Squadron of 72 Armoured Regiment which had been placed under Command Deccan Horse was deployed west of Tawi; two troops on the Phagla ridge facing west and north west and the Squadron Headquarters and two troops in reserve at Chak Pandit.
THE 4 AK BRIGADE ATTACK ACROSS TAWI 04/05 DECEMBER 1971
4 AK Brigade was assigned 13 AK and 47 Punjab minus a company for the attack across Tawi. One squadron of 26 Cavalry and 12 Independent Squadron which had only 4 tanks available was also under command 4 AK Brigade.
The 4 AK BrigadeÕs attack plan was as following:-a. 6 AK and 13 AK to launch night attack across Tawi; 6 AK on the left and 13 AK on the right. Both the battalions were to capture Spur Feature.b. Two companies of 47 Punjab and one squadron 26 Cavalry under command RHQ 26 Cavalry and one company 47 Punjab were to be held in reserve.
It may be noted that there was literally no enemy in front of 4 AK Brigade, 7 Kumaon still lost due to loss of its CO and O Group and just one Indian para company holding the Chamb Mandiala bridge. At night it appeared that only a miracle could save the Indians.4 AK Brigade had been alerted to launch the attack from 1000 hours 04 December.
Later the subject attack was postponed from 1800 hours 04 December to 05 December 0400 hours. Both the 6 AK and 13 AK were well aware about their tasks in the planned attack. However, somehow at the appointed time the CO of 6 AK failed to join the unit to lead it into the approach march to the forming up place since he had lost his battalion. (Refers-the Battle of Chamb Col Saeed-pages 42 and 43).
13 AK, however, launched the planned attack at 0300 hours 05 December. 13 AK ran into the Indian unit 9 Jat and dispersed it and advanced forward to capture its objective i.e. Spur Feature. However, no unit was supporting it and the Indians in its rear reorganised themselves and surrounded the brave battalion in the morning.
Elements of 5 Sikh, 9 Jat now surrounded 13 AK organised a breakout back to own lines but lost heavily losing 26 men killed and 50 wounded including its brave CO Col.
Basharat Raja who was taken prisoner.During this whole confusion 4 AK Brigade HQ passed back the information that both its battalions had captured the Spur Feature and ordered its reserve i.e. elements of 26 Cavalry and companies of 47 Punjab to move forward and consolidate the bridgehead.
Basharat Raja who was taken prisoner.During this whole confusion 4 AK Brigade HQ passed back the information that both its battalions had captured the Spur Feature and ordered its reserve i.e. elements of 26 Cavalry and companies of 47 Punjab to move forward and consolidate the bridgehead.
When these moved forward the Indians who had by now reoccupied their defensive positions.Candeth the Indian GOC western command acknowledged 13 AKÕs performance in the following words:-PakistanÕs 13 AK Battalion had by then succeeded in capturing the bridge (Mandiala) but their attempts to get their tanks across was thwarted by 9 Horse ... Taking advantage of the gap caused by absence of 7 Kumaon 13 AK Battalion got through to the gun positions of 39 medium and 216 medium regimentsÓ.Refers-The Western Front-Candeth-Page-79
As per the Indian account the situation of utter panic caused by 13 AK attack was only checked by personal intervention of Commander Indian 68 Brigade who in words of Praval Ã’reached the scene on the morning of December 5 with a company of 9 Jat mounted on two troops of tanks from 72 Regiment 5 (Refers-Indian Army after Independence-page-497). Absence or presence of commanders can be decisive in crisis situations.
The previously mentioned Indian accounts prove that 4 AK Brigade attack across Chamb had the potential to cause a major crisis in the Indian position, provided 4 AK Brigade Headquarters had exercised control on the battle like fighting from the front like Commander 68 Brigade who joined the battle all the way from Akhnur. Once compared with General Shaukat RazaÕs account of the 4 AK Brigade the Indians sound very different; Shaukat Raza had the following to say about 4 AK Brigade:-ÒBy first light 5 December Brigade Major 4 AK Brigade confirmed capture of Bridgehead over River Tawi.
The information was premature. Enemy positions had been reinforced. As our troops neared Tawi the Indians counter attacked with tanks, our troops hurriedly withdrewÓ. (Refers-the History of the Pakistan Army-Shaukat Raza Services Book Club-1990-page-182).
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