Blog Pakistans Flawed Afghanistan Outlook

Pakistans Flawed Afghanistan Outlook

Posted by Author on in Blog 49

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VIEW: Pakistan's new Afghanistan outlook —Syed Talat Hussain

 

By Major Agha H Amin (Retired)


 

AUTHOR HISTORY OF PAKISTAN ARMY FROM 1757 TILL 1971,SEPOY REBELLION OF 1857-59 REINTERPRETED,DEVELOPMENT OF TALIBAN FACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN-A GEOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNT (ALONG WITH OSINSKI AND DEGEORGES)

 

The upcoming visit to the US by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani — only partly related to the strategic dialogue process that the Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi is heading — will afford him the opportunity to most comprehensively detail Pakistan's security interests before the entire spectrum of the US leadership. The army chief will have one-of-a-kind bilateral engagement that would cover not just operation plans in Afghanistan but also the peace regime in South Asia.

TALAT HUSSAIN

WHILE PAKISTANS FOREIGN MINISTER DOES NOT CONTROL A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF PAKISTANS FOREIGN POLICY,I.E THE AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA POLICY ,THUS THE VISIT OF PAKISTANS ARMY CHIEF TO USA FOR THE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE.
 
AGHA H AMIN
 
 
 

 

STRATEGIC WOULD BE A BIT INFLATED SINCE IN REALITY PAKISTAN DOES THE TACTICAL GARBAGE COLLECTING FOR USA

AGHA H AMIN,MAJOR ® (BOLD BLACK UNDERLINED)


Specifically on Afghanistan, it should not surprise anyone if General Kayani and his military assistants speak their minds about the situation in a manner that is jarring to some ears in Washington. Pakistan's security establishment is sensing a widening opportunity in Afghanistan to have a greater, louder voice. It is far more confident and clear about the centrality of role in its vast backyard than ever before, and is likely to use this important forum in Washington to state its case.

PAKISTANS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT HAS SURVIVED AND THRIVED BECAUSE OF AFGHANISTANS WARS.FIRST FROM 1979 WHEN THE PAKISTANI MILITARY JUNTA OF GENERAL ZIA WAS AN UNDOUBTED POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ORPHAN AND SECOND AFTER 9/11 WHEN THE MUSHARRAF MILITARY JUNTA WAS AGAIN AN ILLEGITIMATE JUNTA RULING A BANANA REPUBLIC OR LETS SAY A WALNUT OR A KADOO REPUBLIC

HOW CAN TALAT HUSSAIN LABEL AN INDEPENDENT STATE WITH A GREAT HISTORY AS PAKISTANS BACKYARD ! SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT INDIA MAY CALL AFGHANISTAN ITS BACKYARD !

HOW CAN PAKISTAN OR FOR THAT MATTER ANY COUNTRY BE ALLOWED TO HAVE A LOUDER VOICE IN AFGHANISTAN.ONE MAY SUGGEST THAT THE AUTHOR IS HINTING TOWARDS HEGEMONISM.

ONE MAY STATE THAT AFGHANISTAN CAN PROVE TO BE PAKISTANS ACHILLES HEEL RATHER THAN ANY OPPORTUNITY.
 
AGHA H AMIN


This case is shaped by the new realities informing Pakistan's Afghan policy, which, in more ways than one, is different from the policy of physical and proxy engagement of the 1980s and the 90s. The first and most visible change can be illustrated by recalling two terms from the days of the British Raj in the Subcontinent: the 'forward policy' and its opposite, the 'closed border policy'.
 
TALAT HUSSAIN

After 1872, the British administration, fearing that instability in Afghanistan might cause the Russian influence to spread into the realm of their influence, became hands-on in dealing with the affairs of the lands that now form Balochistan and NWFP. They were involved in pretty much everything that happened there: from the feuds among the sardars to their resolution, from the goodwill of the Khan of Kalat to its relations with the local population; and from building alliances and dispensing patronage in the borderlands to the favourites while punishing those who resisted control.

THE BRITISH FORWARD POLICY WAS MAINTAINED RIGHT FROM 1850S RATHER THAN 1872 AS ASSERTED BY SOME ANALYSTS.NOTABLE BEING BRINGING KALAT IN BRITISH SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN 1854-56 AND THE TREATY OF 1857 WITH AFGHANISTAN.

Pakistan treaded the 'forward policy' path in the 1980s and the 90s and the result was a border with Afghanistan that, aside from historical reasons, became a complete thoroughfare for militant activity and covert operations. This has now changed, and effectively Pakistan is now pursuing the equivalent of the 'closed border policy' of the British, which had argued for softer control through more deliberate interaction, but never leaning too much towards the northwest.

THE PAKISTANI MILITARY JUNTA OF ZIA WITH THE STATED AIM OF JIHAD AND THE ACTUAL AIM OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL CHOSE TO FOLLOW A POLICY OF ACTIVE INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTANS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AS A US AND SAUDI PROXY.

For Pakistan, the Pak-Afghan border has acquired a new and added sanctity and strategic significance. While Islamabad continues to wield influence, it is doing so from the baseline of a well-demarcated and tightly controlled border, marked by miles-long ditches, hundreds of check-posts and regular patrolling with the help of horse-mounted sentries and gun-ready vehicle-borne paramilitary troops. This is a huge shift from the days when a deliberate attempt was made to erode the borderlines and allow the monitoring along this long stretch in the northwest to become non-operative.

PAKISTANI STATE REDISCOVERED THE SANCTITY OF AFGHAN BORDER AFTER IT WAS BADLY SHAKEN BY A TRIBAL WAR IN ITS FATA AND BLAMED INDIA AND ISRAEL AND EVEN USA AND NATO FOR DOING WHAT PAKISTANI MILITARY JUNTA AND ITS CIVILIAN REMOTE CONTROLLED REGIMES WERE DOING IN AFGHANISTAN FROM 1978 TO 2001 I.E AIDING PROXIES CALLED MUJAHIDEEN  IN ORDER TO DESTABILISE AFGHANISTANS DE FACTO GOVERNMENT.

The present comprehensive border planning, whose implementation is going to speed up in the coming months, would not have been possible without the Pakistani state's practical writ getting extended to these areas. FATA operations have allowed the Pakistan Army to physically occupy this strip of Pakistan's land. The US surge in the south of Afghanistan has forced the Pakistani military establishment to enhance its border footprint in Balochistan.

ONE IS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTANDING WHICH COMPREHENSIVE BORDER PLANNING DO SOME PAKISTANI ANALYSTS TALK ABOUT REFERRING TO THE AFGHAN PAKISTAN BORDER WHEN THE ENTIRE PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN BORDER OF SOME 800 KM PLUS FROM ZHOB TILL KOH I TAFTAN IN BALOCHISTAN HAS NO PAKISTANI TROOPS AND TALIBAN FREELY MOVE BACK AND FRO FROM AFGHANISTAN.PRACTICALLY PAKISTANI MILITARY HAS NO FOOT PRINT IN NORTH BALOCHISTAN AS FAR AS PASHTUN AREAS ARE CONCERNED ND QUETTA HAS BEEN REFERRED TO AS BACKYARD OF KANDAHAR AND HELMAND TALIBANS, ALSO KNOWN AS GOOD TALIBAN IN SOME QUARTERS IN PAKISTAN.

THE FATA OPERATION OF PAKISTAN ARMY HAS IN NO WAY ATTACKED THE VAST BULK OF TALIBAN FIGHTING THE US AND NATO FORCES IN KANDAHAR HELMAND ZABUL AND FARAH , EXCEPT POUNDING LOCAL PAKISTAI TALIBAN FIGHTING ONLY AGAINST PAKISTAN ARMY.

The impact of these two factors on Pakistan's Afghan policy needs to be properly understood. For the first time in 62 years of our history, Pakistan's security policy makers are in a position to plan and execute strategies in the northwest from a position of actual strength and real life presence on the border. This changes almost entirely the previously available range of options open to them. In the past, the absence of a functioning force in control of the contours of the border required the establishment to extensively rely on shady interlocutors. Religious parties, their madrassa affiliates, local khans, thugs and fixers for rent became strategically relevant.

IT IS DEBATABLE TO STATE THAT PAKISTANS MILITARY PRESENCE IN FATA IS A POSITION OF STRENGTH WHEN ALL ALONG FROM OPERATION CURZON IN 1948 TILL 2001 PAKISTANS TRIBAL AREA WAS A VIRTUAL BACKYARD OF THE PAKISTANI STATE AND WAS USED OR MISUSED AS A MAJOR LOGISTIC AND OPERATIONAL BASE TO SUPPORT PAKISTANI PROXIES KNOWN AS MUJAHIDEEN FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN FROM 1978 TO 2001.

THE PRESENT PAKISTANI MILITARY PRESENCE IN FATA IS A RETROGRESSIVE STEP WITH NO VICTORY IN SIGHT FOR PAKISTAN AND A LOGISTICIANS NIGHTMARE FOR PAKISTANI MILITARY.

AS A MATTER OF FACT THE PAKISTANI STATE HAS BEEN BOGGED DOWN IN TWO MAJOR INSURGENCIES IN ITS FATA AND BALOCHISTAN SINCE 2003.TWO INSURGENCIES WHICH HAVE LITTLE CONNECTION WITH THE VAST BULK OF TALIBAN ACTUALLY FIGHTING THE US AND NATO FORCES IN AFGHANISTANS SOUTH.

Also, intelligence officials, whose covert presence and influence was used as a substitute for actual control of the border situation, became policy drivers, whose agendas sometimes second-guessed and surpassed those of their bosses sitting in Islamabad. And, finally, the Taliban had a free run in carving out their zones of influence in and across this entire region. Because Pakistan was not in control of its border, dealing with militarily strong Taliban commanders was not possible. These black holes of the past have increasingly disappeared ever since Pakistan's forces have advanced to the country's northwestern borders, hoisting the national flag that previously flew only in name. The Pakistani establishment is increasingly confident of its ability to make policies that are purely its own and are not derailed by interlocutors or hijacked by intelligence operatives who think themselves super patriots and pretend to know the world better than anybody else.

IT'S A FALLACIOUS ASSERTION WHEN SOMEONE STATES THAT PAKISTAN IS IN CONTROL OF ITS ENTIRE WESTERN BORDER WHEN PAKISTANS PARA MILITARY FC HAS A LESS THAN RUDIMENTARY PRESENCE ON PKISTANS 800 KM BORDER WITH AFGHANISTAN FROM ZHOB TO KOH I MALIK SIAH AND PAKISTANS REGULAR ARMY HAS A NEAR ZERO PRESENCE ON THIS BORDER.



It is this determination that actual control of a situation brings which is informing the new confidence General Kayani and his military assistants have as they set out for Washington. They think they can make things happen and can prevent things from happening far more directly and decisively than before in the northwest of Pakistan. But still they will have a lot of talking to do in the US. The country's media elite is caught in a time warp. Farid Zakaria of Newsweek and CNN fame proved last week that the best selling is not always factually the most compelling. In his opening remarks to the interview of Richard Holbrooke, US's ageing czar on Afghanistan and Pakistan, he admitted that there is a "shift in the approach of the Pakistani military". But he levelled the admission to the ground with the second part of his sentence. "How big a shift, we don't know, but it is a shift..."

THE ROLE OF PAKISTAN IN A FUTURE AFGHANISTAN MAY NOT BE CENTRAL OR DECISIVE AS THE PERCEPTION IN AFGHANISTAN REMAINS THAT PAKISTAN SUPPORTS A CERTAIN PART OF AFGHANISTANS SOCIETY REFERRED AS GOOD TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN.THESE REGARD THE NON PASHTUNS , SHIAS AND ISMAILIS AS SECOND RATE CITIZENS.SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT HOW CAN PAKISTAN ALONE CALL THE SHOTS WHEN IRAN,RUSSIA,CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND INDIA SEES PAKISTANI PROXIES IN AFGHANISTAN AS PART OF THE PROBLEM RATHER THAN A SOLUTION.PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA MAY BE IMPORTANT PLAYERS BUT THEY ARE NOT THE GODS OF AFGHANISTANS GEOPOLITICS.

Unfortunately, analysts like him who sit thousands of miles away from the subjects and areas they build their expertise and fame on, are still determining the discourse in the US about Pakistan's policy in this region, which, in essence and in form, has changed much more than the world realises.

THIS IS NOT THE  VIEWPOINT OF AN ANALYST SITTING THOUSANDS OF MILES AWAY BUT ONE WHO IS BASED IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE 2003 AND HAS TRAVELLED ALL 36 PROVINCES OF AFGHANISTAN AND HAVE WORKED AS A CONTRACTOR AND SECURITY ANALYST WITH MORE THAN 11 COUNTRIES IN AFGHANISTAN AND HAS USED TALIBAN AS SUB CONTRACTORS ON PROJECTS FINANCED BY THE NATO AND US MILITARY.

 



--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN