islam and islamism today

                ISLAM AND ISLAMISM TODAY:
              THE CASE OF YUSUF AL-QARADAWI

                    by Samuel Helfont

 

 

INTRODUCTION
Many consider Yusuf al-Qaradawi to be the most influential
living Islamic scholar. He is viewed as the spiritual leader
of the Muslim Brotherhood and, as Gilles Kepel, a recognized
expert on Islamic movements, asserts, he "sets the tone for
Arabic language Sunni sermons across the world."[1] He is a
highly controversial Islamist and has attracted considerable
media attention for his support for suicide bombings, his
sometimes draconian views on women's issues, such as
recommending female circumcision, and his approval of
executing homosexuals. Paradoxically he is also known for
his moderate views on certain key issues including: allowing
men and women to study together, endorsing Muslim
participation in Western democracies, and condemning al-
Qaeda style attacks such as 9/11.

His willingness to engage these hot-button issues, as well
as his global influence, makes him a perfect case study for
demonstrating the interplay between Islam and modernity.
Comprehending this relationship is vital for appreciating
how an increasing number of Muslims understand and practice
their religion in a rapidly changing world. This dynamic is
also essential for policymakers because it forms the
foundation of modern Islamist political thought, which has
become increasingly popular throughout Middle East. An
analysis of Qaradawi, as the most influential Islamist
thinker today, therefore offers a unique window into an
ideology that is often difficult to define.

BRIEF BIOGRAPHY
Qaradawi was born in the Delta region of Egypt in 1926.  He
received a religious education and eventually earned a
doctorate from al-Azhar, the most prestigious center of
Sunni Islamic learning.  In the 1940s he became politically
active and joined the Muslim Brotherhood.  He was, and
remains, heavily influenced by the teachings of the Muslim
Brotherhood's founder, Hasan al-Banna.  In the 1960s he was
sent to Qatar as part of a delegation from al-Azhar, which
opened an Islamic university in Doha. At the same time, the
Egyptian regime, led by Gamal abd al-Nasser was cracking
down on the Muslim Brotherhood. Thousands of Brothers,
including Qaradawi, had been arrested, and some had been
brutally tortured or executed. Qaradawi chose, therefore,
not to return to Egypt. He remained in Qatar and has lived
there ever since.

Qaradawi owes much of his influence to his early embrace of
mass media. He began broadcasting religious programming on
Qatari radio and then on Qatari television in the early
1970s.  In the mid-1990s, he took advantage of his location
in Qatar to begin hosting a show entitled "Sharia and Life"
on the fledgling satellite station, Al-Jazeera.  In the late
1990s, Qaradawi also launched two websites: Qaradawi.net and
Islamonline.net.  Both of these sites provide religious
guidance and receive heavy internet traffic.

In addition to his work with mass media, Qaradawi is also
well known as a founder of the wasatiyya movement, usually
translated as either Islamic Centrism, or the Middle Way.
This movement tries to strike a balance between puritans
such as the Wahhabis and the Taliban, and liberal reformers.
For Qaradawi, the puritans are too rigid and the reformers
too radical.

ADAPTING TO MODERNITY
First and foremost, Qaradawi should be understood as a
modern Islamic scholar. In other words, his teachings are
affected by his context where increased education,
communication and migration have amplified the ability of
"the masses" to make life-altering decisions. This reality
has transformed the world Qaradawi inhabits as a scholar and
significantly distinguishes him from his pre-modern
predecessors.

To understand this phenomenon, consider that modern
residents of Cairo, for example, know much more about other
cultures and societies than their pre-modern predecessors.
If they choose, they can act on this knowledge. They can
leave Cairo, immigrate to Europe and live an entirely
secular life, forming a completely new identity. This
option, and others like it, simply did not exist for the
vast majority of Cairo's pre-modern residents. If these
modern residents of Cairo decide not to emigrate, yet they
know it is an option, that in itself is also a choice. As
the prominent German philosopher, Jurgen Habermass has
argued, modernity therefore allows "each person" to "pursue
the ends of his particular welfare."[2]  This point is
extremely relevant to a discussion of Qaradawi because
modern Islamic scholars have had to adapt to an increased
level of agency among the general population. They have
therefore been forced to consider not just theology and
sacred texts, but the desires of modern Muslims who are more
educated and freer to choose what type of life they will
lead. Further intensifying this phenomenon is that alongside
the increased agency of the general population, modern
religious scholars have, to a large extent, lost the backing
of state power to enforce their religious edicts. More and
more, this situation has transformed Islamic law into a
matter of conscience, rather than coercion.

Much of Qaradawi's influence can be attributed to his
embrace of modernity, which has proven very popular among
many Muslims who wish to live modern lives, yet not shed
their Islamic identity. Like other scripture-based
religions, Islam's sacred texts have been interpreted
differently throughout history. Qaradawi's skill in
reinterpreting them to fit the contemporary world has been
vital to his success. He determines what is "Islamic" not
only through considering classical Islamic sources, but also
through considering the situation and needs of modern
Muslims.  This is an important point for policymakers.
Qaradawi's Islamism, and by extension the Muslim
Brotherhood's, is not a static and unchangeable theology
driven by dogma.  Policymakers must therefore avoid policies
that presuppose the Brotherhood's or Qaradawi's positions to
be based on an orthodox and timeless interpretation of
Islam. Such policies would assume that the Brotherhood's
positions are completely inflexible and not worth engaging
or attempting to influence. Nothing could be further from
the truth.

 

 

 

A few examples of how Qaradawi determines what is "Islamic"
should highlight how the Brotherhood's Islam is not dogmatic
or timeless. In his methodology, for example, he will
consider certain Koranic verses and ahadith (sayings
attributed to the Prophet Muhammad - sing: hadith) in a
historical context.  In doing so, he claims that the verses
and ahadith were given in a specific time and place and to a
certain historical community.  This, of course does not mean
they are irrelevant today, it simply requires modern Muslims
to look beyond a strict, literal interpretation. For
example, in one religious edict, Qaradawi quotes the Koran,
Sura 8: Verse 60, which when read literally, praises the
raising of horses for jihad. Qaradawi claims,

That was because horses were the military vehicles then,
which is not the case today, when things have changed
and horses have become no longer significant in fighting
except limitedly in certain areas. Thus, we can say that
today's horses are the tanks, armored vehicles, and such
like military weapons used in wars today. Those who
perfect using them are the cavalry of our age.[3]

So, instead of taking the Koranic verse literally as a
command to raise horses, Qaradawi looks for a principle
behind the verse and then applies it to contemporary
circumstances.  Many Islamic reformers use this type of
reasoning, traditionally called ijtihad.  Some, in fact,
take it much further to justify extremely liberal versions
of Islam.  Qaradawi does not go that far, yet uses the same
methodology. This contrasts starkly with more traditionalist
and literalist interpretations of Islam that insist on
taking the canonical texts at face value.

Another way Qaradawi updates Islamic law is to use widely
known Islamic principles to justify modern practices.  For
example, in an edict justifying Muslim participation in
Western democracies, Qaradawi argues "The true character of
a Muslim as required by Islam obliges him to be a man of
politics. Every Muslim is required to fulfill the Islamic
obligation of commanding good and forbidding evil."[4]  The
injunction to command right and forbid wrong is a well-known
Islamic principle but Qaradawi uses it in a new way.  As
Michael Cook of Princeton University points out in his
definitive work on the subject, forbidding wrong has been
used in a wide variety of ways throughout Islamic history,
but it was primarily directed at other Muslims, not non-
Muslims, and certainly not non-Muslim society.[5] There is,
therefore, little historical precedent in evoking the
principle of forbidding wrong as a justification for
democratic participation in a non-Muslim state.
Nevertheless, forbidding wrong is a well-known principle
that most Muslims recognize as Islamic. It is a useful tool
for Qaradawi in arguing that Islam is compatible with, and
in fact complementary to democracy.

MUSLIMS LIVING IN THE WEST
The last example is typical of how Qaradawi has developed
new interpretations of Islam that appeal to modern Muslims,
and especially those living in the West.  He has also been a
pioneer in developing a new jurisprudence called fiqh al-
aqalliyyat, or the Jurisprudence of Minorities (the
minorities in question are Muslim minorities living in non-
Muslim lands). In this new jurisprudence Qaradawi uses the
traditional Islamic concept of "taysir," often translated as
"facility," to argue that Muslims in the West are weak and
need to be treated leniently with regard to Islamic law,
just as one treats a sick or disabled person.

Qaradawi, for instance, issued an edict permitting a
European woman to remain married to her non-Muslim husband
after she converted to Islam, and he has permitted European
Muslims to take mortgages on houses and small businesses.
Both of these practices were strictly forbidden in
traditional interpretations of Islamic law.

MODERN NOT MODERATE
Though the previous examples have depicted Qaradawi as a
moderate, it is important to understand that his
modernization of Islamic jurisprudence does not always lead
to moderation.  For example, though suicide is forbidden in
Islamic sources, Qaradawi justifies suicide bombings in
Israel, Iraq, and other lands he considers to be occupied.
Though Qaradawi is not the only major scholar to justify
suicide bombings, his rulings break with what was
historically an Islamic consensus on this subject.
Consequently, other influential scholars such as the Sheikh
of al-Azhar, the most important center of Sunni Islamic
learning, and the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia have
criticized Qaradawi's rulings regarding suicide bombings.

Significantly, in each example mentioned, Qaradawi updates
Islamic law because he believes it is necessary for the sake
of the greater Muslim community.  In the case of jihad and
suicide bombings, Qaradawi views what many would consider a
more extreme position as the only way modern Muslims can
defend themselves against the onslaught of the West. On the
other hand, in the case of Muslims living in the West,
Qaradawi sees a situation where if Islam is not updated to
meet the needs of Muslim minorities, he and other scholars
will fail to have any influence on them.

For example, Muslim minorities often find it difficult to
live Islamically acceptable lives in the West, but a
religious edict suggesting Muslims live strictly in
accordance with traditional interpretations of Islamic law
would require Muslims to withdraw from Western society.  As
one of Qaradawi's colleagues has noted, "For the majority,
the question [of withdrawing from society] is irrelevant,
even if it is supported by a religious edict, for the
majority don't bother about its implications. For the
conscious minority, if they accept the fatwa it will mean
the abandonment of those who are in need of protection."[6]
So scholars are left with a decision: either lose large
populations of Muslims to Western secularism or find a way
to accommodate them, thereby keeping them within the fold.
Qaradawi has chosen the latter. This is not a question of
theology, but of priorities and practicality.

This idea of necessity can be understood by looking at an
Islamic law that could easily be reformed, but that Qaradawi
refuses to update.  This is the question of the hijab, or
headscarf, worn by Muslim women.  Qaradawi views the hijab
as compulsory and an injunction based on a literal reading
of the Koran.  In one sermon he asserted that the hijab is,
"not the result of an opinion by jurists or even by Muslims.
It is a Koranic order."  He then quoted the Koran, Sura 24:
Verse 31, stating: "And say to the believing women, that
they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that
they should not display their beauty and their ornaments,
except what (ordinarily) appears thereof; that they should
draw their veils over their bosoms."[7]  As Nikkie Keddie, a
prominent historian and an expert on women's issues in
Islam, has pointed out, this verse does not refer to
covering the hair.  It was only "later interpreted as
meaning covering the whole body, including the hair, and
most of the face." She goes on to state that "This
interpretation is illogical.  If the whole body and face
were meant, there would be no reason to tell women to veil
their bosoms specifically, while the later interpretation of
'adornment' to mean everything but the hands, feet, and
(possibly) the face is a forced one."[8]

So in this instance, it seems that Qaradawi could change the
ruling fairly easily, yet he does not. He sees no need, and
in cases where he does not see a clear threat to Islam, he
refuses to go against the traditional interpretations.
Instead he has harshly criticized the governments of Turkey,
France, and Tunisia for attempting to limit the place of the
hijab in public, asserting that it is a custom protected by
the Declaration of Human Rights as well as modern
constitutions.

Many of Qaradawi's methodologies such as ijtihad, mentioned
earlier, have been used by reform movements throughout
Islamic history, but what makes Qaradawi and his
contemporaries unique is that they are dealing with modern
world realities.  Qaradawi's followers have power to follow
or ignore his religious edicts.  Unlike many pre-modern
scholars, Qaradawi does not have the power of a state to
enforce his interpretations of Islamic law.  His influence,
therefore, relies wholly on the agency of his followers.  To
capitalize on that agency, Qaradawi and other modern
scholars have needed to communicate in new ways when
addressing their increasingly modern audience.  As Muhammad
Qassim Zaman of Princeton University has noted in his book
on modern Islamic scholars, they are, "modern in that their
intellectual discourses are often formulated in terms
heavily indebted to the discourses of the modern age."[9]
Thus, Qaradawi often frames his rulings in terms of
international human rights, and democracy.  He also invokes
women's liberation, resistance to imperialism, and sometimes
even Orientalism. Often his understandings of these subjects
are different from how they are perceived in the West, yet
this type of modern rhetoric is prevalent throughout his
writings and sermons.  He realizes that he must use this
style of discourse to communicate with modern Muslims, who
unlike their pre-modern predecessors, need to be convinced
to follow the scholar's rulings.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
For groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Qaradawi's
thought undergirds their ideology. Therefore, understanding
Qaradawi and how his thought intersects with modernity is
essential for policymakers trying to understand Islamism
today. Two lessons are of special importance.

First, policymakers should not equate modern with moderate.
Some of the most totalitarian movements in the twentieth
century were very modern yet they were far from moderate.
Thus, while Qaradawi's views may be modern compared to the
Wahhabis or other literalists, that does not mean he is
necessarily more moderate when concerning issues such as
suicide bombings. This generally holds true for the Muslim
Brotherhood as a whole.

Second, policymakers should keep in mind that Qaradawi's
views are not a fixed reading of Islamic sources. His
thought gives considerable weight to the lived experience of
modern Muslims and, therefore, reflects the current
situation in the Muslim world more than it does an orthodox
understanding of Islamic texts. In other words, his ideas
are not set in stone. As such, policymakers should
understand that problems associated with Qaradawi's style of
Islamism have more to do with the situation on the ground in
the Islamic world than they do with Islamic theology.
Addressing the issues that are important to Muslims and
improving the situation in the Muslim world will,
consequently, be much more effective than trying to address
Islamism as a coherent ideology.

Finally, because Islamism does not rely on a fixed, orthodox
Islam, policymakers should try to avoid the issue of whether
Islam, or aspects of Islam, impede or facilitate America's
policy goals. Instead they should focus on concepts such as
democracy, education, human rights, and economic issues,
which can be well defined and debated. If the United States
is successful in addressing these issues, it will find that
many of the problems associated with Islamism will also be
alleviated.

----------------------------------------------------------
Notes

[1] Gilles Kepel, Bad Moon Rising: A Chronicle of the Middle
East Today, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (London: Saqi Books,
2003), p. 60.

[2] Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Fredrick Lawrence
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 18.

[3] Yusuf al-Qaradawi, "Raising Horses and Today's Modern
Weapons," Islam Online, March 7, 2005,
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503549564
(July 2, 2007).

[4] Yusuf al-Qaradawi, "Muslim's Participation in US
Political Life," Islam Online, November 4, 2003,
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=Islam
Online-English-Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503543122
(July 15, 2007).

[5] Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in
Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000).

[6] Alexandre Caeiro, "The European Council for Fatwa
Research." Paper Presented at the Fourth and Mediterranean
Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence and
Montecatini Terme (23 March 2003), organized by the
Mediterranean Program of the Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, p. 3-
4.

[7] "Live Sermon from Umar Bin-al-Khattab Mosque in Doha,"
Qatar TV, December 19, 2003.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam:
Custodians of Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2002), p. 8.



--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!