General Mahmuds History of 1965 Suppressed and Mahmud Recompensated with a Job

Posted by Author on February 15, 2010 in Blog 08 49

Army attemps to prevent book sales

The Army has bought all copies of a book written by a former
intelligence chief fearing it may explode the myth victory in the 1965
war with India, a source has said.

* By Amir Mir, Correspondent
* Published: 00:00 October 1, 2006
* Gulf News

Lahore: The Army has bought all copies of a book written by a former
intelligence chief fearing it may explode the myth victory in the 1965
war with India, a source has said.

The source said the General Head Quarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army
bought up 22,000 copies of the book by Lt Gen Mahmood Ahmed, fearing
that its contents could malign its image.

The book titled The Myth of 1965 Victory, which was published by the
Oxford University Press, was found to be "too sensitive" by none other
than the Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf.

The sources said that General Mahmood Ahmed had submitted the
manuscript of his book to the GHQ as per the rules in vogue.

Manuscript

However, after going through the contents, the GHQ referred the
manuscript to General Musharraf who noted on the file that Mahmood
should review some sensitive parts of the book as well as the title
especially use of the word myth in relation to the 1965 war.

As General Mahmood was subsequently suggested some major deletions by
the GHQ, he refused to oblige, saying that it was already in the
printing stage.

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Under these circumstances, the sources said, the GHQ directed the Army
Book Club to immediately buy all the 22,000 copies worth millions of
rupees directly from the publishers to stop it from being marketed.

When some leading distribution houses contacted the Oxford University
Press, they were informed that the book has already been sold out.

Even otherwise, the sources said, there was a binding on the
publishers under a revised contract not to provide it for general
distribution.

The sources said that Gen Mahmood, who is considered a hawkish
pan-Islamist himself, tried to get a few hundred copies for his own
library but could not get permission from the GHQ.

Being a former ISI chief, Mahmood is already at the centre of a
controversy for having quoted former American Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage of threatening to "bomb Pakistan back to stone
age" in September 2001.

Interviews

Musharraf recently made a mention of Mahmood's book in one of his
interviews to foreign press in the US while describing his former
aide's post-retirement activities and referring to it as unpublished
yet.

The sources said Mahmood has already joined the Tableeghi Jamaat after
being relieved of his post-retirement assignment to head Fauji
Fertiliser Corporation

http://gulfnews.com/news/world/pakistan/army-attemps-to-prevent-b
ook-sales-1.258770

========================================

another link by Hassan Abbas, a former Pakistani government official
is now a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University. He is the author of "Pakistan's Drift into Extremism:
Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror"

Mahmood went into a low profile and started working on his favorite
projectÃ¢â‚¬â€a book on the 1965 war. When he finished the work, he sent the
manuscript to GHQ for permission to publish. Interestingly the title
of the work was "Myth of 1965 victory". Musharraf himself looked at
the manuscript and noted on the file that Mahmood should re-consider
the titleÃ¢â‚¬â€especially use of the word myth in relation to the 1965 war.
This was enough of a hint and Mahmood almost shelved the idea of
publishing the book for a while. Mahmood had already requested
Musharraf for a job and thought that he should not annoy Musharraf on
any count. He was rightÃ¢â‚¬â€he did get a job soon. And instead, Musharraf
started working on his book project.
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MEN OF STEEL

Major Shamshad Ali Khan Kaimkhani (Retired)

majshamshad@hotmail.com

25 Cavalry

This was first sent to daily DAWN but they did not have the guts to
publish it on grounds that it involved the president and the army.

The other day I came across a book entitled ,' MEM OF STEEL,'.
President General Mushrraf has graced the book with Foreword while the
preface has been written by General Khalid Mahmud Arif (Retired). The
book is based on war diaries supposed to had been maintained by the
units and the staff or the general (late ) Abrar Hussain who commanded
6 Armoured Division in 1965 on Chawinda sector. I cannot reason out as
to why the book has been published now when the event is forty years
behind at this point of time. As there is nothing in the book that
would have jeopardized the security of the country, it should have
come out immediately after the war. That was the time when it could
provided opportunity to higher command( there is nothing for junior
leaders in the book) to learn from the experience of the one who had
fought the greatest tank battle after world war- II. That would have
saved us of many debacles in 1971 and especially the ones committed in
Sialkot sector on western front The book has five parts. Part three
(25% of the book) is the description of the events on the battlefield
that is of interest to students of military history. 75 % of the book
comprises of background and statistics regarding composition of units
/formations, casualties in men and material on both sides, names of
commanders, list of recipients of gallantry awards, photographs and
such like details.

I feel that late general Abrar Hussain has not authored the book
because he was known to be of the type who would never indulge in such
a travesty. General K.M Arif appears to be the ghost author of the
book.

I was a participant in the events on battlefield mentioned in part 3
of the book and have a different version.

To give authenticity to my narration, which will be diametrically
opposed to the one given in the book, it is necessary to state that I
was directly involved in the events as a troop leader in C squadron of
25 cavalry and squadron commander twice on extreme critical moments on
the battle field. I was face to face with enemy every day throughout
the war. My location from day one had been at Gadgor, Phillorah,
Chawinda and Butter Dogranmdi where the battle was fought. It is
regretted that I did not have the good luck to see a red tab or even a
staff officer on front line during entire war.

From the text of part three it is clear that the general left his
Headquarter, at Bhollowal ten miles behind the front line, for the
first and last time in a helicopter on 11 September in the evening, By
that time our two regiments , Guides and 11 Cavalry, had been badly
mauled.. The right time for the general to leave his HQ was in the
morning when he got the news that 11 cavalry was under pressure. Had
he been at Chawinda at 1100 hours he could have directed and
controlled the efforts of the three regiments and saved the day. By
the evening, while sitting in the caravan, he had launched two more
regiments, Guides and 25 cavalry. Guides was launched at a time( about
1100 hours) when 11 cavalry had retreated and Indians had taken up
defensives position to shoot up Guides who attacked with high spirits
on their first day in action. Some fine men and officers were lost in
this action due to the apathy of commanding officer who launched the
regiment in haste, without artillery and infantry support contrary to
the dictates of terrain.. Lethargy and incompetence of HQ 6 armoured
division resulted in our defeat at Phillorah which was the greatest
tragedy on this front.

As if that was not enough, 25 cavalry was launched at 1600 hours with
a mission to occupy Phillorah track crossing which was reported not
occupied by the enemy. Thanks to our stars and battle experience of
preceding three days that we got away with loss of only one tank when
we hit against enemy defenses at Phillorah at 1700 hours. This is a
classic example how to destroy one's forces piecemeal.

Now a word about the title of the book.

General Musharraf in the introduction of the book has mentioned that
he was proud to be apart of the force called MEN OF STEEL by its
commander. It implies that late general Abrar had ascribed the title
of MEN OF STEEL to his own formation. This never happens, it amounts
to praising oneself. Such an absurdity was not expected of general
Abrar who, I am told , was a different breed.

Titles or honors are always awarded by higher authorities .It was 25
cavalry alone which was referred to as men of steel by General Ayub
Khan during the course of his talk on the eve of his visit to the
regiment immediately after ceasefire, in acknowledgement of our
performance. This had happened on Pasrur airstrip where we were
camping .Army, Naval and Air Chiefs were also present. Since the
president was not to visit any other unit or formation head quarter,
all officers in the area were called at the airstrip.

There are tangible, discernable and universally accepted actions of 25
cavalry on the battlefield that justify the suffix ' men of Steel'
with its' title. The actions precisely and in short are;

1-It was 25 cavalry alone which clashed headlong with an armored
division , north of Fhillorah crossing at 0800 and pushed it back to
Gudgor (2.5miles) by 1200 hours.

2-we attacked, captured Gudgor at 1700 hours and pushed the enemy
further back by three miles to Chobara.,

3- we kept the enemy at bay for another two day with no additional
force in our support. Air support was of course there.

4- On night 10/11 September we were sent to Pasrur for rest and refit
On this point of time we were placed under command 6 armoured division
which had taken over Chawinda sector.

5- At about 1100 hours on 11 September C squadron 25 cavalry found
itself deployed behind Chawinda with a mission to stop the enemy at
all cost that was believed to be advancing behind our force that had
retreated from Gudgor-Phillorah area in the morning. In fact Div HQ
had accepted the loss of Chawinda and therefore we were deployed
behind that town to stop the enemy advance towards Pasror.

After five hours of my insistence that Chawinda was vacant, at 1700
hours we were ordered to advance and occupy Phillorah, which according
to high command was not held by the enemy. What happened later is
along story but it should suffice to say that we hit enemy defenses in
Phillorah where tank to tank battle ensued. In the process our one
tank with crew was destroyed. The skirmish proved to be a deterrent
and the enemy did not advance any further that day.

6- On12, 13,14,and 15 September C squadron along with 3FF was
defending area in the north and up to Jassoran in the west of
Chawinda. It was through this area that the enemy attempted, for four
days, to penetrate but could not succeed.

7- On 16th the enemy launched an armored Brigade to out flank Chawinda
and attacked Butter Dograndi in the rear of that town. They succeeded
because the task force commander (who later retired as Major General
Wajahat Hussain), failed to coordinate with 24 Bde and left Jassoran
unoccupied providing a gap through which the enemy infiltrated and
turned our flank. We suffered heavy losses. Seven tanks were destroyed
including two of 33 TDU. In the evening we attacked Butter Dugrandi
supported by artillery. . Destroyed two enemy tanks and some infantry.
Under very critical circumstances we stopped the enemy at Butter
Dograndi that was determined to reach Pasror that day. Artillery
played effective roll but never fired on enemy tanks with open sights
on that day as mentioned in the book. We never allowed enemy tanks to
reach that close to our gun areas.

8- It was a troop of 25 cavalry and company of 3 FF who again attacked
(without artillery) Butter Dograndi, midway to our main objective
Jassoran, on the morning of 17th and mounted enemy trenches north of
the village. Although we suffered heavy losses and could not reach the
objective, our offensive action forced the enemy to vacate Butter
Dograndi and withdraw to Jassonan in the evening and eventually across
the railway line Chawinda Ã¢â‚¬â€œSialkot.(quoted from official history of 17
Poona Horse that was controlling the operation on Indian side).

9-It was 25 cavalry again, along with 3 Ff who repulsed an infantry
brigade attack on night19/20 September. Although some of their troops
had crossed over the railway line and hit the track behind Chawinda at
milestone 5, our tanks fired from behind railway line and forced the
enemy to withdraw, leaving behind dead and wounded.

Now where does the 6 armour division appear in this scenario? It has
always been a troop or squadron action through out war accept 11
September that was a fiasco .I can confront any one who can prove me
wrong.

Now the story as to how did 6 armored division became'Men Of Steel'.

I served in 6 armored division, of which 25 cavalry was a part , till
September 1971. No one called the Division as men of steel it was only
25 cavalry alone. I was shocked when I visited HQ 6 armoured Div after
Indian captivity in 1974. I saw on the name boards of staff officers
written 'MEN OF STEEL' on top. No body could explain how it happened.
Knowing general K.M.Arif I can say that he is behind this happening
supported by general Wjahat Hossain(retd) who was commanding 6 Armored
Division in 1973-74.

To face the enemy is the professional obligation of a soldier. To be
killed in action, get wounded and fall prisoner is very much a normal
happening in the life of soldier and there is nothing to be proud or
ashamed about it. This ancient and universal concept of soldiering
does not hold good in Pakistan. Here a soldier sitting in trench and
killed by artillery fire can be given gallantry award and also
proclaimed a national hero. A gallantry award is justified only for an
act performed beyond call of duty and in the face of enemy.

Major K.M. Arif never left the Divisional HQ which was 10 miles away
from front line and the Div Commander left only once in the evening of
11 September, as mentioned an the book, when fighting had subsided.
Obviously both of them do not deserve the gallantry award.

Major Khalid .Mahmod Arif ( Later general) was GSO-2 operation of 6
armored division in 1965.

.In 1974 he was a Brigadier and held very powerful position in GHQ.

To justify undeserved gallantry awards that he and the Div commander
had received and also to cover-up the blunders committed by Div HQ, he
floated the word that general Mosa Khan had called 6 armored division
as men of steel at Pasror airstrip. Knowing his vindictive nature
nobody could dare oppose him.

On his signal this word was continuously and systematically given
currency for 20 years. It is possible that he provided documentary
support to this misdeed while he was in power.

It is time that we stopped fabricating and twisting history to serve
the vested interests and record true fact for our posterity.

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In 1999 I wrote my book on Pakistan Army titled Pakistan Army till
1965.When I sent it to various bookshops the shops were threatened to
remove it.One bookshop Mr Books in Islamabad was told by the person
warning him that the binding was not good !

However the book made it to 29 military libraries in the world
including US Army Staff College and War College and Russian Army Staff
College.

Now thanks to scribd it is available free and downloadable for any one
and some five thousand copies have been disseminated.

In February 2010 finally the Edwin Mellen Press has printed my book on
Taliban and Afghanistan which explodes many of the myths and lies
about Afghanistan and Taliban that one may hear in Pakistan.

Destruction and distortion and suppression of history is the norm in Pakistan.

A.H Amin

--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear
of punishment and hope of reward after death." --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN